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ABSTRACT 
 
Although many examples have demonstrated the great potential of a human 
crowd as an alternative supplier in creative problem-solving, empirical evidence shows 
that the performance of a crowd varies greatly even under similar situations. This 
phenomenon is defined as the performance variation puzzle in crowdsourcing. Cases 
suggest that crowd development influences crowd performance, but little research in 
crowdsourcing literature has examined the issue of crowd development.  
This dissertation studies how crowd development impacts crowd performance in 
crowdsourcing. It first develops a double-funnel framework on crowd development. 
Based on structural thinking and four crowd development examples, this conceptual 
framework elaborates different steps of crowd development in crowdsourcing. By doing 
so, this dissertation partitions a crowd development process into two sub-processes that 
map out two empirical studies.  
The first study examines the relationships between elements of event design and 
crowd emergence and the mechanisms underlying these relationships. This study takes a 
strong inference approach and tests whether tournament theory is more applicable than 
diffusion theory in explaining the relationships between elements of event design and 
crowd emergence in crowdsourcing. Results show that that neither diffusion theory nor 
tournament theory fully explains these relationships. This dissertation proposes a 
contatition (i.e., contagious competition) perspective that incorporates both elements of 
these two theories to get a full understanding of crowd emergence in crowdsourcing.  
ii 
The second empirical study draws from innovation search literature and 
tournament theory to address the performance variation puzzle through analyzing crowd 
attributes. Results show that neither innovation search perspective nor tournament theory 
fully explains the relationships between crowd attributes and crowd performance. Based 
on the research findings, this dissertation discovers a competition-search mechanism 
beneath the variation of crowd performance in crowdsourcing. 
 This dissertation makes a few significant contributions. It maps out an emergent 
process for the first time in supply chain literature, discovers the mechanisms underlying 
the performance implication of a crowd-development process, and answers a research call 
on crowd engagement and utilization. Managerial implications for crowd management 
are also discussed.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“When we harness the power of the crowd, we can innovate and iterate on products at a 
pace many manufacturers didn’t think was possible.” 
Jay Rogers, Co-founder and CEO, Local Motors 
Background 
Statistics show that many best global brands (e.g., IBM, Cisco, GE, and Dell) are actively 
applying crowdsourcing to tap into external creative resources in their innovation 
processes (King & Lakhani, 2013; Roth, Pétavy, & Céré, 2015). Crowdsourcing is 
defined as a practice of outsourcing a task to a crowd rather than to a designated contract 
supplier in the form of an open call (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Howe, 2006). The term “a 
crowd” in the crowdsourcing definition refers to a collective of suppliers who are nested 
within a virtual network and share a common focus to solve crowdsourced tasks (e.g., 
product design) (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Forsyth, 2009). For instance, Airbus intended to 
develop a drone that could be used in the last-mile humanitarian logistics in 2016. Instead 
of relying on in-house development or contract outsourcing, Airbus teamed with Local 
Motors1 and crowdsourced this task to Local Motors’ community suppliers by creating 
the Airbus Cargo Drone Challenge. Within two months, Airbus acquired a total of 425 
designs from Local Motors’ community suppliers (Prassler, 2016). 
                                                          
1 Local Motors is an American auto company based in Chandler, Arizona that designs and builds 
customized vehicles through co-creation with community members (Gerth, Burnap, & Papalambros, 2012; 
Randall, Ramaswamy, & Ozcan, 2013). 
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Cases like the Airbus Cargo Drone Challenge demonstrate the great potential of a 
crowd in generating solutions in innovation processes. As many companies adopt 
crowdsourcing to solve their innovation-related problems, the human crowd has emerged 
as a new type of supplier that specializes in providing knowledge in innovation processes 
(Boudreau & Lakhani, 2013). Empirical evidence from the pharmaceutical industry 
shows that the application of a crowd in the R&D domain can be more than 20 times less 
expensive than regular R&D paths (e.g., in-house development or contract outsourcing) 
(Lakhani, Jeppesen, Lohse, & Panetta, 2007; Raynor & Panetta, 2008). Statistics from 
TopCoder2 show that the crowd can often provide Topcoder’s clients with development 
work that is comparable in quality to what they would get by more traditional means but 
at little as 25 percent of the cost (Johns, Laubscher, & Malone, 2011). As such, some 
analysts and scholars anticipate that the human crowd has potential to reshape established 
business processes, redraw organizational boundaries, and change global labor markets, 
thus profoundly disrupting the supply network in the near future (Howe, 2008; Kaganer, 
Carmel, Hirschheim, & Olsen, 2013). 
Research Phenomenon 
Although the human crowd has a huge potential in creative problem-solving, not 
every crowd is always creative and productive (Euchner, 2010; King & Lakhani, 2013). 
Empirical evidence on crowdsourcing from Topcoder shows that the performance of a 
crowd varies even under similar situation. In this dissertation, crowd performance refers 
to the quantitative outcomes of a crowd in crowdsourcing (e.g., crowd productivity 
                                                          
2 A company that administers crowdsourcing contests in computer programming (Archak, 2010). 
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defined as the numbers of solutions generated by a crowd) (Cohen & Bailey, 1997; 
Horwitz & Horwitz, 2007). For instance, Topcoder hosted two programing contests on 
data search web design challenges in August 2014. These two events had the exact same 
payment size (i.e., $2,250) and payment structure (first place: $1500; second place: $500; 
third place: $250) (Topcoder, 2014a, 2014b). The nature of the tasks and the event 
lengths were similar. However, the crowd performance between these two cases were 
significant different: One event had six submissions and the other had no submission 
(Topcoder, 2014a, 2014b). Scholars in the operations and supply chain management 
literature have also identified similar cases on performance variation in crowdsourcing 
(Billington & Davidson, 2013; Sloane, 2012; Tang et al., 2011). The phenomenon that 
the performance of a crowd in crowdsourcing varies even under similar situations is 
termed as the performance variation puzzle in this dissertation. 
Motivations 
Theories that scholars use to explain firm performance variation, such as 
resource-based view (Wernerfelt, 1984), knowledge-based theory of the firm (Grant, 
1996), and relational view (Dyer & Singh, 1998), are at firm level or network level. 
These theoretical lenses are out of scope to explain the performance variation of a crowd 
in crowdsourcing because a crowd in crowdsourcing does not have a formal 
organizational structure (Forsyth, 2009; Reicher, 2001). Suppliers in a particular crowd 
are loosely connected and geographically distributed all over the world with limited 
information visibility. Moreover, because the performance of a crowd varies even when 
firms use the same incentives for similar tasks (Tang et al., 2011), knowledge from 
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motivation literature (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2000) cannot easily explain performance 
variation puzzle in crowdsourcing either.  
Current crowdsourcing literature primarily focuses on the best practices (Guinan, 
Boudreau, & Lakhani, 2013), the conditions facilitating crowdsourcing (Afuah & Tucci, 
2012), individuals’ motivations for participation in crowdsourcing (Brabham, 2010, 
2012), incentive design and its influence on individual performance (Boudreau, Lacetera, 
& Lakhani, 2011; Liu, Yang, Adamic, & Chen, 2014), and winners’ characteristics in 
crowdsourcing (Bockstedt, Druehl, & Mishra, 2015; Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010). A few 
studies on individual performance suggest that crowd attributes have an impact on crowd 
performance (Boudreau et al., 2011; Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010). However, these studies 
provide contradictory findings on how crowd attributes (e.g., crowd size and crowd 
diversity) relate to crowd performance. For instance, Boudreau, Lacetera, and Lakhani 
(2011) found that an increase in the crowd size has a negative influence on solvers’ effort 
and crowd performance due to a reduced chance of winning, but Bockstedt, Druehl, and 
Mishra (2015) identified a positive association between crowd size and crowd 
performance. 
The existence of contradictory findings indicates an insufficient understanding of 
the crowd performance issue. Our literature review shows that little research in 
crowdsourcing literature examines crowd-level performance and explores the factors that 
can explain the performance variation puzzle in crowdsourcing. A lack of research on this 
puzzle creates confusion about crowdsourcing and causes scholars to question the 
application of a crowd in an innovation process (Euchner, 2010; Simula, 2013). Many 
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executives and supply chain managers are thus unable to develop strategies or are 
hesitant to allocate resources to crowdsourcing, resulting in missed opportunities for new 
competitive advantages that might come from engaging crowds (Prpić, Shukla, 
Kietzmann, & McCarthy, 2015). As such, scholars call for research that can help 
organizations better manage, utilize, and organize both internal and external crowds when 
innovating (Felin, Lakhani, & Tushman, 2015).  
Statement of the Problem 
A few case studies on crowdsourcing suggest that the process through which 
firms develop a crowd, defined as crowd development, influences the operational 
processes of a crowd which, in turn, have a potential impact on crowd performance 
(Guinan et al., 2013; King & Lakhani, 2013). However, relatively little research describes 
how to develop a crowd more effectively and efficiently, despite a growing popularity 
and reliance on the human crowd in practice (Wooten & Ulrich, 2017). We thus do not 
know how crowd development works and how it explains the performance variation 
puzzle in crowdsourcing. Therefore, the grand research question we study in this 
dissertation is:  
How does a crowd development impact the performance of a crowd in 
crowdsourcing?  
Dissertation Design  
To answer the above grand research question, we divide this dissertation into 
three closely related parts that include one conceptual framework development and two 
empirical tests. From structural thinking perspective (Molm, 1990; Ralston, Blackhurst, 
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Cantor, & Crum, 2015), we first develop a double-funnel model based on four crowd-
development examples to address the deficiency of no framework on crowd development 
in existing crowdsourcing literature. We use this model to describe the detailed process of 
crowd development, which includes crowd initiation, crowd formation, crowd realization, 
and crowd evaluation. This framework partitions a crowd-development process into 
crowd emergence and crowd evaluation, which maps out two empirical studies that 
examine the influence of event design on the emergence of a crowd and the performance 
implications of crowd attributes.  
The first empirical study in this dissertation examines the relationships between 
elements of event design and crowd emergence and the mechanisms underlying these 
relationships. In this study, crowd emergence is defined as the arising of unexpected 
growth rate and crowd size in a crowd development process (Dooley & Corman, 2002; 
Holland, 2000). One rationale behind this study is current crowdsourcing literature lacks 
studies examining the influence of event design on crowd emergence. Both scholars and 
professionals thus have no reported knowledge on how to manage crowd emergence in 
crowdsourcing. Another reason is that scholars suggest two mechanisms to explain crowd 
emergence: competition mechanism from tournament theory (Connelly, Tihanyi, Crook, 
& Gangloff, 2014; Lazear & Rosen, 1981) and contagion mechanism from diffusion 
theory (Rogers, 2010; Strang & Soule, 1998). These two mechanisms offer different 
predictions on the relationships between elements of event design and crowd emergence. 
We thus took a strong inference approach (Davis, 2006; Platt, 1964) and developed 
alternative hypotheses on the relationships between elements of event design and crowd 
emergence. Our regression analysis based on 734 observations shows that neither 
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competition mechanism based on tournament theory nor contagion mechanism based on 
diffusion theory fully explains crowd emergence in crowdsourcing. Based on our 
empirical findings, we propose a contatition (i.e., contagious competition) perspective 
that incorporates both elements of these two theories to get a full understanding of crowd 
emergence in crowdsourcing.  
The second empirical study is designed to address the performance variation 
puzzle by analyzing the performance implications of crowd attributes (i.e., crowd size 
and crowd diversity). In this study, we attempt to explain some contradictory findings 
related to the performance implication of crowd attributes (Bockstedt et al., 2015; 
Boudreau et al., 2011), and resolve the confusion about the mechanisms underlying the 
relationships between crowd attributes and crowd performance. Some scholars argue that 
a competition mechanism based on tournament theory explains the relationship between 
crowd attributes and crowd performance (Boudreau et al., 2011), while others suggest 
that a search process based on innovation search literature explains the performance 
implications of crowd attributes (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010). 
These two mechanisms offer different explanations for how crowd attributes relate to 
crowd performance, providing us another chance to develop alternative hypotheses. We 
test our theory by using secondary data collected from a crowdsourcing platform 
company through web crawling. Results demonstrate that crowd attributes explain the 
crowd performance variation puzzle and that some relationships are not linear but 
quadratic, suggesting the complication of crowd performance. Our empirical findings 
also indicate that the competition mechanism plays a majority role in explaining the 
relationships between crowd attributes and crowd performance, but we need to consider 
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the search mechanism due to the significant interactions between these two mechanisms. 
We thus propose a competition-search view on the performance implications of crowd 
attributes.   
Contributions 
This dissertation contributes to the current crowdsourcing literature and supply 
chain field in several significant ways. First, it maps out an emergent process in supply 
chain literature by proposing a double-funnel framework on crowd development. This is 
the first time in crowdsourcing and supply chain literature to describe this new process 
and to explore the performance implications of this process. This dissertation thus fills a 
void in crowdsourcing and supply chain literature. The proposed double-funnel model 
has significant implications for scholars and supply chain managers. For scholars, this 
framework advances academic understanding of supplier development from a controlled, 
deliberate perspective in outsourcing literature to an emergent, unsystematic perspective 
in crowdsourcing. It also provides a framework for scholars to explore crowd 
development from many other lenses like system dynamics. For managers, this model 
offers a holistic view on engaging with a crowd in the innovation processes through 
adjusting elements of event design.  
Second, this dissertation uncovers the contatition mechanism that underlies the 
relationships between elements of event design and crowd emergence. This contatition 
mechanism indicates that the crowd emergence based on suppliers’ interactive 
participation follows neither a full competition process as suggested by tournament 
theory (Connelly et al., 2014; Lazear & Rosen, 1981) nor a full contagion process as 
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implied by diffusion theory (Rogers, 2010; Van den Bulte & Stremersch, 2004). Instead, 
it demonstrates both competition and contagion elements. This finding suggests that some 
suppliers (i.e., participants) influence crowd emergence through competition while 
others, especially senior ones with winning records, exert their influence on crowd 
emergence by triggering imitation within a crowd. This dissertation thus deepens our 
understanding on suppliers’ participation behaviors in the crowd-development process. 
By discovering this contatition mechanism underlying crowd emergence, this dissertation 
also answers a research call on crowd management (Felin et al., 2015). Meanwhile, 
managers can better manage and engage with a human crowd in innovation processes by 
leveraging this contatition mechanism underlying crowd emergence. For instance, 
managers can take a less homogenous view towards the crowd members and keep a close 
eye on the influential suppliers in the crowd formation process.   
Finally, our dissertation explains the performance variation puzzle by revealing 
the complicated relationships between crowd attributes and crowd performance and by 
discovering the competition-search mechanism underneath the complicated relationships 
between crowd attributes and crowd performance. The competition-search mechanism 
means that the logic linkage between crowd attributes and crowd performance includes 
not only the competition process driven by solvers’ utility maximization but also a search 
process over a solution landscape. This dissertation shows that these two forces are not 
necessarily exclusive in explaining performance. Instead, they are complementary to each 
other. This finding is different from the predominant thinking in crowdsourcing literature 
(Afuah & Tucci, 2012) and tournament literature (Boudreau et al., 2011; Fullerton & 
McAfee, 1999; Lazear & Rosen, 1981). The competition-search mechanism also suggests 
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that the crowd-level attributes have direct influence in causing the variations on crowd 
performance. Although many of the event design elements such as payment size and 
payment structure are similar, crowd performance can vary if the emergent crowd-level 
attributes are different.  
Organization  
This dissertation organizes as follows. Chapter 2 is a literature review that 
summarizes the current state of crowdsourcing, identifies the main deficiencies of 
existing literature, and explores the theoretical lenses that we can use to understand 
crowd development and crowd performance variation. Chapter 3 proposes a process 
model to elaborate the stages of crowd development and identify the constructs that are 
relevant to different stages of crowd development. Chapter 4 is our theory development 
section that includes two theory developments: One is for understanding the relationships 
between elements of event design and crowd emergence; the other for the performance 
implications of crowd attributes. Chapter 5 describes the methodology design and data 
collection process. Chapter 6 covers the detailed data analysis and empirical findings 
from our two studies. Chapter 7 is our discussion chapter that addresses the theoretical 
contributions and managerial implications. Chapter 8 is the conclusion section that 
summarizes the whole dissertation, addresses methodology-related limitations, and 
proposes future research directions. A publication plan is also discussed in this chapter.  
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Chapter 2: Background Literature 
Overview of Crowdsourcing Practice 
This chapter addresses the literature background of crowdsourcing. The practice of 
outsourcing a task to a crowd in an open call can be traced back to the Longitude Prize 
organized by the British government to determine the position of ships in the sea in 1714 
(Economist, 2008). History is filled with examples similar to the Longitude Prize, 
especially in the architecture design industry. The use of architecture design contests 
have led to some of the most notable buildings in the world, including the Sydney Opera 
House, the White House, the British Houses of Parliament, and the Berlin Central Station 
(Afuah & Tucci, 2012). However, the research stream on crowdsourcing did not occur 
until the notion of crowdsourcing was introduced one decade ago (Howe, 2006). We thus 
review the research on crowdsourcing in this chapter after the notion was created. 
Through this review, we intend to identify deficiencies in crowdsourcing literature and 
the theoretical gaps that this dissertation can fill. We also review other relevant literature 
(e.g., supplier development) and the theoretical lenses (e.g., diffusion theory, tournament 
theory, and structural thinking) that can help us understand crowd development and 
develop our research framework.  
Definition.  The earliest references to the term “crowdsourcing” can be traced to Jeff 
Howe in a 2006 Wired magazine article to describe a web-based business practice that 
companies use to harness the creative solutions of a distributed network through an open-
call process (Howe, 2006). According to Howe (2006), crowdsourcing represents an act 
of a company or institution taking a function once performed by employees and 
12 
outsourcing it to an undefined (and generally large) network of suppliers in the form of 
an open call. In Howe’s (2006) definition of crowdsourcing, the crucial prerequisites of 
crowdsourcing are outsourcing an internally performed function, the use of the open-call 
format, and a large network of potential suppliers, i.e., a crowd. As crowdsourcing gets 
more popular, scholars observe that companies or institutions crowdsource many 
activities that never have been performed by their employees (Billington & Davidson, 
2013; Boudreau & Lakhani, 2013). Google’s Lunar X Prize, a crowdsourcing 
competition that called for privately funded spaceflight teams to land robotic spacecraft 
on the moon, is a case in point (Kay, 2012). Afuah and Tucci (2012) thus redefine 
crowdsourcing as “the act of outsourcing a task to a ‘crowd’, rather than to a designed 
‘agent’ (an organization, informal or formal team, or individual), such as a contractor, in 
the form of an open call” (p.355). This definition has been commonly cited in 
crowdsourcing literature.  
Crowdsourcing as a New Outsourcing Practice. By definition, crowdsourcing falls 
within the domain of outsourcing. The open-call process involved in crowdsourcing 
makes crowdsourcing seem like other common business practices such as reverse 
auction, request for quotes (RFQ), or request for bidding (RFB). Because of the open call 
process, some scholars argue that crowdsourcing overlaps with open innovation in 
innovation literature (Chesbrough, 2006) and open source in computer science literature 
(Daniel, Agarwal, & Stewart, 2013; Roberts, Hann, & Slaughter, 2006). However, 
crowdsourcing differs significantly from these traditional practices in terms of task 
specificity and membership openness (Figure 1). Task specificity refers to the extent to 
which the inputs for a task are specified (Piller & Walcher, 2006). In general, tasks in 
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crowdsourcing have a low level of specificity. For instance, Harvard Catalyst organized a 
crowdsourcing challenge titled “What do we not know to cure Type 1 diabetes?” (Guinan 
et al., 2013). Harvard Catalyst did not specify specific requirements for this challenge. 
Instead, participants had to formulate their own well-defined problems and/or hypotheses 
to advance knowledge about Type 1 diabetes research in new and promising directions. 
Membership openness refers to the extent of filtering in the selection process of external 
participants (i.e., suppliers) for a particular task (Chesbrough, 2006; Lakhani et al., 2007). 
In reality, crowdsourcing has a high level of membership openness because each agent 
(i.e., individuals, teams, and/or organizations) can self-select to participate for a particular 
task.   
Figure 1 
Uniqueness of Crowdsourcing 
 
These differences contribute to the operation of focal buying firms in several 
significant ways. First, high levels of membership openness allows focal buying firms to 
14 
expand organizational boundaries. Unlike traditional outsourcing, crowdsourcing does 
not establish an ex ante contract relationship between a focal buying firm and its potential 
suppliers. Suppliers in a crowd self-select to compete and cooperate with each other for a 
specific crowdsourced event. Buying firms thus can avoid the classic principal-agency 
and moral hazard issues associated with suppliers in outsourcing if they use a contract 
supplier to solve their innovation-related problems (Afuah & Tucci, 2012). Due to the 
high level of membership openness, crowdsourcing proves to be a cost-effective solution 
to innovation related problems (Johns et al., 2011; Lakhani et al., 2007). Second, low 
levels of task specificity in crowdsourcing facilitate focal buying firms to tap into 
creative resources outside their organizations in a large scale. Crowdsourcing provides a 
solution for firms to conduct distant search in their innovation process (Afuah & Tucci, 
2012), which can help firms find the optimal solution and increase their innovation 
performances.  
Classification of Crowdsourcing.  Crowdsourcing can take the form of peer 
production in which self-selected suppliers work together on a particular problem, while 
the result is one solution or multiple solutions generated from the crowd (Afuah & Tucci, 
2012). This type of crowdsourcing is termed as collaboration-based crowdsourcing 
(Afuah & Tucci, 2012), also called community-based crowdsourcing (Bayus, 2013), or 
online open collaboration (Ren, Chen, & Riedl, 2015). Wikipedia is a classic example of 
collaboration-based crowdsourcing in which a group of editors collaborate with each 
other through the internet to perform encyclopedic work (Ren et al., 2015). Another 
example is Dell’s IdeaStorm through which Dell collects product/process improvement 
ideas from its cooperative online community (Bayus, 2013). This cooperative type of 
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crowdsourcing shares similarities with phenomena such as open source in computer 
science literature (Daniel et al., 2013; Roberts et al., 2006) and information system 
literature (Dissanayake, Zhang, & Gu, 2015). Many scholars from these two research 
streams examine the phenomenon of crowdsourcing from different perspectives 
(Dissanayake et al., 2015).  
Crowdsourcing can also take the form of peer competition in which each supplier 
self-selects to work on its own solution(s) and compete with others to provide the best 
solution. Only the winner(s) chosen by the focal buying firms can receive financial 
payment, which is always publicly announced at the beginning of a crowdsourcing event. 
Scholars call this competitive type of crowdsourcing competition-based crowdsourcing 
(Afuah & Tucci, 2012), broadcast search (Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010), or innovation 
contest (Bockstedt et al., 2015). For example, Netflix crowdsourced a task of developing 
an algorithm to improve its movie recommendation system in 2007 in the form of an 
open call to the world. Anyone who could come up with an algorithm that improved 
Netflix’s existing recommendation system by at least 10 percent could win $1 million 
(King & Lakhani, 2013). This competitive type of crowdsourcing shares similarities with 
the tournament in economics literature, such as rewarding policy and self-selected 
participation (Connelly et al., 2014).  
In the current crowdsourcing industry, competition-based crowdsourcing is more 
popular than cooperation-based crowdsourcing for a few practical reasons. First, because 
of the low level of information visibility and loose connection among crowd members, it 
is difficult for self-selected crowd members to develop high-level of interpersonal trust to 
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function efficiently and effectively as a team in a cooperation-based crowdsourcing 
(Dirks, 1999; Nirwan, 2014). Another obstacle for cooperation in crowdsourcing is the 
potential leakage of intellectual property (King & Lakhani, 2013). Cooperation in 
crowdsourcing thus becomes challenging. On the other site, the emergence of many 
platforms (e.g., Topcoder, InnoCentive, Eyeka, and Kaggle) that specialize in organizing 
contests makes competition-based crowdsourcing more attractive to managers (Billington 
& Davidson, 2013). Also, competition is a different from cooperation, which means that 
competition-based crowdsourcing is a different phenomenon from cooperation-based 
crowdsourcing. We thus mainly focus on competition-based crowdsourcing in this 
dissertation and use crowdsourcing to represent competition-based crowdsourcing.   
Literature Review on Crowdsourcing  
A recent report on the state of crowdsourcing published by eYeka (one of the 
largest crowdsourcing platforms) in 2015 indicates that 85 percent of the best global 
brands (e.g., Coca-Cola, Pepsi, Samsung, and GE) has used crowdsourcing in the last ten 
years (Figure 2) (Roth et al., 2015). According to this industry report, Toyota used 
crowdsourcing 23 times in the last ten years to tap into the creativity of the crowd. The 
fact that crowdsourcing was successfully utilized in a company like Toyota, whose 
innovation was traditionally assumed to be fully driven by its internal employees and 
external tier-structured suppliers (Girotra & Netessine, 2013), demonstrates the great 
potential of crowdsourcing for contemporary business operations. As crowdsourcing gets 
more popular, scholars pay increasing attention to the issues related to the application of 
this new practice. Current literature on crowdsourcing can be segregated into three 
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streams of research based on methodological approaches: qualitative stream (including 
conceptual thinking), empirical stream, and analytical stream.  
Figure 2 
The 15 Best Global Brands that Most Use Crowdsourcing Since 2004 
 
                                 Source: Roth, Petavy, & Cere (2015, p.8) 
Qualitative Research Stream.  This research stream mainly focuses on identifying 
the best practices through case study and conceptually understanding crowdsourcing as a 
solution of distant search. Jeff Howe’s (2006) qualitative article on crowdsourcing in 
Wired magazine represents the start of academic research on crowdsourcing. In this 
article, Howe (2006) provided successful crowdsourcing applications and predicted the 
rise of crowdsourcing. Howe’s (2006) prediction was so insightful that Howe’s (2006) 
article has been cited 2,779 times since its publication, according to Google Scholar as of 
March 7, 2016. Inspired by Howe’s (2006) work, scholars from strategy literature, 
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innovation literature, and other disciplines start to qualitatively examine successful 
crowdsourcing cases from Fortune 500 companies, such as IBM, Cisco, and GE. A series 
of cases studies were published in the following years in managerial journals such as 
Harvard Business Review (HBR), MIT Sloan Management Review, and California 
Management Review (Bjelland & Wood, 2008; Chesbrough, 2012; Jouret, 2009). These 
qualitative case studies demonstrate the value of crowdsourcing as another successful 
mechanism for creative problem-solving beyond two traditional mechanisms (i.e., 
internal development and contract outsourcing) (Brabham, 2008).  
 As the practice of crowdsourcing becomes popular, scholars start to question 
when crowdsourcing might be a better mechanism for solving problems than the other 
two traditional mechanisms. Afuah and Tucci (2012) addressed this question in their 
conceptual paper that was published in Academy of Management Review (AMR). Afuah 
and Tucci (2012) conceptualized crowdsourcing as a solution for distant search. This 
conceptualization is consistent with the “search thinking” in the innovation literature, 
which argues that a problem-solving or innovation process falls a recombinant search 
over a solution landscape (Fleming & Sorenson, 2004; Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Laursen & 
Salter, 2006). In their conceptual paper, Afuah and Tucci (2012) explored conditions that 
could increase the likelihood of crowdsourcing by considering the characteristics of the 
focal problem, the knowledge required for solution, the crowd, and the solutions to be 
evaluated, as well as the pervasiveness of information technology. Afuah and Tucci’s 
(2012) conceptual thinking was so thought-provoking that it was awarded the 2012 AMR 
Best Paper Award. This paper represents the most advanced conceptual thinking in 
crowdsourcing literature.  
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 Another interesting phenomenon in the qualitative research stream is the 
emergence of many intermedia (e.g., InnoCentive, Topcoder, and eYeka) that specialize 
in organizing crowdsourcing events for focal buying companies and institutions 
(Billington & Davidson, 2013). These intermedia act as bridges between focal buying 
firms and potential suppliers from a crowd (i.e., individuals, teams, or organizations). 
Scholars thus start to qualitatively examine how managers can better leverage 
crowdsourcing and manage the human crowd by using these crowdsourcing intermedia. 
Many qualitative case studies on crowdsourcing intermedia appear in HBR and MIT 
Sloan Review (Boudreau & Lakhani, 2013; Guinan et al., 2013; Kaganer et al., 2013). 
Although these case studies are quite useful to demonstrate the power of a crowd for 
decision-makers, no specific framework on crowd management has been developed yet. 
Besides, current crowdsourcing literature still witnesses quite a few crowdsourcing 
failures and many unproductive or even destructive crowds (Harris, 2015; Rosenfeld, 
2012). Scholars are thus calling for research that can help organizations better manage, 
utilize, and organize both internal and external crowds when innovating (Felin et al., 
2015). 
Empirical Research Stream.  In the empirical research stream, the level of 
analysis is primarily at an individual level instead of the crowd level. Scholars in this 
stream use different methods (e.g., filed study, secondary data, and experiment) to 
examine issues related to individual participants in a crowd. These issues include but are 
not limited to participation motivations (Brabham, 2010, 2012), factors that influence 
individuals’ performance (Bayus, 2013; Bockstedt et al., 2015; Jeppesen & Lakhani, 
2010), individuals’ expected fairness as well as its effects in crowdsourcing (Franke, 
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Keinz, & Klausberger, 2013), individuals’ attention allocation in crowdsourcing contests 
(Haas, Criscuolo, & George, 2015), and incentive design as well as its effect on 
individuals’ participation (Boudreau et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2014).  
Findings related to individual motivations in crowdsourcing are helpful to 
understand suppliers’ self-selected participation in a crowd-development process. 
Through these empirical findings, we know that supplier’s participation behaviors in 
crowdsourcing are driven by economic and social reasons. For instance, Brabham (2010, 
2012) identified that individuals are motivated by both extrinsic motivations (e.g., 
financial return, reputation, and status) and intrinsic motivations (e.g., fun, learning, a 
sense of satisfaction and accomplishment) to participate in crowdsourcing events. In their 
study on how individuals allocate attention for crowdsourced problems on-line, Haas, 
Criscuolo, and George (2015) identified that individuals are more likely to participate in 
solving problems that closely match their expertise, but that their participation decisions 
are influenced by problem characteristics (e.g., length, breadth, and novelty). Liu and her 
colleagues (2014) found that a higher reward could induce significantly more 
submissions and higher quality submissions. They also found that high-quality 
participants were less likely to participate in crowdsourcing tasks where a high-quality 
solution had been posted as a benchmarking, suggesting that competition within a crowd 
could have a negative influence on supplier’s participation behaviors (Liu et al., 2014). 
All the findings related to suppliers’ participation in crowdsourcing suggest that 
managers can exert their impact on the crowd-development process indirectly through 
adjusting the precedents of suppliers’ self-selected participation (e.g., payment size). 
However, these findings do not provide specific implications for managers to exert their 
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influence because no research in the empirical stream has examined the mechanisms 
underlying crowd development.  
Meanwhile, the empirical findings related to individual performance are 
inconsistent and have conflicting implications for crowd-level performance. The 
inconsistent findings are mainly related to the performance implication of crowd size and 
crowd diversity. For instance, some scholars conceptualize crowdsourcing as a distant 
search for solutions over a rugged landscape (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Boudreau, Guinan, 
Lakhani, & Riedl, 2016). This conceptualization runs parallel with the search view in the 
innovation literature, which claims that the progress of science follows a recombinant 
search process through either recombining existing elements or combining new elements 
(Fleming, 2001; Fleming & Sorenson, 2004). Following these two lines of thinking, 
scholars argue that an increase in crowd size (i.e., the number of participants) allows 
firms to search in a wide landscape and thus acquire more solutions (Laursen & Salter, 
2006). Through an empirical analysis based on secondary data from Logomyway.com3, 
Bockstedt, Druehl, and Mirsha (2015) found a positive association between the number 
of participants (i.e., crowd size) and the number of submissions per task (i.e., crowd 
productivity). From a tournament theory perspective, however, Boudreau, Lacetera, and 
Lakhani (2011) found that an increase in the number of constants leads to poor 
performance outcomes. This is because increasing the number of competitors a contest 
reduces the likelihood of winning for any one competitor, thereby reducing contestants’ 
                                                          
3 A popular competition-based crowdsourcing platform that matches graphic designers with organizations 
in need of new logos (Bockstedt et al., 2015) 
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motivation to invest or exert effort and then lowering overall performance (Che & Gale, 
2003; Fullerton & McAfee, 1999).  
 As for the performance implication of diversity, Jeppesen and Lakhani (2010) 
identified a “marginality effect” in tournament-based crowdsourcing which means 
individuals who are technically and socially far away from the focal buying firms are 
more likely to offer creative solutions and thus become the winners in competitive 
crowdsourcing events. This finding provides strong support for firms to conduct distant 
search for their innovation-related problems (Afuah & Tucci, 2012). Franke, Poetz, and 
Schreier (2014) also found that integrating problem solvers in ideation crowdsourcing 
could increase the chance to generate more novel solutions. However, in their study on 
individuals’ problem-solving effort and success in innovation contests, Bockstedt, 
Druehl, and Mishra (2015) found that individuals with greater similarity to focal buying 
firms in terms of cultural background and economic wealth are more likely to be winners. 
Scholars call this phenomenon as the “homophily effect” which refers to the propensity 
of individuals to associate with other individuals who have similar social, cultural, 
economic, and/or demographic characteristics (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001; 
Milliken & Martins, 1996).  
These above contradictory findings provide conflicting implications for managers 
on how to develop a crowd for a particular crowdsourcing contest, which demonstrates 
the necessity for further exploration on the issue of winners’ characteristics and winner 
selection in tournament-based crowdsourcing. The search view in the innovation 
literature and the competition view in tournament theory seems to have conflicting 
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implications in crowdsourcing. We found no research in the current crowdsourcing 
literature that has tested the relative power of these two views in explaining the 
relationships between crowd attributes and crowd performance. This literature gap offers 
a great opportunity for this dissertation to make a contribution in crowdsourcing 
literature.  
Analytical Research Stream.  Based on tournament theory in economics literature 
(Che & Gale, 2003; Lazear & Rosen, 1981), many scholars from operations management 
(OM) and operation research (OR) apply an analytical modeling approach to study 
optimal design of innovation contests (i.e., competition-based crowdsourcing) (Ales, 
Cho, & Körpeoğlu, 2017; Terwiesch & Xu, 2008) and the behavior of contestants 
(Boudreau, Lakhani, & Menietti, 2016; Chen, Ham, & Lim, 2011). This research stream 
assumes agents (i.e., suppliers) are rational. Agents’ participation behavior and 
investment (i.e., effort) are driven by their utility maximization functions. Findings from 
this research stream provide a full economic view on suppliers’ behaviors in 
crowdsourcing and offers some support for us to understand the performance 
implications of crowd size.   
The dominant view on the contest design is that having many people work on an 
innovation problem simultaneously will lead to a lower equilibrium effort for each 
participant (Che & Gale, 2003; Fullerton & McAfee, 1999). This result is undesirable 
from the perspective of focal buying firms and suggests that firms should limit the 
number of participants. However, Terwiesch and Xu (2008) found that buying firms can 
benefit from a large crowd because they obtain a more diverse set of solutions, which 
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mitigates and outweighs the effect of participants’ underinvestment in effort. This 
conclusion supports the distant search view in the empirical steam which argues that an 
increase in the crowd size is positively associated with crowd productivity. Terwiesch 
and Xu (2008) also found that the inefficiency of the innovation contest caused by 
participants’ underinvestment can be reduced by changing the incentive structure from a 
fixed-price to a performance-contingent award.  
From a behavioral perspective, Boudreau, Lakhani, and Menietti (2016) found 
that the performance response to added contestants varies non-monotonically across 
contestants of different abilities: Most participants respond negatively, whereas the 
highest skilled contestants respond positively. Chen, Ham, and Lim (2011) examined 
how a change in the prize structure affects the effort of contestants in a multi-person 
tournament where contestants have different initial endowments. In particular, Chen, 
Ham, and Lim (2011) found that when the number of prizes increases from one to two, 
both high-level initial endowments and low-level initial endowment participants increase 
their efforts. This is because high-level initial endowments might perceive psychological 
losses from losing while low-level initial endowments think about psychological gains 
from winning (Chen et al., 2011). This finding shows the importance of payment 
structure on suppliers’ behaviors in a contest. We need to control for the number of 
payments in our empirical test analysis.   
Summary of Literature Review. The above literature review on three streams of 
research on crowdsourcing identifies a few gaps that hinder academic development of 
crowdsourcing in the supply chain field. First, current crowdsourcing literature 
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improperly assumes the preexistence of a crowd and thus lacks a developmental view to 
look at the crowd-development issue. Second, there exists no framework that can be 
useful for studying crowd development, which provides an opportunity for this 
dissertation to make a meaningful contribution. Third, there exist some contradictory 
findings related to performance implication of crowd attributes, suggesting a paradox of 
applying knowledge from different literature (e.g., tournament theory and innovation 
search) to understand crowdsourcing. Current crowdsourcing literature lacks studies that 
compare the relative power of these different views in explaining the relationships 
between crowd attributes and crowd performance, thus motiving us to develop empirical 
tests to fill this gap.  
Theoretical Background of Crowd Development  
The above literature review shows that crowdsourcing literature lacks a 
theoretical framework that addresses crowd development. We thus review multiple 
research streams from different disciplines to increase our understanding on crowd 
development. In its essence, crowd development is a process through which firms 
identify a collective of suppliers for a particular task. This process is similar to supplier 
development in traditional sourcing literature. We first briefly summarize supplier 
development in sourcing literature in the following section. Because a crowd in 
crowdsourcing shares similarities with a crowd in sociology (e.g., fuzzy boundary, no 
specific structure, and transience), we also review the contagion thinking and diffusion 
theory in sociology literature that are related to crowd formation. As we state in the 
beginning of this chapter, we mainly focus on tournament-based crowdsourcing in this 
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dissertation. We then review tournament theory and structural thinking to help us better 
understand the influence of crowdsourcing event design on crowd development.  
Supplier Development.  In sourcing literature, supplier development refers to any 
effort or attempts of a buying company to increase performance and/or capabilities of its 
suppliers to meet its short- and/or long-term needs (Krause, 1997; Krause & Ellram, 
1997a). The research stream on supplier development occurred in the early 1990s. 
Because of global sourcing at that time, suppliers played an important role in determining 
buying firms’ competitive advantages (Krause, 1997; Krause & Ellram, 1997a). As such, 
buying firms increasingly relied on their suppliers to deliver technologically advanced, 
defect-free products in a timely and cost-effective manner and thus developed many 
managerial practices to develop their suppliers’ capabilities and skills (Hahn, Watts, & 
Kim, 1990; Krause & Ellram, 1997a). Based on many supplier development practices, 
Hahn, Watts, and Kim (1990) proposed the first conceptual model for supplier 
development (Figure 3), which has been widely cited in the supplier development 
literature. This process model proposed by Hahn, Watts, and Kim (1990) demonstrates 
the detailed and sequential steps of a supplier development. This framework also suggests 
that s supplier development is a systematic, deliberate, and controlled process. This is 
because buying firms have full decision power over which supplier needs to improve, 
what needs to be done, and what the expected results would be (Hahn, Watts, & Kim, 
1989; C. K. Hahn et al., 1990). 
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Figure 3 
Supplier Development Framework 
 
Source: Hahn, Watts, and Kim (1990, p.4) 
Krause and Ellram (1997) systematically reviewed the critical elements of 
supplier development from a buying-firm perspective. This review indicates that main 
identified supplier development practices include effective two-way communication, top 
management involvement, cross-functional buying firm teams, and large percentage of 
supplier’s annual sales (Krause & Ellram, 1997a; Watts & Hahn, 1993). The identified 
facilitators for supplier development are buying firms’ communication efforts with 
suppliers (Krause & Ellram, 1997b), and buying firms’ proactive attitude toward supply-
base performance (Krause, Handfield, & Scannell, 1998; Monczka, Trent, & Callahan, 
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1993). Scholars in the supplier development literature also identified many barriers for 
supplier development, which include lack of buying firm power measured in terms of the 
percentage of a supplier’s output purchased by the buying firm (Lascelles & Dale, 1989), 
lack of effective communication, and lack of buying firms’ credibility (Galt & Dale, 
1991; Lascelles & Dale, 1989). Empirical studies shows that buying firms’ supplier 
development programs have significant performance implications (e.g., suppliers’ 
performance improvement, buyer’s competitive advantage, and buyer-supplier 
relationship improvement) (Humphreys, Li, & Chan, 2004; Modi & Mabert, 2007). The 
whole supplier development involves into early supplier involvement (Dowlatshahi, 
1998; Neal, 1993; Zsidisin & Smith, 2005). 
A crowd development by definition is a process of identifying a collective of 
suppliers for a particular crowdsourced task. The supplier development literature thus 
offers some insights for us to understand crowd development. According to the supplier 
development framework proposed by Hahn, Watts, and Kim (1990), a crowd 
development process involves multiple steps such as initiation, development, and 
evaluation. As indicated by the empirical studies on supplier development, the 
developmental practices taken by the focal buying firms such as communication and 
information sharing could impact the operational process of a crowd development as well 
as its performance implication.  
However, we believe that the application of supplier development in crowd 
development is limited because of several significant differences between a crowd 
development and a supplier development. First, crowd development involves an open-call 
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process, while supplier development is a closed-call process. In crowdsourcing, it is the 
suppliers that make their own decisions (i.e., self-selection) to participate in solving a 
particular crowdsourced task. Buying firms thus have very limited decision power over 
which supplier gets involved in the crowd development process. Second, the information 
visibility is very low in crowdsourcing. Suppliers are nested in a virtue network. Low 
information means high uncertainty since buying firms have no information or very 
limited visibility who might self-selection to participate. Third, the task is less specified 
in crowdsourcing, which means that buying firms cannot apply specific criteria to 
evaluate, select, and engage with suppliers as they do in supplier development. Because 
of these significant differences, we believe that knowledge from the supplier 
development cannot fully explain crowd development. We need other theoretical lenses 
that is reviewed in the remaining sections.  
Contagion Thinking.  The crowd in crowdsourcing shares three similarities with 
the crowd in sociology. First, the boundary of a crowd is not clearly defined. Second, the 
existence of the crowd is temporary. Once the task is completed in crowdsourcing or the 
common focus disappears in a social setting, the crowd dissolves. Third, the relationships 
among crowd members are loosely coupled. Members self-select to form a crowd. 
Scholars in sociology literature argue that the formation of a crowd is due to the 
contagion influence existing within a crowd (Christakis & Fowler, 2013; Freedman & 
Perlick, 1979; Wheeler, 1966). This research stream is referred to contagion thinking in 
sociology literature.  
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Contagion thinking was developed to describe the phenomenon of contagion in 
crowd formation process, which refers to the spreading of behaviors, attitudes, affect, and 
emotions through a crowd and other types of social aggregations from one member to 
another (Forsyth, 2009; Le Bon, 1897, 1960). In this research stream, a crowd refers to a 
gathering of individuals sharing a common focus and concentrated in a single location 
(Forsyth, 2009). Gustave Le Bon (1897, 1960) was the first scholar who observed the 
phenomenon of contagion in social psychology. According to Le Bon, emotions and 
behaviors could be transmitted from one person to another just as germs could be passed 
along, and he believed that contagion accounted for the tendency of crowd members to 
behave in very similar ways (Le Bon, 1897, 1960; Wheeler, 1966). In Le Bon’s own 
words, “In a crowd every sentiment and act is contagious” (Le Bon, 1960, p. 50).  
Le Bon (1897, 1960) recognized the contagion issue in a crowd but did not offer 
explanations for the mechanisms underlying this issue. Scholars in social psychology 
have pondered and debated crowd behavior for centuries, seeking to specify the factors 
that transform individuals so thoroughly and so unexpectedly (Forsyth, 2009). Various 
explanations have been offered for the occurrence of contagion in society, including 
imitation, social facilitation, normative pressure, herding, and/or conformity (Baddeley, 
2010; Chapman, 1973; Freedman & Perlick, 1979; Raafat, Chater, & Frith, 2009). 
Factors that can contribute to the contagion in a crowd include physical density of a 
crowd (Freedman & Perlick, 1979), similarity of crowd members in terms of needs, 
values, goals (Hoffer, 1951; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), and crowd size 
(Gladwell, 2006; Newton & Mann, 1980).  
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Following this contagion thinking, we believe that suppliers’ participation 
behavior is contagious and can spread to other members within the same nested network. 
Thus, the crowd formation/development is an automatic and spontaneous process. As 
indicated by the empirical studies on contagion in society (e.g., Gladwell, 2006; Hoffer, 
1951), factors that are beneficial to crowd development in crowdsourcing include the 
closeness of crowd members, the similarity of crowd members, and the number of 
participants.   
Although the contagion thinking seems promising in explaining crowd 
development, the application of this literature should be tested due to its own limitations. 
First, it does not tell us how the process starts, that is, the contagion thinking does not 
address the initiation of a crowd development process. Second, the contagion thinking 
mainly addresses the contagious phenomena in a physical crowd (e.g., street crowds, 
mobs, and riots) (Forsyth, 2009). The crowd in crowdsourcing is virtual. It remains 
unclear whether the contagion thinking still holds in explaining the spreading of 
suppliers’ participation behavior in a virtual setting like crowdsourcing. Due to these 
obvious limitations of contagion think, this dissertation further reviews other theoretical 
lenses that are related to crowd development and crowdsourcing in the following 
sections.  
Diffusion Theory.  From an emergence perspective (Dooley & Corman, 2002; 
Holland, 2000), a crowd for a particular crowdsourcing event arises from suppliers’ 
interactive participation behavior in the crowd-development process. The spreading of 
suppliers’ participation within a social network then forms the foundation of crowd 
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development. Diffusion theory is thus an appropriate theoretical lens to look at crowd 
development. This is because diffusion theory seeks to explain the spreading of behavior, 
new ideas, products, and technologies (i.e., innovations) through certain channels over 
time among members of a social system (Rogers, 1962, 2010).  
The diffusion paradigm was developed by Ryan and Gross (1943), two rural 
sociologist who studied the diffusion of hybrid corn seed in two Iowa communities. By 
surveying more than 300 farmers in two communities, Ryan and Gross found that 
diffusion is a social process that spreads adoption in the community through subjective 
evaluation and social imitation, rather than individual rational decision-making (Ryan & 
Gross, 1943). After Ryan and Gross (1943), the issue of diffusion has been studied in 
many disciplines such as anthropology, marketing, rural sociology, economics, 
agriculture, and communications science (Chandrasekaran & Tellis, 2007; Valente & 
Rogers, 1995). Everett Rogers, a professor in communications studies, synthesized the 
work of many studies on diffusion and developed the theory of diffusion in his book 
Diffusion of Innovations (Rogers, 1962, 2010).  
According to Rogers (1962, 2010), diffusion is the process by which an 
innovation is communicated over time among the participants in a social system. In this 
line of thinking, the concept of “innovation” is a generic term that includes not only new 
ideas, products, and technologies (Rogers, 1962, 2010), but also human behaviors such as 
communication of information, policy decision-making, and adoption of technology in a 
network (Rogers & Shoemaker, 1971; Valente, 1993, 1995). Two main indicators used to 
capture a diffusion process are diffusion rate and diffusion scale (Rogers, 2010; Van den 
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Bulte, 2000). Diffusion rate is defined as “the relative speed with which an innovation is 
adopted by members of social system” (Rogers, 2010, p.221). Diffusion scale, sometimes 
called market size, captures the aggregate number of people who adopt an innovation 
over a certain period of time (Rogers, 1962; Ryan & Gross, 1943). By plotting the 
diffusion rate or aggregate number of adopters over time in a curve, scholars in the 
diffusion literature found that the innovation diffusion follows a so-called S-curve 
(Figure4). This curve is also termed as the growth curve (Mahajan & Muller, 1979; Peres, 
Muller, & Mahajan, 2010). The diffusion rate is a numerical indicator of the steepness of 
the diffusion curve for an innovation (Rogers, 2010). 
Figure 4 
Innovation Diffusion Process 
 
Source: Rogers (2010, p.273) 
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According to the conceptual diffusion framework proposed by Rogers (1962, 
2010), the main structural elements of social systems that influence the diffusion 
rate of an innovation include perceived attributes of an innovation (e.g., relative 
advantage and complexity), communication channels (e.g., mass media or 
interpersonal), and characteristics of a network (e.g., degree of network 
interconnectedness) (Figure 5). Researchers in the marketing literature extended 
Roger’s diffusion framework and considered the influence of opinion leaders (i.e., 
influentials) to capture the social imitation underlying a diffusion process 
(Goldenberg, Han, Lehmann, & Hong, 2009; Keller & Berry, 2003; Van den Bulte 
& Joshi, 2007). Inspired by Rogers’ (1962) framework and its extended versions, 
scholars from different disciplines have extensively examined the issue of diffusion 
Figure 5 
Innovation Diffusion Framework 
 
Source: Rogers (2010, p.222) 
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and tested the conceptual diffusion framework. For a detailed understanding, refer to 
the systematic literature review in the innovation diffusion domain (e.g., 
Chandrasekaran & Tellis, 2007; Greenhalgh, Robert, Macfarlane, Bate, & 
Kyriakidou, 2004; Valente & Rogers, 1995).  
The diffusion framework proposed by Rogers (1962, 2010) offers a structural 
guideline for us to conceptualize factors that might influence crowd development (e.g., 
crowd growth rate and crowd size). The detailed application of this theoretical lens will 
be addressed in chapter 3 and chapter 4 of this dissertation. In the empirical stream of 
diffusion literature, the diffusion rate is generally measured as the number of individuals 
who adopt a new idea in a specified period, such as a year (Roger, 2010). This 
measurement makes the diffusion rate contingent on the time specified for the diffusion 
of an innovation. If the time specified for innovations is different, the calculated rates 
might not be fully comparable for a large-scale empirical study like this dissertation that 
involves thousands of observations each with unique event length. Moreover, the role of 
social imitation that is similar to the contagion thinking in a previous section is 
underplayed in Roger’s (1962, 2010) diffusion framework. The Bass Model developed by 
Frank M. Bass (1969) in the analytical stream of diffusion literature resolved these two 
issues. Because we adopt the Bass Model to operationalize the crowd growth rate in this 
dissertation, a brief summary of this model is provided in the following paragraphs.  
The Bass model emphasizes the role of communication, namely external 
influence via advertising and mass media, and social imitation (i.e., contagion) (Bass, 
1969; Van den Bulte & Stremersch, 2004). The basic assumption of this model is that the 
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timing of consumers’ initial purchase (i.e., adoption) is related to the number of previous 
buyers (Bass, 1969). In a mathematical term, this assumption suggests that “the 
probability that an initial purchase [𝑃(𝑇)] will be model at 𝑇 given that no purchase has 
yet been made is a linear function of the number of previous buyers” (Bass, 1969, p. 
1826), that is,  
𝑓(𝑇)
1−𝐹(𝑇)
= 𝑃(𝑇) = 𝑝 +
𝑞
𝑚
𝑌(𝑇), 
where 𝑓(𝑇) is the probability of purchase at time 𝑇, 𝐹(𝑇) is accumulated probability of 
purchase at time 𝑇, and 𝑌(𝑇) is the total number of previous buyers. The three key 
parameters in the Bass Model are the coefficient of innovation (𝑝), which captures the 
intrinsic tendency to make an initial purchase (i.e., adopt an innovation), the coefficient 
of imitation (𝑞), which captures social influence on making initial purchase, and the 
potential market size(𝑚). Through algebra and calculus transformation, Bass (1969) 
identified cumulative sales 𝑆(𝑇) at time 𝑇 (i.e., the growth curve of an innovation 
diffusion) as a function of 𝑝, 𝑞, and 𝑚, that is, 
𝑆(𝑇) = 𝑚(𝑝 + 𝑞)2/𝑝[𝑒−(𝑝+𝑞)𝑇/(
𝑞
𝑝𝑒−(𝑝+𝑞)𝑇
+ 1)2] 
When 𝑞 > 𝑝, the diffusion curve has a S-shape and a differentiation of the 𝑆(𝑇) function 
can get the maximum of diffusion rate at the reflection point 𝑇∗ = 1/(𝑝 + 𝑞)ln (
𝑞
𝑝
). When 
𝑞 < 𝑝, the diffusion curve is concave and has no reflection point (Figure 6).  
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Figure 6  
Bass Diffusion Curve 
 
Source: Van de Bulte (2002, p.13) 
The Bass Model provides a very scientific approach to operationalize the 
diffusion rate of an innovation curve. The sum of innovation coefficient (𝑝) and imitation 
coefficient (𝑞) offers an estimate of total diffusion rate (Lawrence & Lawton, 1981; 
Sultan, Farley, & Lehmann, 1990). Lawrence and Lawton (1981) found that 𝑝 + 𝑞 ranged 
from 0.3 to 0.7 over several innovations. The analytical stream of the diffusion literature 
offers many approaches to estimate the three parameters in the Bass Model, which 
include ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (Bass, 1969), nonlinear least squares 
regression (Jain & Rao, 1990; Srinivasan & Mason, 1986), genetic algorithm 
(Venkatesan, Krishnan, & Kumar, 2004), and agent-based simulation (Kiesling, Günther, 
Stummer, & Wakolbinger, 2012; Rand, Herrmann, Schein, & Vodopivec, 2015). Each 
method has its advantages and disadvantages. This issue will be discussed further when 
we use the Bass Model to operationalize the crowd growth rate for each crowdsourcing 
event in our sample.  
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Tournament Theory.  Because the crowdsourcing events that this dissertation 
mainly focuses on are competition-based, tournament theory is an appropriate framework 
for explaining the structure, design, and outcomes of a competition-based crowdsourcing 
event (Terwiesch & Xu, 2008). That is the main reason that we extensively review the 
structure of a tournament in tournament literature in this section, which will be useful in 
chapter 3 when we describe the event design of a crowdsourcing event. In this section, 
we also review the main constructs in the tournament theory and their associated analytic 
and empirical findings. We will use these findings to look at crowd development and its 
performance implication in crowdsourcing, which will be addressed in the theory 
development in chapter 4. 
Tournament theory mainly focuses on designing contests (i.e., tournaments) that 
promote effective competition among agents (i.e., participants), which, in turn, leads to 
more positive final performance outcomes (Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Lin, Yeh, & Shih, 
2013). It is originally developed in personnel economics to study human behavior when 
reward structures are based on relative rank rather than absolute levels of outcomes 
(Connelly et al., 2014). This research stream was first proposed by economists Edward 
Lazear and Sherwin Rosen in the early 1980s when they examined the optimal labor 
contract design based on relative ranking instead of absolute levels of output (Lazear & 
Rosen, 1981). Since then, this theoretical lens has expanded to a wider range of other 
disciplines, such as law (Anabtawi, 2005), ecology (Zabel & Roe, 2009), psychology 
(Nieken & Sliwka, 2010), finance (Kale, Reis, & Venkateswaran, 2009), sports (Bothner, 
Kang, & Stuart, 2007; Frick, 2003), management (Henderson & Fredrickson, 2001; Lin 
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et al., 2013), and supply chain management (Bockstedt, Druehl, & Mishra, 2016; 
Wowak, Craighead, Ketchen, & Hult, 2016).  
Scholars in the tournament research stream conceptualize tournaments as contests 
in which agents compete for a prize that is awarded based on relative rank and are 
designed to incentivize an optimal level of effort (Becker & Huselid, 1992; Lazaer, 
1999). Within this line of thinking, a tournament has four main structural elements 
(Connelly et al., 2014; Lin et al., 2013): (1) a specific task for agents to participate and 
compete, such as a promotion contest in management setting, a tennis tournament in sport 
setting, and logo design in a product development context; (2) an effective time frame 
associated with this task (e.g., annual golf tournament, monthly sales contest, and weekly 
logo design); (3) a disclosed reward policy based on agents’ relative performance ranking 
(i.e., prize); and (4) a participation policy (e.g., qualifications in sports tournaments and 
open call in innovation contests). In the tournament research stream, agents are assumed 
to be rational, and agents’ decisions (e.g., participation and effort investment) are based 
on utility maximization (Lazear & Rosen, 1981). Scholars in the tournament literature 
thus pay much attention to issues that influence agents’ expected utilities when they study 
tournament design (e.g., payment size, pay gap, and tournament size) (Connelly et al., 
2014).  
Connelly and his coauthors (2014) extensively reviewed the development of 
tournament theory in the past thirty years. According to this review, key constructs 
addressed in the tournament theory include payment size, pay gap, and tournament size. 
Payment size refers the financial reward for tournament winner(s) designed to incent the 
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effort of all participants (Knoeber & Thurman, 1994). A payment size is considered 
“optimal” when it maximizes the productive outcome of the tournament, including all 
participants (Knoeber, 1989; Knoeber & Thurman, 1994). Empirical evidence shows that 
payment size is positively associated with the number of participants (Liu et al., 2014; 
Morgan, Orzen, & Sefton, 2012), suggesting that tournaments with a large payment size 
are more attractive to participants. As for the performance implication of payment size, 
scholars suggest that what matters is not the payment size but the pay gap defined as the 
difference between winning and losing or between relative ranks (Connelly et al., 2014).  
When the pay gap is small, agents are not motivated to compete (Knoeber & 
Thurman, 1994; Lazear & Rosen, 1981). Under this situation, the total productive output 
of the tournament drops. However, a very high pay gap can have a detrimental effect on 
tournament efficiency because it induces too much effort that agents must be broadly 
compensated (Connelly et al., 2014; Wowak et al., 2016). These findings suggest the 
complexity of payment design and imply the existence of a quadratic relationship 
between payment and tournament performance. Empirical studies among executives in 
corporate tournaments demonstrate that the executives’ pay gap has positive implications 
for performance (e.g., ROA) in general, but large pay gaps do not necessarily lead to high 
firm performance (Henderson & Fredrickson, 2001; Lin et al., 2013). In addition to 
studying the consequences of pay gap, scholars in the corporate tournament stream 
examined the antecedents of pay gap and found that job-related risks and uncertainties 
are positively associated with pay gap (Bloom & Michel, 2002; Gupta, Conroy, & 
Delery, 2012). 
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 Another key issue in a tournament design is the tournament size that is defined as 
the number of participants in a tournament (Connelly et al., 2014). Based on the utility 
maximization assumption, analytic scholars in the tournament literature have studied the 
issue of tournament size and its performance implication for a while (Fullerton & 
McAfee, 1999; Körpeoğlu & Cho, 2017; Terwiesch & Xu, 2008). The main notion is that 
a small increase in tournament size can motivate participants to exert effort to improve 
performance, but too many participants actually reduces the winning chance for each 
participants, thereby reducing incentives to invest or exert effort and lowering overall 
performance outcomes (Che & Gale, 2003; Fullerton & McAfee, 1999; Terwiesch & Xu, 
2008). Similar predictions and findings associated with the negative performance 
implication of a large increase in tournament size have been found in competition 
situations in sociology, a phenomenon called the “N-effect” which means that more 
competitors lead to less competition and worse performance outcome (Garcia & Tor, 
2009; Mukherjee & Hogarth, 2010). Based on an empirical analysis on innovation 
contests, Boudreau, Lacetera, and Lakhani (2011) found a negative association between 
the number of competitors (i.e., tournament size) and the overall performance outcomes.  
 However, the above notion that a large increase on tournament size leads to lower 
performance outcomes due to reduced winning chance and less effort investment is 
challenged by the latest findings in the tournament literature. By taking participants’ 
heterogeneity into consideration, Körpeoğlu and Cho (2017) found that participants with 
high-expertise actually raise their effort and improve their performance in response to 
increased competition. This is because an increase in the tournament size raises the 
expected best performance among other participants, creating positive incentives for 
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participants to exert higher effort to win the contest, thereby increasing the overall 
performance (Körpeoğlu & Cho, 2017). This latest finding not only justifies the increase 
popularity of tournament-based crowdsourcing to attract a large number of participants, 
but also indicates the importance of heterogeneity (i.e., diversity) related to tournament 
size. This finding is consistent with the concept of “relative deprivation” in social 
comparison situation, which means that participants who suspect that they might be left 
behind by their peers (i.e., structural equivalent participant) are motivated to exert and 
improve their performances (Bothner et al., 2007; Burt, 1982; Garcia, Tor, & Schiff, 
2013). These latest findings in the tournament literature call for further research on the 
performance implication of crowd attributes, which is one of the main objectives of this 
dissertation.   
Structural Thinking.  The grand research question of this dissertation is to answer 
how crowd development impacts the performance of a crowd in crowdsourcing. The 
theoretical lenses that this dissertation reviews so far (e.g., contagion thinking, diffusion 
theory, and tournament theory) mainly address crowd formation that is based on 
suppliers’ interactive participation behavior in crowdsourcing (e.g., Rogers, 2010; 
Connelly et al., 2014). Tournament theory does examine participants’ efforts and final 
performances in tournaments (e.g., Garcia & Tor, 2009; Terwiesch & Xu, 2008), but the 
level of analysis is not at a crowd level but mainly at individual level. We thus review 
another research stream called structural thinking which links crowdsourcing event 
design not only with suppliers’ interactive participation behavior but also crowd-level 
performance.       
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Structural thinking evolves from multiple research streams such as the structure-
conduct-performance in industrial organization economics (Bain, 1956; Caves, 1987) and 
the structure-process-outcome in service quality literature (Donabedian, 1966, 1988). The 
basic tenet of structural thinking is that the performance of a social system (e.g., industry, 
firm, or team) is a function of the conduct of the agents in the system and the process 
underlying agents’ conduct which, in turn, are a function the system’s structure (Caves, 
1987; Donabedian, 1988; Harper, 2015). For instance, scholars argue that firms derive 
competitive advantages by responding to the characteristics of the industry in which they 
compete (e.g., R&D, merge, and acquisition) (Bain, 1956; Caves, 1987). The attributes of 
the service settings (e.g., facilities, equipment, and human resources etc.) denotes what is 
actually done in giving and receiving services, which directly influences the service 
quality (e.g., customer satisfaction) (Campbell, Roland, & Buetow, 2000; Donabedian, 
1988).  
In structure thinking literature, a structure is generally defined as a system (such 
as an organization) made up of individual elements or parts (such as people, resources, 
aspirations, values, market trends, levels of competence, reward systems, departmental 
mandates, capital, workload/capacity relationship, and so on) that impact each other by 
the relationships they form (Fritz, 1996; Harper, 2015; Molm, 1990). A structure includes 
tangible elements (e.g., hierarchy, policy statement, procedures, rules, regulation, and 
reward systems) and intangible ones such as norms, values, beliefs, and roles (Fritz, 
1989, 1996, 1999). Conduct refers to the activities of the agents in the system. Depending 
on the situations, the conduct in structural think literature can refer to installation and 
utilization of capacity in management (McWilliams & Smart, 1993), strategic supply 
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chain integration in supply chain management (Ralston et al., 2015), and adoption of IT-
assisted communication technology in healthcare (Angst, Devaraj, & D'Arcy, 2012). The 
process denotes how the agent in the system interact with different elements within the 
system to provide different activities, while the outcomes refer to the final performance.  
The structural thinking framework makes statements about how elements of a 
social system (e.g., an organization) can be configured and how they causally relate to 
each other (Größler, Thun, & Milling, 2008). This framework is a theoretical lens that 
examines social phenomena for scholars in disciplines such as marketing (Geyskens, 
Steenkamp, & Kumar, 1999), sociology (Molm, 1990), E-commerce (Devaraj, Fan, & 
Kohli, 2006), management (Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp, & Gilson, 2008), and supply chain 
management (Ashenbaum, Salzarulo, & Newman, 2012; Samaddar, Nargundkar, & 
Daley, 2006). Through these many studies, the level of analysis for the structural thinking 
has been expanded from organizational level (Angst et al., 2012; Donabedian, 1988) to 
network level (Molm, 1990; Samaddar et al., 2006) and group or team level (Mathieu et 
al., 2008). The structural thinking has also evolved to study the influence of structure on 
outcomes through not only different processes (e.g., establishing technical protocols of 
care) (Angst et al., 2012), but also unique organizational or individual actions (e.g., 
information sharing and usage of power) (Geyskens et al., 1999; Molm, 1990) and some 
emergent states (e.g., team efficacy and group cohesion) (Mathieu et al., 2008).  
According to these studies, the causal mechanisms through which a structure 
influences the processes and outcomes include but are not limited to resource allocation, 
levels of dependence or interdependency, and generating incentives (Molm, 1990; Yin & 
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Zajac, 2004). As indicated by structural thinking, the structure of a system (e.g., team, 
organization, or network) affects the behaviors and processes of the system which, in 
turn, determines the outcomes of this system (DeCanio, Dibble, & Amir-Atefi, 2000; 
Hansen & Wernerfelt, 1989; Reagans & McEvily, 2003). If we apply this theoretical lens 
to look at the crowd development, we argue that different elements of event design (e.g., 
specific crowdsourcing task, evaluation criteria, participation rule, payment size, and 
event length) constitute a unique structure in crowdsourcing. This particular structure 
influences how solvers and sponsors (i.e., focal buying companies) interact with each 
other, thus determining the outcomes of a crowd in crowdsourcing (e.g., crowd 
productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness). The detailed application of structural thinking 
in this dissertation is discussed in the following chapter.  
Summary 
In this chapter, we conducted a comprehensive review on the recent development 
of crowdsourcing literature. Because of the increasing popularity of crowdsourcing in 
innovation processes, the human crowd has emerged as an alternative collective supplier. 
As such, academic research on crowdsourcing has develops quickly in recent years. 
However, this research stream is at an early stage. Our extensive literature review 
indicates the existence of several significant research gaps that further motives us to 
develop this dissertation to enrich crowdsourcing literature and supply chain literature.   
First, issues such as the crowd and crowd development are under-examined. 
Scholars implicitly assumed that a crowd exists before a crowdsourcing event initiates 
(e.g., Afuah & Tucci, 2012). Crowd characteristics (i.e., pervasiveness of problem-
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solving know-how in a crowd and motivation of potential solvers with solution 
knowledge) are also assumed to be known to decision-makers when they consider the 
possibility of crowdsourcing. Following these two assumptions, managers do not need to 
think of the issue of crowd development. However, these assumptions are not justified 
since a crowd emerges only after the crowdsourcing decision has been made. Since these 
participants are nested online and are located all over the world (Howe, 2006), it is 
impossible for decision makers to know the characteristics of a crowd in advance.  
Besides, individuals’ decisions to participate in or withdraw from a particular 
crowdsourcing event are greatly influenced by the conditions specified by focal buying 
firms for the crowdsourced tasks (Haas et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2014). The characteristics 
of a crowd for a particular crowdsourcing event thus remain unknown to decision-
makers. Therefore, it is theoretically possible but unrealistic to discuss how the 
characteristics of a crowd in crowdsourcing influence the manager’s decision on 
crowdsourcing. It is no wonder that current crowdsourcing literature lacks empirical 
studies that test the crowdsourcing theory proposed by Afuah and Tucci (2012). There 
also exists no framework that explains crowd development in current crowdsourcing 
literature. This research void will be addressed in chapter 3.  
Second, our literature review identifies multiple theoretical lenses (e.g., contagion 
thinking, diffusion theory, and tournament theory) that are useful in explaining crowd 
development, but they suggest different mechanisms underlying crowd development. For 
instance, both contagion thinking and diffusion theory propose a contagion mechanism 
through which managers can facilitate the spreading of suppliers’ participation behavior 
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to form a crowd for a particulate crowdsourcing event (e.g., Le Bon, 1960; Rogers, 
2010). However, tournament theory advocates a competition mechanism through which 
managers can administrate the growth of a crowd for an event by creating beneficial 
conditions for suppliers to compete with each other (e.g., Connelly et al., 2014; 
Terwiesch & Xu, 2008). It remains unclear which mechanism is more applicable in 
explaining crowd development in crowdsourcing since no research in current 
crowdsourcing literature has examined this issue. This deficiency will be addressed in the 
first empirical study in first section of chapter 4.  
Third, our literature review discovers some conflicting findings on the 
performance implication of crowd attributes. For instance, the “homophily effect” (e.g., 
Bockstedt et al., 2015) and “marginality effect” (e.g., Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010) indicate 
that crowd diversity could have opposite implications for performance: the former would 
suggest a negative influence while the later would indicate a positive effect. These 
conflicting findings offer opposite implications for managers to organize a crowd in 
crowdsourcing. The existence of these contradictory findings suggests an insufficient 
understanding of the associations between crowd attributes and crowd performance, 
which motivates us to develop the second empirical study in this dissertation. The theory 
development of this study will be addressed in the second section of chapter 4. 
Finally, our literature review indicates that some scholars with the distant search 
view in the empirical research stream argue that crowdsourcing can allow firms to find 
“novel” solutions (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010). This argument 
suggests that crowd solution quality is a crowd-level performance indicator, in addition to 
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crowd productivity and crowd efficiency introduced in the introduction section. Through 
a few empirical studies, we found that managers have a strong selection bias caused by 
limited cognitive attention and familiarity bias when they evaluate the solution quality 
(Boudreau, Guinan, et al., 2016; Piezunka & Dahlander, 2015). To avoid this section 
bias, we focus on quantitative crowd-level performance (i.e., crowd productivity and 
crowd efficiency) in our empirical tests.  
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Chapter 3: Crowd Development Framework 
This chapter conceptually addresses the issue of crowd development from a 
structural thinking perspective. Based on four descriptive cases on crowd development, 
this chapter proposes a crowd development framework termed as the double-funnel 
model. Through this conceptual development, this dissertation lays down the theoretical 
foundations for the two empirical examinations in the following chapter.  
Introduction 
A crowd in crowdsourcing refers to a collective of agents (e.g., individuals, 
teams, and/or firms) who are nested within a network and share a common focus such as 
a scientific problem-solving, a product design, or a logo design (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; 
Howe, 2006). As the application of crowdsourcing becomes popular (Roth et al., 2015), 
using a human crowd for solving innovation-related tasks is growing rapidly. Statistics 
show year-over-year growth in the global revenue of human crowd platforms was 53 
percent in 2010 and 74 percent in 2011 (Kaganer et al., 2013). Some scholars and 
analysts say that the application of human crowd is potentially more disruptive than the 
previous outsourcing or global sourcing (DeViney, Sturtevant, Zadeh, Peluso, & Tambor, 
2012; Kaganer et al., 2013). They claim that the application of human crowd will 
“reshape established business processes, redraw organizational boundaries, and – most 
importantly – profoundly change global labor markets” (Kaganer et al., 2013, p. 24). Due 
to the increasing application of crowdsourcing in innovation processes, crowd 
management becomes an important and arising issue for supply chain managers (Kaganer 
et al., 2013; Malhotra & Majchrzak, 2014).  
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Despite a growing popularity and reliance on a crowd in practice, relatively little 
research prescribes how to manage a crowd more effectively and efficiently (Wooten & 
Ulrich, 2017). Specifically, current crowdsourcing literature lacks research framework to 
describe the crowd development process. Unlike a supplier development in outsourcing, 
crowd development in crowdsourcing involves an open-call process, a loosely-coupled 
buyer-supplier relationship, very limited suppliers’ information visibility, and suppliers’ 
self-selection. These differences make it impossible for supply chain managers to apply 
knowledge from supplier development to manage a crowd development in 
crowdsourcing. Due to a lack of understanding, many professionals and academic 
scholars express their concerns and doubts on applying crowds in their innovation 
processes (Clough, Sanderson, Tang, Gollins, & Warner, 2013; Euchner, 2010). Scholars 
thus call for research that can help managers better engage, utilize, and organize crowds 
in innovation processes (Felin et al., 2015).  
In this chapter, we intend to develop a crowd development framework that can 
help both managers and scholars in the supply chain field better understand and utilize a 
crowd in crowdsourcing. Specifically, we first identify stages of crowd development by 
reviewing four illustrative crowd development cases. Based on these illustrative cases, 
we compare the differences between a crowd development and supplier development in 
traditional sourcing literature. We then draw from structural thinking perspective to 
discuss how each stage of crowd development process relates to crowd development and 
crowd performance. In this process, we also identify theoretical constructs related to each 
stage of crowd development so as to facilitate academic research on crowd management 
(Felin et al., 2015).  
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Illustrative Examples of Crowd Development  
As indicated by our literature review in the previous chapter, the issue of crowd 
development is under-developed in current crowdsourcing literature and there exist no 
research frameworks for crowd development in this research stream. We thus illustrate 
four crowd development cases to increase academic understanding of this emergent 
crowd-development process. The four cases come from four industries (e.g., aviation, 
recreation, services, and medical) and three categories of business: corporations (e.g., 
Airbus and Netflix), a crowdsourcing platform (e.g., Topcoder), and a non-government 
organization (e.g., Harvard Catalyst). These cases represent crowd development under 
different situations, i.e., outsourcing crowd development (e.g., Airbus Cargo Challenge, 
Harvard Catalyst Experiment, and Topcoder Programming Contest) and making crowd 
development (e.g., Netflix Prize Challenge). We believe that these cases are 
representative for crowd development in tournament-based crowdsourcing. We pull 
information from multiple sources (e.g., Web of Science, Google Scholar, and Website) 
to recapture the crowd-development process for these four cases.  
Airbus Cargo Drone Challenge.  In early 2016, Airbus intended to identify the next 
generation of multi-purpose drones and to seek a safe, easy-to-operate and affordable 
drone solution that could be used for many civil applications including last-mile 
humanitarian logistics (Local Motors, 2016). Instead of relying on internal development 
or contract outsourcing, Airbus created the Airbus Cargo Drone Challenge in partnership 
with Local Motors, a US-based vehicle innovation company focused on low-volume 
52 
manufacturing of pen-sourced motor vehicle designs using co-creation (Moritz, Redlich, 
& Wulfsberg, 2016).  
Airbus first created the design specifications regarding size, weight, and operation 
mode (Moritz et al., 2016). For instance, the design should be capable of vertical takeoff 
and landing, and vehicle weight when fully loaded should be less than 25 kg (i.e., around 
55 pounds) (Local Motors, 2016). Total payment size was set as $117,500, which would 
be awarded in three categories (main award voted by Airbus executives: 1st: $50,000, 2nd: 
$20,000, 3rd: $10,000; cargo prize voted by cargo industry experts: 1st: $15,000, 2nd: 
$5,000, 3rd: $2,500; community prize voted by Local Motors’ community designers: 1st: 
$10,000; 2nd: $3,000, 3rd: $2,000). After Airbus identified the design requirement and 
specified the payment policy, Local Motors broadcasted this challenge to its online 
design community, which has around 300,000 members including engineers, fans, 
investors, and enthusiasts from all over the world (Warwick, 2016).  
This event started on April 12, 2016. After the initiation date, thousands of 
designers from Local Motors’ design community started to participate in this competition 
and submitted their designs. Each submission has its own webpage where all information 
(e.g., text, design, drawings etc.) on the design is posted online and other community 
members can make comments. All submissions were publicly available and licensed 
under Creative Commons (CC-BY-NC-SA) (Warwick, 2016). By May 22, 2016 (i.e., six 
weeks later after the initiation day), Airbus and Local Motors received 425 solutions. 
After the submission deadline, all solutions were checked for validity according to the 
specified requirements. Then, the voting was conducted by a panel including Airbus 
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executives, cargo industry experts, and Local Motors’ community designers. Winners 
were announced June 15, 2016.  This Airbus Cargo Drone Challenge demonstrates not 
only the great potential of a crowd in generating designs but also the different stages of 
crowd development (e.g., initiation, formation, realization, and evaluation). 
Harvard Catalyst’s Experiment.  Harvard Catalyst, a pan-university clinical 
translational science center situated at Harvard Medical School, intended to generate 
research topics to cure Type 1 diabetes in early 2010 (Guinan et al., 2013). Rather than 
working with the 17 health centers and more than 20,000 faculty, research staff, and 
graduate students affiliated with Harvard Medical School, Harvard Catalyst partnered 
with InnoCentive, an online crowdsourcing platform, and organized a challenge titled 
“What do we not know to cure Type 1 diabetes?”  
This crowdsourcing event, which was open for six weeks in 2010, was advertised 
throughout the Harvard and InnoCentive communities, and in the journal Nature as well. 
Harvard Catalyst offered $30,000 in awards. Within six weeks, 779 individual agents 
self-selected to compete in this contest. In the end, 163 agents submitted 195 solutions. 
These participants represented 17 counties and every continent except Antarctica. Their 
solutions encompassed a broad range of therapeutic areas including immunology, 
nutrition, stem cell/tissue engineering, biological mechanisms, prevention, and patient 
self-management (Guinan et al., 2013). A total of 150 submissions was identified as 
ready for evaluation after duplicates and incomplete submissions were filtered out. 
Harvard Catalyst opened the process of evaluation by inviting experts with widely 
disparate knowledge bases to select noteworthy solution submissions.  
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In the end, 142 Harvard Medical School faculty reviewed and evaluated 150 
submissions. After aggregating the anonymous evaluations form all reviewers, Harvard 
Catalyst provided awards to the 12 best submissions based on the average score. Winners 
included a human resources professional with Type 1 diabetes, a college senior, an 
associate professor of biostatistics, a retired dentist with a family member with diabetes, 
faculty biomedical researchers, and an endocrinologist (Guinan et al., 2013). The 
background of the winners indicates the importance of diversity in creative problem-
solving. The Harvard Catalyst’s experiment shows the power of a crowd in generating 
solutions and the sequential process of crowd development such as initiation, formation, 
and evaluation.  
Netflix Prize Challenge.  Netflix desired to develop a software that would achieve a 
10 percent improvement in the DVD rental firm’s algorithm-based movie 
recommendation system in 2006 (Bennett & Lanning, 2007; Zhou, Wilkinson, Schreiber, 
& Pan, 2008). Netflix provided over 100 million ratings from over 480,000 randomly 
chosen, anonymous subscribers on nearly 18 thousand movie tiles. Netflix made this data 
publically available on its website and created the 2006 Netflix Prize Challenge. A grand 
prize of $1 million would be awarded to the first person or team that reached the goal of 
10 percent improvement (Bell & Koren, 2007).  
This competition began on October 2, 2006. Hundreds of thousands of people 
competed in this challenge. By Jun 2007, over 20,000 teams had registered for this 
competition from over 150 countries, and 2,000 teams had submitted over 13,000 
solutions (Bennett & Lanning, 2007). Due to the complexity of this challenge, no team 
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had ever achieved the goal of 10 percent improvement before June 2009. To maintain and 
stimulate the crowd growth, Netflix offered two progress prizes with $50,000 in 2007 and 
2008 to the team that achieved the best performance among all participants. Netflix 
stopped gathering submissions for the Netflix Prize Challenge on July 26, 2009 and 
announced the $1 million grand prize to a team who achieved a 10.05 percent 
improvement (Netflix, 2009). This Netflix Prize Challenge denotes the productivity of a 
crowd and also the complexity of a crowd development under a situation for a very 
complex task.  
Topcoder – IBM Discount Mobile Apps Design Challenge.  Established in 2001, 
Topcoder is a leading platform for delivering crowdsourced software solutions for IT-
intensive organizations by soliciting independent programmers from around the world to 
compete in a regular stream of software contests (Boudreau et al., 2011). Over the years, 
Topcoder has served companies such as Best Buy, Eli Lilly, IBM, and GEICO (Lakhani, 
Garvin, & Lonstein, 2010). Latest statistics from Topcoder community shows that 
Topcoder has more than one million active online programmers from all over the world, 
and that there are hundreds of them competing in programming contests every day 
(Topcoder, 2017b). Our observations collected from Topcoder’s website show that 
Topcoder organized 6,825 programing contests on behalf of its clients between July 4, 
2014 and October 18, 2016. On average, there were eight programming events every day 
during our data collection time frame. The following paragraph describes the crowd 
development for a discount mobile application design challenge organized by Topcoder 
for IBM in November 2014 (ID: 30047222).  
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Topcoder first worked with IBM to identify software needs. The goal of this 
“IBM – Discount Mobile Apps Design Challenge” was to create a new mobile 
application that would help IBM employees find places where they could use their IBM 
company discount. According to the identified needs, Topcoder transferred specific needs 
to programming design requirements (e.g., screen features, navigation, and dashboard), 
guidelines (e.g., font size, colors, platform), and judging criteria (e.g., visual effect, 
cleanliness of design, and compatibility with smartphone). After the requirements were 
clarified, Topcoder posted this event on its website. The total payment size was decided 
at $2,450 (i.e., 1st: $1,500; 2nd: $650; 3rd: $300). The event start data and end data were 
specified at 8:00 EST, Nov 15, 2014 and 8:01 EST, Dec 1, 2014, respectively (i.e., event 
length is 16 days/384 hours). After this event went alive on its website, designers from 
Topcoder’s community registered online for participating in this design challenge and 
started to submit solutions. During the crowd formation process, IBM offered feedbacks 
to suppliers who submitted solutions at 8:14 EST, Nov 20, 2014.  
In total 51 programmers participated in this competition. The first submission was 
made on 11:46 EST, Nov 15, 2014 (i.e., 3.16 days after the starting date), and the last 
submission was on 7:53 EST, Dec 1, 2014 (i.e., 16 days after the starting date). 
Submissions were closed at the announced end time. For this particular design challenge, 
Topcoder received 19 submissions. Each contest submission was evaluated by a peer-
review panel of three expert members according to the judging criteria. Three winners 
were announced at 18:54 EST, Dec 3, 2014. According to each participant’s unique 
participation time, we plotted the accumulated number of registrants over the event 
length and got the following crowd emergence trajectory for this event (Figure 1). These 
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participants represented 11 countries including the United States, China, and India. 14 out 
of 51 participants had more than one year membership with Topcoder, and four had more 
than two years’ membership experience.  
Figure 7 
Crowd Emergence Trajectory for Event 30047222 
  
Data source: Topcoder4 
Summary of Crowd Development Cases 
 Through the above four illustrative crowd development cases, we know that a 
crowd development process involves multiple parties such as focal buying firms and 
multiple suppliers who are normally outside the buying firms’ network and might have 
no prior business relationships. If buying firms outsource the crowd development process 
like the Airbus case, a crowd development can also involve a crowdsourcing platform 
                                                          
4 https://www.topcoder.com/challenge-details/30047222/?type=design 
Time step 
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(e.g., InnoCentive). Each party has different objectives. Focal buying firms attempt to 
solve a particular task or problem (e.g., drone design or improving the prediction 
accuracy) by leveraging the distributed creativity outside the organizational boundaries. 
Suppliers self-select to participate and compete for winning. The crowdsourcing platform 
that is involved in crowd development process facilitates the financial transactions and IP 
transfer between buying companies and selected winner(s).  
The crowd development process involves an open call through which suppliers 
make their own participation decisions. Suppliers’ self-selection makes the crowd 
development process filled with uncertainties. For instance, buying firms do not know 
which supplier might participate in the crowdsourced event, how many suppliers will 
participate, how many solutions suppliers will generate, and what the quality of solutions 
will be. All these puzzles will not be resolved until the crowd emerges at the end of a 
crowdsourced event. The crowd for a crowdsourced event dissolves when the event 
reaches its deadline. In a sense, a crowd in crowdsourcing is not only transient but also an 
outcome of crowd-development process.  
As our literature review indicated in the previous section, crowd development is a 
process of identifying a collective of suppliers for a particular crowdsourcing event. This 
process shares some similarities to supplier development in traditional source literature. 
According to the above descriptions, we believe that significant differences exist between 
a crowd development in crowdsourcing and a supplier development in traditional 
outsource situation. Table 1 summarizes the main differences between these two 
processes. These significant differences indicate that crowd development in 
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crowdsourcing is not a controlled, deliberate, systematic process but an emergent, not 
calculated, unsystematic process. Due to these significant differences, we cannot use the 
knowledge about supplier development to understand and manage crowd development in 
crowdsourcing. Thus, a detailed description on crowd development becomes meaningful 
for both scholars and managers. We address this task in the following section. 
Table 1 
Difference between Crowd Development and Supplier Development 
  Crowd Development  Supplier Development  
Process openness An open call  A closed, systematic call  
Information visibility Low High 
Outcome uncertainty High Relative low 
Supplier autonomy  High  Low 
Relationship proximity Loosely coupled Closely connected 
Time horizon Short Relative long 
 
Double-Funnel Crowd Development Framework 
The above four illustrative cases suggest that a crowd development starts with the 
design of a crowdsourcing event (e.g., task specifications, payment, and event length etc.) 
and ends with winner announcement. Although the specific operations of crowd 
development might vary under different situations, the whole process generally goes 
through four stages: crowd initiation, crowd formation, crowd realization, and crowd 
evaluation. We describe each stage of a crowd development in the following section and 
discuss the application of each stage from the structural thinking perspective (Fritz, 1996; 
Molm, 1990).  
Crowd Initiation.  This is the starting point of a crowd development process. The 
main parties involved in this stage include focal buying firms (i.e., sponsors). This stage 
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also involves a crowdsourcing platform (i.e., organizer) if buying firms outsource their 
crowd development like in the Airbus Cargo Drone Challenge. The purpose of this stage 
is to design the crowdsourcing event, which is called tournament design in tournament 
literature (Che & Gale, 2003; Chen et al., 2011). At this stage, buying firms first identify 
the task that will be crowdsourced. The task can be very specific in the Netflix case and 
also very abstract in Harvard Catalyst’s case. They then need to clarify the requirements 
for the task and the criteria for evaluating solutions and selecting winners. Once the scope 
and requirements of a task are identified, the complexity of a task is determined from a 
task design perspective (Campbell, 1988; Wood, 1986; Zheng, Li, & Hou, 2011).  
The event design at this stage also includes specifying reward policy (i.e., 
payment size and payment structure), participation policy (e.g., individual based or team 
based), and determining the event length (i.e., event starting time and ending time). 
Specifications related to payment size and event length are objective and can be used to 
differentiate crowdsourcing tasks. One last element of the event design is to identify the 
target audience. This identification can be broad, as in the Netflix case (i.e., any online 
users who are interested in data analytics and algorithm design), or specific, as in the 
Airbus case (i.e., Local Motors’ community members). The target audience forms an 
“intended” crowd for a particular crowdsourcing event, which includes influential 
suppliers who are deemed to be most qualified based on their profiles (e.g., winning 
records, prior participation history, and skills) and non-influential ones.  
From a structural thinking perspective (Fritz, 1996; Molm, 1990), we believe that 
all these specifications and requirements made by the buying firms or crowdsourcing 
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platform constitute a structure for crowd development. This structure is made of very 
tangible elements such as crowdsourcing task, payment size, rewarding policy, and event 
length and some intangible elements like the target audience. Different combinations of 
these structural elements form unique structures for each crowdsourcing event, which 
influence how the targeted suppliers (e.g., agents) might interact with each other. Based 
on structural thinking (Caves, 1987; Harper, 2015; Molm, 1990), we argue that the 
structure of a crowdsourcing event will exert influence on suppliers’ subsequent 
behaviors (e.g., participation, effort-investment, risk-taking) in the crowd formation 
process that, in turn, will impact the final crowd performance outcomes.  
Crowd Formation.  After its initiation, a crowd-development process goes into the 
formation stage which is the second and a very important stage of crowd development. 
Our selected cases indicate that this stage directly determines the outcomes of a 
crowdsourcing event. The main party involved in this stage is the suppliers (i.e., solvers, 
participants, or agents) who are nested in a virtual network. These suppliers can be 
individuals in most situations, but they can also be teams, as in the Netflix case. Suppliers 
make many decisions at this stage. For instance, they decide whether and when they 
participate in a particular contest, whether they withdraw or sustain their participation, 
and whether and when they submit their solutions. As the crowd emergence trajectory for 
the Topcoder – IBM case indicates, suppliers’ participation decisions are not made 
simultaneously but gradually. This trajectory suggests that crowd formation is mainly 
based on suppliers’ participation decisions. Depending on the situations, buying firms or 
crowdsourcing platform might interact with suppliers by providing feedback to suppliers 
who participate in a contest at this stage (e.g., Topcoder – IBM case).  
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The information available in our four cases provides a brief description on what’s 
going on supplier’ behaviors (i.e., participation, withdrawal, and submission) in a 
crowdsourcing contest. The knowledge from tournament literature suggest that suppliers’ 
behaviors depend on many factors such as payment size, skills, and expected chances of 
winning (Connelly et al., 2014). Current academic interests on this stage focuses on 
suppliers’ motivations for participation (Brabham, 2008, 2010, 2010) and interaction 
mechanisms (Bothner et al., 2007). The identified motivations include extrinsic 
motivations (e.g., money, reputation, and skills development) and intrinsic motivations 
(e.g., fun, a sense of belonging, and achievement) (Brabham, 2010, 2012). Potential 
interaction mechanisms among suppliers include imitation (i.e., social contagion) 
(Brabham, 2010; Le Bon, 1897) and competition (Bognanno, 2001; Boudreau, Lakhani, 
et al., 2016; Morgan & Wang, 2010). There also exists many other potential issues at the 
crowd formation stage that are worthy of further exploration. For instance, the growth 
speed of a crowd and its antecedents.  
From a structural thinking perspective, crowd formation is an intermediate 
process in which suppliers interact to form a crowd for a particular crowdsourcing event. 
Specifically, suppliers evaluate the attractiveness of a crowdsourcing event according to 
not only the tangible structural elements of an event (e.g., task complexity, payment size, 
and event length) but also the emergent structural elements like competition intensity 
(i.e., the number of participants) (Connelly et al., 2014; Terwiesch & Xu, 2008). Since 
suppliers make their participation decision gradually, the competition intensity is 
dynamic in the crowd formation process. As indicated by the tournament literature, 
competition intensity determines the suppliers’ winning chances for a contest that, in 
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turn, impacts suppliers’ effort investments and potential final outcomes (Körpeoğlu & 
Cho, 2017; Terwiesch & Xu, 2008). We thus believe that crowd formation is a dynamic 
and complicated process and the competition mechanism underlying suppliers’ multiple 
behaviors can explain the relationship between the structure of a crowdsourcing event 
and final performance outcomes.  
Crowd Realization.  From a structural thinking perspective, the crowd realization is a 
transient stage between crowd formation and crowd evaluation. The reason that we argue 
this stage is transient is because a crowd for a particular crowdsourcing contest dissolves 
immediately after the contest ends. The main actors at this stage are suppliers whose 
main decisions are to submit their solution(s) before the ending time. After the event 
ending time, buying firms and/or crowdsourcing platforms close the solution submission 
link and automatically announce the completion of a crowdsourcing event. This stage is 
the time that a crowd for an event finally emerges. We refer the crowd that emerges in the 
end as the realized crowd.  
Through this realized crowd, buying companies can get crowd-level attributes 
such as crowd size (i.e., the number of participants) and crowd diversity (i.e., the extent 
of differences in terms of demographic background and skills). For instance, the crowd 
size for the IBM Discount Mobile Apps Contest was 51. The crowd members came from 
11 different countries including the United States, China, and India. Some crowd 
members were senior programmers with many years of programming contest experience. 
Some quantitative crowd outcomes are available at the realization stage. For instance, 
once suppliers submit their solutions by the event expiration day, buying firms and 
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crowdsourcing platforms know the number of solutions generated by a crowd (i.e., crowd 
productivity). Another quantitative crowd-level performance indicator that can be 
operationalized at the realization stage is crowd efficiency defined as the relative speed 
with which a crowd finishes a crowdsourcing task. For instance, the shortest task time for 
the IBM Discount Mobile Apps Contest was 3.16 days and the average task time for this 
contest was 7.53 days.  
Crowd Evaluation.  After realization, the crowd development process moves into 
crowd evaluation (i.e., solution evaluation), the last stage of a crowd development. Main 
parties that are involved in this stage are buying firms and/or crowdsourcing platforms, 
whose main actions are to organize a panel and evaluate solutions generated by a crowd 
according to the specified criteria. Based on the evaluation outcomes and relative ranking 
of solutions, buying firms or the crowdsourcing platform announce the winners, reward 
the winners according the announced payment size and structure, and manage the transfer 
of intellectual property.  
 In the evaluation process, buying firms and crowdsourcing platform acquire 
quality- related crowd outcomes, such as the percentage of viable solutions. In the 
Harvard Catalyst case, 12 out of the 150 submissions, i.e., 8 percent, is deemed to be 
winning solutions. According to structural thinking, the qualitative crowd performance is 
a function of the conducts of suppliers in the crowd formation (e.g., competition, risk-
taking, and effort investment) which, in turn, is a function of the structure of crowd 
development (e.g., task complexity, payment size, and event length) (Bain, 1956; Harper, 
2015). 
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Although one of the main purposes of using a crowd in an innovation process is to 
acquire novel solutions (i.e., distant search), empirical studies show that managers 
unintentionally give low scores to the solutions that they are not familiar with when they 
evaluate the quality of solutions due to their narrow attention and familiarity mentality 
(Boudreau, Guinan, et al., 2016; Piezunka & Dahlander, 2015). Because of the existence 
of evaluation bias, we believe that the quantitative outcomes (e.g., crowd productivity 
and crowd efficiency) are more objective than quality outcomes in crowdsourcing. We 
thus mainly focuses on qualitative crowd performance in this dissertation. 
Summary  
In this chapter, we illustrate crowd development through four cases and identify 
different stages of crowd-development process. By putting the four stages of crowd 
development on a temporal scale and considering relevant variables involved at each 
stage, we develop the following process framework for crowd development (Figure 8). 
As shown in this framework, a crowd development starts from an initiation stage in 
which firms specify elements of a crowdsourcing event design such as the specific task, 
reward policy, and targeted suppliers. Through these specifications, we can 
operationalize and differentiate crowdsourcing events via a series of constructs such as 
task complexity, payment size, and event length. After the initiation stage, the crowd 
development process goes into formation stage. In this stage, suppliers from the 
“intended crowd” (i.e., targeted suppliers) and outside of the specification boundary self-
select to participate and compete with each other to provide the best solutions. During 
this stage, some supplier might sustain their participation and submit their solutions, 
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while others might withdraw their participation. A crowd for a particular crowdsourcing 
event finally emerges at the specified ending time of this event. After that, the whole 
process goes into evaluation stage. This is the time that managers evaluate the 
productivity and efficiency of a crowd as well as the usefulness and novelty of the 
solutions generated by a crowd.  
Figure 8 
Double-Funnel Crowd Development Framework 
  
This framework indicates that a crowd-development process incorporates two 
filtering funnels. We thus call our proposed crowd development framework a “Double-
Funnel Model”. This framework not only maps out the crowd development process but 
also partitions the whole process into two testable potions. From a structural thinking 
perspective, the first portion addresses the influence of event design on the crowd 
formation (i.e., the structure – conduct link), which will be the first empirical study in this 
dissertation. The second portion deals with the performance implication of crowd 
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attributes (i.e., the conduct – performance link), which the second empirical test in this 
dissertation. The following chapter 4 will cover the detailed theory development of these 
two tests. 
Beyond the above support for this dissertation, the proposed double-funnel 
framework offers other implications for scholars and managers in the supply chain 
management field. For instance, scholars can compare the differences between intended 
crowd and realized crowd in a crowd-development process and further explore the 
conditions that are related to the differences. The double-funnel process framework is 
also promising in applying system dynamics lens (Choi, Dooley, & Rungtusanatham, 
2001; Dooley, 1997; Größler et al., 2008) to examine suppliers’ interactive behavior in 
crowd development and to study the influence of event design on the whole process. As 
for supply chain managers, this framework is the first time in current supply chain 
literature to map out an emergent process (i.e., crowd development) in innovation 
processes. Specific managerial implications will be addressed in the discussion section of 
this dissertation.  
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Chapter 4: Theory Development 
Overview of Theory Development 
This chapter addresses the theory development for the two empirical tests in this 
dissertation. Our proposed “Double-Funnel Crowd Development Framework” partitions 
the whole crowd-development process into two parts: formation and evaluation. Our 
theory development thus includes two sections: the first one covers the influence of event 
design on crowd formation, and the second is related to the performance implication of 
crowd attributes.  
The first theory development addresses the issue of crowd emergence, which 
refers to the arising of unexpected growth rate and crowd size in the crowd development 
process for a particular crowdsourcing event (Dooley & Corman, 2002; Holland, 2000). 
One rationale behind this study is current crowdsourcing literature lacks studies 
examining the influence of event design on crowd emergence. Both scholars and 
professionals thus have no reported knowledge on how to manage crowd emergence in 
crowdsourcing. Another reason is that tournament theory (Connelly et al., 2014; Lazear 
& Rosen, 1981) and diffusion theory (Rogers, 2010; Strang & Soule, 1998) suggest two 
mechanisms underlying crowd emergence (i.e., competition and contagion). These two 
mechanisms offer different predictions, sometimes even the opposite predictions, on the 
relationships between elements of event design and crowd emergence. We thus have two 
specific purposes for the first theory development. The first purpose is to address the 
relationships between elements of event design and crowd emergence. The second is to 
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examine whether tournament theory is more applicable than diffusion theory in 
explaining the relationships between elements of event design and crowd emergence. 
Our second theory development addresses the performance variation puzzle by 
analyzing the performance implication of crowd attributes. We examine two main crowd 
attributes suggested by the crowdsourcing and management literature: crowd size and 
crowd diversity. Crowd size is defined as the number of solvers (i.e., agents) participating 
in a crowdsourcing event (Liu et al., 2014), while crowd diversity refers to the extent of 
differences among crowd members in terms of background and demographic statistics 
(Daniel et al., 2013; Harrison & Klein, 2007; Horwitz & Horwitz, 2007; Ren et al., 2015).  
Many existing findings related to the performance implication of crowd attributes 
are contradict to each other. For instance, Boudreau, Lacetera, and Lakhani (2011) found 
that an increase in crowd size has a negative influence on solvers’ efforts and crowd 
performance due to a reduced chance of winning, but Bockstedt, Druehl, and Mishra 
(2015) identified a positive association between crowd size and crowd performance. As 
for the issue of diversity, Jeppesen and Lakhani (2010) argued that solvers who are 
marginal in terms of technical skills and social background are more likely to develop 
good solutions, indicating that an increase in crowd diversity can have a positive 
performance implication (i.e.. the marginality effect). However, Bockstedt, Druehl, and 
Mishra (2015) claimed that solvers who are similar to the buying companies are more 
likely to be the winners in crowdsourcing, suggesting that an increase in crowd diversity 
might have negative influence on performance (i.e., the homophily effect). These 
opposing findings demonstrate that our understanding on the performance implication of 
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crowd attributes is insufficient and incomplete. Thus, the first objective of our second 
theory development is to understand the relationships between crowd attributes and 
crowd performance. 
Some scholars argue that the competition mechanism based on tournament theory 
explains the relationship between crowd attributes and crowd performance (Boudreau et 
al., 2011), while others suggest that a search process based on innovation search literature 
can better explain the performance implications of crowd attributes (Afuah & Tucci, 
2012; Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010). These two mechanisms offer different explanations for 
how crowd attributes relate to crowd performance, which indicates that the true 
mechanism that links the crowd attributes and crowd performance is not quite clear. 
Therefore, the second objective of this theory development is to test whether a 
competition mechanism is more applicable than a search mechanism in explaining the 
relationship between crowd attributes and crowd performance.  
As indicated in the literature review chapter, we identified that different theories 
(e.g., diffusion theory and tournament theory) or research streams (e.g., search literature) 
offer opposing views on crowd emergence or crowd performance (e.g., crowd 
productivity). We thus took the strong inference epistemological approach developed by 
John R. Platt (1964) to develop alternative hypotheses. The strong inference approach is a 
model of scientific methodology that encourages a priori specification and the subsequent 
evaluation of multiple, often competing, hypotheses (Davis, 2006; Jewett, 2005; Platt, 
1964). Many scholars believe that this method can avoid the confirmation bias of a single 
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hypothesis and intensify the process of science (Nadler, Thompson, & Boven, 2003; 
Platt, 1964; Rungtusanatham, Forza, Koka, Salvador, & Nie, 2005).  
Understanding the Influence of Event Design on Crowd Emergence 
In this section, we develop hypotheses on the relationship between elements of 
event design and crowd emergence (i.e., crowd growth rate and crowd size). According 
to our discussion on crowd development in previous chapters, the elements of event 
design include task complexity, payment size, event length, and the involvement of 
influentials. Table 2 lists all the constructs used in this theory development. As indicated 
by our literature review in chapter 2, both diffusion theory and tournament theory offer 
different explanations on crowd formation. Specifically, diffusion theory takes the 
perspective that the crowd will form based on spreading of suppliers’ participation 
behavior within a supplier network (Goldenberg et al., 2009; Keller & Berry, 2003; 
Table 2 
Constructs in Theory Development for Crowd Emergence 
Constructs Definition  Reference  
Crowd growth 
rate 
The relative speed with which suppliers participate in a 
particular crowdsourcing event 
Rogers (2010) 
Crowd size The total number of suppliers that participate in a 
particular crowdsourcing event 
Liu et al. 
(2014) 
Task complexity The degree to which a crowdsourcing event is 
perceived is perceived as relatively difficult by 
suppliers to understand and solver   
Rogers (2010); 
Wood (1986) 
Payment size The amount of money specified for the winners in a 
tournament-based crowdsourcing event 
Lazear & 
Rosen (1981) 
Event length The amount of time specified for suppliers to solve a 
particular crowdsourcing event 
Connelly et al. 
(2014) 
Influential agents Suppliers whose behaviors and decision-making are 
influential to those of others within the same network 
Rogers (2010) 
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Rogers, 2010). This spreading depends on individual participants’ evaluation of the 
crowdsourcing task – i.e. ease of completion, task attractiveness, and participation of 
others (Boyd & Mason, 1999). On the contrary, tournament theory takes the perspective 
that the crowd will form based on each participant’s evaluation the competition – i.e., 
chance of winning, the amount of expected returns, and the amount of inputs (Connelly et 
al., 2014; Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Terwiesch & Xu, 2008). These two theoretical lenses 
offer different suggestions on how elements of event design in crowdsourcing relate to 
crowd growth and crowd size. We thus take a strong inference approach (Davis, 2006; 
Platt, 1964) and develop competing hypotheses in the following sections.  
Task Complexity and Crowd Emergence.   Task complexity refers to the degree 
to which a crowdsourced problem is perceived as relatively difficult by agents (i.e., 
solvers) to understand and solve (Rogers, 2010; Wood, 1986). Crowdsourcing tasks can 
be classified on the complexity-simplicity continuum. For instance, a mobile screen 
design challenge focused on creating concepts and visual solutions for customer 
relationship management application will be more complex than a web design challenge 
on information search (Topcoder, 2016). This is because the former challenge involves 
multiple interfaces (e.g., mobile, computers, and technical software) and the interactions 
among them, and requires solvers to consider and to incorporate more technical features 
in their designs. Both diffusion theory and tournament theory offer explanations for how 
task complexity of a crowdsourcing event influences the emergence of a crowd for a 
particular event, but the predictions on the relationships are opposite to each other.  
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From the lens of diffusion theory, crowd emergence is the process through a 
crowdsourced task communicated and diffused over the event cycle time among the 
solvers in a network. Diffusion theory suggests that complex tasks slow down crowd 
emergence (i.e., crowd growth rate and crowd size) for a few reasons. First, complex 
tasks increase solvers’ information processing cost and thus reduce the attractiveness of 
an event to potential solvers (Denis, Hébert, Langley, Lozeau, & Trottier, 2002; Rogers, 
2010). A complex task like the mobile screen design challenge normally has several 
components to consider, which involves more uncertainty for potential agents to solve 
(Campbell, 1988). Second, complex tasks expand solvers’ communication cost, 
diminishing the chances for solvers to communicate with other potential solvers and to 
spread the participation behavior within a solver community (Rogers, 1962, 2010). Third, 
task complexity relates to solvers’ information searching costs. Complex tasks increase 
the cognitive demands placed on the solvers who might be interested in solving this task 
(Campbell, 1988; Wood, 1986). A crowdsourced task that is perceived to be too complex 
to understand or solve may result in a state of information overload among potential 
solvers (Meyer, Johnson, & Ethington, 1997). We thus propose that, 
H1a (b): In the context of tournament-based crowdsourcing, crowd growth rate 
(crowd size) is negatively related to task complexity of a crowdsourcing event. 
By contrast to diffusion theory, tournament theory suggests that the relationship 
between task complexity and crowd emergence is not linear but quadratic. From this 
theoretical lens, task complexity influences crowd emergence through two mechanisms 
(e.g., pay disparity and motivation), both of which suggest the existence of a quadratic 
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relationship between task complexity and crowd emergence. First, as empirical evidence 
from corporate tournaments (Henderson & Fredrickson, 2001) suggests, task complexity 
is positively related to pay disparity defined as the spread between the winning prize and 
losing (Lazear & Rosen, 1981). When pay disparity is small, agents are not sufficiently 
incentivized to compete with other. However, there is a point of diminishing return. A 
large pay disparity can create tournament inefficiencies as it induces excessive effort on 
behalf of the agents, for which they must be compensated (Lazear & Rosen, 1981; 
Wowak et al., 2016).  
Second, task complexity can be positively associated with solvers’ willingness to 
participate, but it can also have negative influence once the level of complexity increases 
to a certain point. An increase in the task complexity can advance the level of challenge 
and activation, which can stimulate solvers’ curiosity and enjoyment (Bendoly, Croson, 
Goncalves, & Schultz, 2010). Participating in solving complex problems can also 
strength solvers’ social recognition and reputation, send out positive signals about their 
skills, and escalate their personal advancement (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 
2011; Leimeister, Huber, Bretschneider, & Krcmar, 2009). However, complex tasks place 
high cognitive burden on solvers, which might lead to information overload and 
discomfort to solvers and cause them to lose interest and withdraw their willingness to 
participate (Zheng et al., 2011), thus slowing down the crowd emergence.  
H1c (d): In the context of tournament-based crowdsourcing, crowd growth rate 
(crowd size) is curvilinear related to task complexity of a crowdsourcing event in 
an inverted-U shape. 
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Payment Size and Crowd Emergence. Payment size is an important element of 
event design when buying companies create crowdsourcing events. It refers to the 
amount of money specified for a crowdsourced event. Depending on the nature of the 
task crowdsourced, the payment size varies with a wide range. For instance, statistics 
show that the payment size for the programming contests hosted by Topcoder between 
July 2014 and October 2016 fluctuated from zero to $100,000 with a mean of $1,127.83 
and a standard deviation of $1,592.26. Both diffusion theory and tournament theory agree 
that financial payment is an effective mechanism to attract solvers to participate and 
stimulate the crowd emergence, but they provide opposite implications on the 
relationship between payment size and crowd emergence.  
Diffusion theory suggests that payment size can have a positive effect on the 
crowd emergence for a particular crowdsourcing event. This is because payment size is 
positively related to relative advantage of an innovation which is often expressed as 
economic profitability (Rogers, 2010). Other things being equal, an increase in the 
payment size can increase the expected return. Studies in the diffusion literature 
demonstrate that the relative advantage of an innovation is positively related to perceived 
attractiveness and diffusion rate (Boyd & Mason, 1999). Following this logic, we believe 
that a crowdsourcing event with a large payment size can stimulate the crowd emergence 
for this event by increasing the attractiveness of this event to solvers. Moreover, as many 
new crowdsourcing events occur every day, payment size serves as a signal for the 
importance of an event. Participating in an event with a large payment size cannot only 
saves solvers’ time in evaluating attractiveness of events, but also increase solvers’ social 
reputations (Connelly et al., 2011; Zheng et al., 2011). For instance, participating in the 
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Harvard Catalyst’s Experiment that is incentivized with $1 million can surely increase a 
solver’s social recognition in the scientific problem-solving community (Guinan et al., 
2013; Lakhani et al., 2007). 
H2a (b): In the context of tournament-based crowdsourcing, crowd growth rate 
(crowd size) is positively related to payment size of a crowdsourcing event. 
However, tournament theory that is based on agents’ utilization maximization 
thinking suggests that a large payment size can exert a negative influence on the crowd 
emergence for a crowdsourcing event. This is because a large payment size can 
potentially attract many agents to participate in a particular crowdsourcing event and 
increase the competition intensity within a crowd (Bognanno, 2001; Liu et al., 2014). 
Many research in tournament literature has shown that strong competition for a particular 
event dilutes the chance of winning and reduces the attractiveness of an event to its 
potential solvers (Boudreau et al., 2011; Garcia & Tor, 2009), thus slowing down the 
crowd emergence for an event with large payment size.  
H2c (d): In the context of tournament-based crowdsourcing, crowd growth rate 
(crowd size) is negatively related to payment size of a crowdsourcing event. 
Event Length and Crowd Emergence.  Another element of event design that firms 
need to specify before launching a crowdsourcing event is the event length, which refers 
to the amount of time (in hours, days, weeks, or months) specified for a crowdsourced 
task. Similar to payment size, event length widely varies, depending on issues such as the 
nature of the task and time pressure facing the buying firms. For instance, the average 
length for the programming contests hosted by Topcoder between July 2014 and October 
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2016 was around two weeks, while the shortest one was a few hours and the longest was 
almost three months. Depending on the theoretical lens that we draw, event length can 
have positive or negative implications on the crowd emergence. 
From a diffusion perspective, the longer the event length, the better for a crowd to 
emerge. Looking from the lens of diffusion theory, crowd emergence is a process by 
which a particular event or task is communicated through a crowdsourcing platform over 
the event cycle time among the registered online members (Robertson, 1967; Rogers & 
Shoemaker, 1971). An event with long cycle time can give buying firms more time to 
broadcast the event to as many solvers as possible and allow solvers to diffuse the 
information via “word-of-mouth” to other potential solvers (Valente & Rogers, 1995; 
Van den Bulte & Joshi, 2007). In the meantime, long event length allows agents to search 
more information and to learn necessary skills, thus reducing the uncertainty associated 
with problem solving and solution-creation in crowdsourcing. An increase in the event 
length can then increase the attractiveness of a particular crowdsourcing event to 
potential solvers, thus facilitating the emergence of a crowd for a particular 
crowdsourcing event.  
H3a (b): In the context of tournament-based crowdsourcing, crowd growth rate 
(crowd size) is positively related to event length of a crowdsourcing event. 
However, tournament theory indicates that an increase in the event length can 
create a practical situation called problem crowding which means that multiple 
crowdsourcing events run simultaneously (Piezunka & Dahlander, 2015). For instance, 
statistics from Topcoder show that there were around eight programming contests, on 
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average, running every day between July 2014 and October 2016. Other things being 
equal, an increase in the event length can lead to more events running simultaneously, 
i.e., problem crowding. Problem crowding is challenging and problematic because 
solvers are limited in terms of their attention and the ability to process information 
(Hansen & Haas, 2001; Ocasio, 1997). Problem crowding dilutes potential solvers’ 
attention and reduces the perceived attractiveness of a particular crowdsourcing event 
(Piezunka & Dahlander, 2015). Therefore, long event length is actually detrimental for 
crowd emergence.  
H3c (d): In the context of tournament-based crowdsourcing, crowd growth rate 
(crowd size) is negatively related to event length of a crowdsourcing event. 
Influential Agents and Crowd Emergence.  Influential agents in crowdsourcing 
refer to solvers whose decisions and behaviors influence those of others in the same 
network. In the social network literature, such people are called opinion leaders, mavens, 
or hubs, depending on the aspect of influence in question (Van den Bulte & Wuyts, 
2007). Scholars in both diffusion literature and tournament literature have been interested 
in examining the influence of influential agents for a while (Greenhalgh et al., 2004; 
Rogers, 1962, 2010). In a crowdsourcing context, issues related to influential agents 
include the number of influential agents involved and the timing that these agents 
participate in an event.  
From a diffusion perspective, influential agents can trigger the imitation 
mechanism within a crowd (Le Bon, 1897; Roger, 2010). Lower ranking community 
members aspire to be like influentials and find it useful to resemble powerful leaders. 
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Participation by influential agents shifts community norm or interaction patterns 
sufficiently that others might find it hard not to go along (Strang & Soule, 1998). 
Influential agents involved in a particular crowdsourcing event shows a positive signal of 
attractiveness of this event to other potential solvers in the same network (Connelly et al., 
2011). The more influential agents participate in an event, the more positive influence 
they can exert on crowd emergence. The earlier influential agents become involved in an 
event, the sooner they will initiate the imitation of other potential agents. They can also 
show the positive attractiveness signal earlier, thus increasing the crowd growth.  
H4a (b): In the context of tournament-based crowdsourcing, crowd growth rate 
(crowd size) is positively related to the number of influential agents participating 
in a crowdsourcing event. 
H5a (b): In the context of tournament-based crowdsourcing, crowd growth rate 
(crowd size) is negatively related to the early involvement of influential agents 
participating in a crowdsourcing event. 
However, tournament theory suggests that influential agents shrink the winning 
chance of other potential agents and thus reduce the perceived attractiveness of an event 
to them, thus slowing the growth of a crowd (Brown, 2011; Garcia & Tor, 2009). The 
more influential agents are involved in an event, the stronger the negative influence that 
they impose on other potential agents. The earlier influential agents participate in a 
crowdsourcing event, the sooner other potential agents realize their diminishing chance of 
winning due to the participation of influential agents. Under such a situation, the crowd 
grows slowly. On the contrary, the later influential agents are involved in an event, the 
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less other potential agents perceive the threat from influential agents and have more 
chance to increase the crowd growth.  
H4c (d): In the context of tournament-based crowdsourcing, crowd growth rate is 
(negatively) related to the number of influential agents participating in a 
crowdsourcing event. 
H5c (d): In the context of tournament-based crowdsourcing, crowd growth rate 
(crowd size) is positively related to the early involvement of influential agents 
participating in a crowdsourcing event. 
Summary  In this first theory development section, we develop hypotheses on the 
influence of event design on crowd emergence (i.e., crowd growth rate and crowd size) 
by drawing from diffusion theory and tournament theory. The following Figure 1 
summarize the theoretical model that we propose in this theory development. As 
indicated by our proposed theoretical model, diffusion theory and tournament theory 
offers different predictions on the relationships between crowd attributes and crowd 
emergence. Specifically, diffusion theory mainly offers a contagion view based on 
individual participant’s considerations of the crowdsourcing task – i.e. ease of 
completion, task attractiveness, and participation of others. Tournament theory provides a 
competition view that is based by individual participants’ evaluation of the chance of 
winning and the expected returns. Empirical testing on this theoretical model will be 
addressed in the following chapters.  
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Figure 9 
Theoretical Model for Crowd Emergence 
 
Understanding the Performance Implications of Crowd Attributes 
In this section, we develop hypotheses on the relationship between crowd 
attributes and crowd performance. We focus our performance on crowd productivity and 
crowd efficiency. The following Table 3 lists all the constructs used in this theory 
development. As indicated by our literature review in chapter 2, both innovation search 
and tournament literature offer explanations on how crowd attributes relate to crowd 
performance. Specifically, innovation search view takes the perspective that crowd 
performance depends on the extensiveness and effectiveness of recombinant search, 
which, in turn, relies on changes in crowd attributes (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Fleming & 
Sorenson, 2004; Laursen & Salter, 2006). On the contrary, tournament theory argues that 
crowd performance hinges upon individual participants’ competition behavior which is 
contingent on factors such as chance of winning, expected returns, and competitive social 
comparison within crowd members (Che & Gale, 2003; Boudreau et al., 2011; Bothner et 
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al., 2007). These two explanations are different to each other. We thus take a strong 
inference approach (Davis, 2006; Platt, 1964) and develop competing hypotheses on how 
crowd attributes relate to crowd productivity and crowd efficiency in crowdsourcing in 
the following sections.  
Crowd Size and Crowd Performance.  Scholars conceptualize crowdsourcing as a 
solution to distant search over a landscape (Afuah & Tucci, 2012). Landscapes offers a 
useful heuristic for thinking about the space that firms must search when attempting to 
discover solutions for their crowdsourced tasks (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Fleming & 
Sorenson, 2004). Search includes two dimensions: search depth and search scope. Search 
breadth is defined as the number of external sources or search channels that firms reply 
on in their innovative activities, while search depth refers to the extent to which firms 
draw deeply from the different external sources or search channels (Laursen & Salter, 
2006). Combing landscape with a search algorithm allows us to make predictions 
regarding the likely outcomes of a crowd in crowdsourcing.  
Table 3 
Constructs in Theory Development for Performance Implications of Crowd Attributes 
Constructs Definition  Reference  
Crowd 
performance 
The quantitative outcomes of a crowd in 
crowdsourcing 
Cohen & 
Bailey (1997) 
Crowd 
productivity 
The amount of outputs produced by a crowd in 
crowdsourcing 
Horwitz & 
Horwitz (2007) 
Crowd efficiency The relative speed with which a crowd solves a 
particular crowdsourced task 
Horwitz & 
Horwitz (2007) 
Crowd size The total number participants for a particular 
crowdsourcing event 
Liu et al. 
(2014) 
Crowd diversity The extent of differences among crowd members in 
terms of background and demographic statistics  
Harrison & 
Klein (2007) 
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From an innovation search perspective, an increase in the crowd size has positive 
implications on crowd productivity and crowd efficiency. First, a large crowd size 
increases search scope of a problem-solving attempt; that is, the number of external 
sources or search channels that firms rely upon in their innovative activities or problem 
solving (Laursen & Salter, 2006). Search with high scope enriches the knowledge pool by 
adding distinctive new variations. For instance, solvers can use computer language such 
as JavaScript, HTML, C+, or C++ to design a website. An increase in the crowd size for a 
programming design contest means that firms can find solvers with different 
combinations of these skills. New variations are necessary to provide a sufficient amount 
of solutions for problem-solving (March, 1991).  
Second, a large crowd size increases the number of solutions through enhancing 
the recombination of different searches (Fleming, 2001; Fleming & Sorenson, 2004). 
There is a limited number of ideas or solutions that can be created by using the same set 
of knowledge elements (Katila & Ahuja, 2002). An increase in the search scope adds new 
elements to the solution landscape and increases the chances to find new and useful 
combinations (Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Laursen & Salter, 2006). Third, an increase in the 
crowd size can increase the chance for firms to disclose a problem or a task to agents who 
possess different problem-solving skills and heuristics (Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010). The 
idea that differences in perspective and heuristics are the sources of problem solving or 
solution design has been explored not only in innovation search literature but also at the 
intersection of economics and behavioral theory of the firm literatures (Dosi, Levinthal, 
& Marengo, 2003; Fleming & Sorenson, 2004; Nelson & Winter, 2009). A main insight 
is that multiple sources of perspectives and heuristics contribute to effective and efficient 
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problem-solving (Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010; Marengo, Dosi, Legrenzi, & Pasquali, 
2000) 
H1a (b): In the context of tournament-based crowdsourcing, crowd size is 
positively related to crowd productivity (crowd efficiency).  
 The tournament perspective suggests that an increase in crowd size can have both 
positive and negative effects on crowd performance, which means that the relationship 
between crowd size and crowd performance is not linear but quadratic. An increase in the 
number of participants, i.e., crowd size, stimulates the competition intensity within a 
crowd. Research in tournament literature shows that an increase in competition intensity 
motivates agents to invest more effort in a particular competition (Che & Gale, 2003; C. 
Harris & Vickers, 1987), which can positively relate to a high crowd performance. In an 
innovation contest with only one participant, this contestant will have little incentive to 
exert effort to improve his/her performance because there is no competition. Thus, some 
level of competition through adding contestants will lead to greater effort to improve 
overall performance (Harris & Vickers, 1987). Studies on organizational-level 
competition confirm that threats from frontier entrants induce incumbents in sectors that 
are initially close to the technology frontier to innovate more, and this triggers 
productivity growth (Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt, & Prantl, 2009; Aghion, Harris, 
Howitt, & Vickers, 2001).  
However, excessive crowd size can have negative consequences. Literature 
identified two negative effects of excessive crowd size: shrinkage of winning and 
motivation crowd-out. We argue below that these negative effects of size at some point 
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exceed the benefits and, thus, the relationship between crowd size and crowd 
performance is actually nonlinear. As the number of participants increase, the chance of 
winning for each contestant shrinks, reducing the motivation effects of competition on 
agents’ efforts in problem solving (Boudreau et al., 2011; Garcia & Tor, 2009). A large 
increase in crowd size induces excessive effort on the participants in order for them to 
win a tournament-based crowdsourcing event. As solvers keep increasing their efforts, 
they may lose interests and enjoyment and hence withdraw their participation (Zheng et 
al., 2011).  
H1c (d): In the context of tournament-based crowdsourcing, crowd size is 
curvilinear related to crowd productivity (crowd efficiency) in an inverted-U 
shape.  
Crowd Diversity and Crowd Performance.  From an innovation search 
perspective, an increase in crowd diversity means an expansion of search depth in a 
problem-solving process, which can allow firms to access diverse knowledge sources and 
approaches (Fleming, 2001; Fleming & Sorenson, 2004; Katila & Ahuja, 2002). An 
increase in search depth also allows firms to search over a rugged landscape and locate 
solvers who are “marginal” and possess alternative knowledge and approaches that may 
be amenable to an effective solution (Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010). Scholars in the search 
literature say that agents who are marginal in terms of technical expertise and social 
establishment are useful for effective and efficient problem solving. This is because these 
agents are not burdened by prior assumptions and they approach problems with different 
perspectives and heuristics (Fleming & Sorenson, 2004; Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010). 
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They have a unique way of problem-solving called “focused naïveté”, which refers to a 
useful ignorance of prevailing assumptions and theories that allows them to attack 
problems generally regarded as impossible or uninteresting by specialists (Gieryn & 
Hirsh, 1983). To illustrate this, Howe (2008) describes a firm that faced an in tractable 
chemical engineering problem that had stymied progress for a significant period of time. 
The ultimate solution came from an external physicist who applied principles of 
electromagnetism to what was thought to be a chemistry issue (Howe, 2008; Jeppesen & 
Lakhani, 2010).  
H2a (b): In the context of tournament-based crowdsourcing, crowd diversity is 
positively related to crowd productivity (crowd efficiency).  
 However, tournament perspective argues that competition is a manifestation of 
social comparison (Festinger, 1954; Garcia, Tor, & Gonzalez, 2006). An increase in 
crowd diversity can reduce the extent and the amount of social comparison between 
crowd members (Bothner et al., 2007; Festinger, 1954), which can be detrimental to 
crowd performance. The social comparison between participants in a tournament 
determines agents’ problem-solving efforts and subsequent behaviors (e.g., submission or 
withdrawal) in a tournament (Bothner et al., 2007). An increase in crowd diversity 
reduces similarity between crowd members and causes them to lose target for social 
comparison in a competition (Festinger, 1954; Garcia et al., 2013; Suls, Martin, & 
Wheeler, 2002). This is because participants in a competition have a tendency to choose a 
reference person who is close to their own characteristics (Garcia et al., 2013; Goethals, 
1986). Empirical evidence from the tournament literature has shown that an increase in 
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homogeneity among competitors increases aggregate effort and overall performance 
(Konrad, 2009).  
The above line of reasoning is consistent with the work on structural equivalence 
and relative deprivation in social network and sociology literature. Structural equivalence 
refers to the extent to which the agents (i.e., notes) in a network are similar to each other 
in terms of network connections, behavioral and demographic statistics (Burt, 1982; 
Lorrain & White, 1971; Sailer, 1978). Relative deprivation refers to a psychological state 
that occurs when agents feels that their personal attainments are below their expectations 
(Forsyth, 2009). Burt (1982) argued that relative deprivation is concentrated between 
structurally equivalent agents and that the feeling of relative deprivation is most acute 
precisely when a peer has moved ahead of him or her. Sociologists also believe that 
agents who feel that their status quo is violated or challenged are more likely to invest 
more effort in improving their performance (Bothner et al., 2007; Forsyth, 2009). Thus, 
we believe that an increase in the crowd diversity reduces agents’ structural equivalence 
and relative deprivation, which will demotivate them to invest effort in problem-solving 
and might lead to poor performance.  
H2c (d): In the context of tournament-based crowdsourcing, crowd diversity is 
negatively related to crowd productivity (crowd efficiency).  
Combination of Crowd Size and Crowd Diversity.  The above hypotheses focus 
on the distinct effects of size and diversity on crowd performance. In this section, we 
propose that these variables have interactive effects. Depending on the literature that we 
draw, the interaction effect could be positive or negative.  
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From a search perspective, we argue that crowd size and crowd diversity are 
mutually beneficial to crowd performance. We suggest two mechanisms that underlie this 
positive interaction: the rugged solution landscape and uniqueness of combination. 
Crowd size and crowd diversity are related to each other but not necessarily in a 
proportional manner (Harrison & Klein, 2007). When they both increase simultaneously, 
they can greatly magnify the ruggedness and complexity of the solution landscape 
(Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Rivkin, 2001). A rugged solution landscape can allow firms 
to conduct both local search and distant search and enjoy as many options as possible 
(Fleming, 2001; Stuart & Podolny, 1996). A combination of depth and scope search can 
increase the uniqueness of recombination, which can intensity the positive effects on 
crowd performance due to an increase either in crowd size or crowd diversity  (Katila & 
Ahuja, 2002). By combing agent-specific accumulated understanding of certain 
knowledge elements (depth) with a large number of agents (scope), the crowd is more 
likely to generate new, unique combinations that can be commercialized (Winter, 1984). 
H3a (b): In the context of tournament-based crowdsourcing, crowd size and 
crowd diversity positively interact to influence crowd productivity (crowd 
efficiency).  
 From a tournament perspective, we believe that crowd size and crowd diversity 
can jointly influence crowd performance in a negative direction. We argue that the 
mechanisms underlying this negative interaction include the attenuation of winning 
chance and a loss of social comparison. Increasing the number of participants in a 
competition not only reduces the chance of winning for each participant but also 
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increases the uncertainty about who might win this competition (Boudreau et al., 2011; 
Garcia & Tor, 2009). Under such a situation, empirical research has shown that all 
participants reduce their effort, causing the overall performance to shift down (Boudreau, 
Lacetera, & Lakhani, 2010; Boudreau et al., 2011).  
An increase in both crowd size and crowd diversity can further reduce the 
similarity of rivals (i.e., solvers) in a crowd for a particular crowdsourcing event (Garcia 
et al., 2006; Garcia et al., 2013). Research in this line of thinking has already shown that 
a reduction of similarity among agents causes them to lose propensity to engage in social 
comparison and thus invest less effort in problem solving (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). An 
increase in both crowd size and crowd diversity can also further attenuate agents’ relative 
deprivation and structural equivalence (Burt, 1982; Lorrain & White, 1971; Sailer, 1978), 
causing participants in a contest to lose motivation to compete and shift down the overall 
performance.  
H3c (d): In the context of tournament-based crowdsourcing, crowd size and 
crowd diversity negatively interact to influence crowd productivity (crowd 
efficiency).  
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Figure 10 
Theoretical Model for the Performance Implications of Crowd Attributes 
 
Summary.  In this section, we develop hypotheses for the performance implication of 
crowd attributes in crowdsourcing by drawing from both innovation search literature and 
tournament theory. Figure 10 summarizes the theoretical model that we propose in the 
second theory development. The innovation search literature indicates that an increase in 
crowd attributes (e.g., crowd size and/or crowd diversity) can be positively related to the 
extensiveness and effectiveness of problem-solving search which, in turn, may lead to 
positive crowd performance. However, the competition perspective based on tournament 
theory suggests that an increase in crowd attributes (e.g., crowd size and/or crowd 
diversity) can reduce either individual participants’ chances of winning as well as the 
expected returns or the competition social comparison among participants, which might 
lead to negative outcomes. We will empirically test these two perspectives in the 
following chapter.  
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Chapter 5: Methodology 
Method Design  
An ideal empirical setting needs to satisfy a number of nontrivial requirements. One 
requirement is the temporal consideration for the crowd-development process. Each 
competition-based crowdsourcing event has a unique cycle time with specific start date 
and end date. Accordingly, the crowd-development process embodies temporal 
consideration, which means that we need to take the whole process into consideration 
when we calculate the growth rate and crowd size for a particular crowdsourcing event. 
The second requirement is the solvers’ precise trace (i.e., participation time and 
submission time) over the crowd-development cycle time. Solvers’ participation and/or 
submission behaviors can occur at any time during the event cycle time. These first two 
requirement make cross-sectional survey impossible to capture solvers’ precise trace over 
the event cycle. We thus rule out survey as a method option for this dissertation.  
The third requirement is the multi-level information, that is, information at the 
crowd level (e.g., elements of event setting and crowd performance) and at the individual 
solver level (e.g., demographic statistics, participation and/or submission behaviors). The 
final requirement would be the sample size. Through a pre-power analysis via G-power 
package, we found that the sample size should be at least 150 if we wanted to achieve a 
medium effect size with 80 percent power. The required sample size would be larger if 
wanted to detect a small effect size with a high power. The unit analysis for this research 
is a crowd, and one crowdsourcing event provides only one observation. The large 
sample size requirement makes lab experiment unrealistic for our empirical testing.  
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We propose to use secondary data in this dissertation because this method not 
only meets all the above requirements but also has many obvious advantages that are 
missing in the other empirical methods such as survey and experiments. For instance, 
there are many crowdsourcing intermedia (i.e., Topcoder, InnoCentive, and Kaggle) that 
are specialized in organizing competition-based crowdsourcing contests for companies. 
These intermedia are very good sources for secondary data (Archak, 2010; Boudreau et 
al., 2011; Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010). Table 4 summarizes the main advantages 
recognized by scholars in the supply chain literature. Because of these advantages, many 
scholars argue that secondary data can expand academic horizons and deepen the 
understanding on the social phenomena and thus are actively calling for research in using 
secondary data (Ellram & Tate, 2016; Rabinovich & Cheon, 2011). The context and data 
we describe below allow for a possibility to rely on a real crowdsourcing setting in a 
natural environment that is characterized by the availability of empirical measures, 
appropriate identification, and external validity. 
Table 4 
Advantages of Secondary Data Methodology 
Relatively large amount of data available 
Relatively low amounts of resources (money and time) necessary for data collection 
Limited chance to bias in the data collection process due to researchers' 
preconceptions 
Higher internal validity of studies due to measurements and statistics inferences 
constructed by the third-party and derived from less biased database 
Greater opportunity for replication when data is publicly available 
Source: adapted from Ellram and Tate (2016), Rabinovich and Cheon (2011) 
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Research Setting - Topcoder 
Established in 2001, Topcoder creates outsourced software solutions for IT-
intensive organizations by specializing in organizing programming crowdsourcing events 
and soliciting independent solvers (i.e., programmers) from all over the world to compete 
in programming design and/or software development contests. Topcoder’s value 
proposition to its clients is that it can harness the wisdom of a large number of 
professional programmers and let the competition determine the best solutions without 
risking either a wrong hiring or an incorrect solution (Boudreau et al., 2011). Since 2001, 
Topcoder has served clients such as Best Buy, Eli Lilly, IBM, and GEICO. From 2001 to 
2009, Topcoder added an average of 25,000 new computer programmers to its 
community each year (Lakhani et al., 2010). As of May 2017, over 1 million solvers have 
registered at Topcoder’s website (Topcoder, 2017b). These solvers have the opportunity 
to win cash prizes, obtain assessments of their skills, and signal their potential in a global 
sharing economy through participation in thousands of crowdsourcing events (Boudreau 
et al., 2011; Boudreau & Lakhani, 2013).  
Case studies on Topcoder show that Topcoder used to run two types of 
crowdsourcing competitions on its platform: algorithm and client software development 
(Archak, 2010; Lakhani et al., 2010). The algorithm competitions served as the primary 
means for attracting new programmers and retaining existing community members, while 
the software development competition was targeted at developing software applications 
for Topcoder’s clients (Lakhani et al., 2010). Our latest community review shows that 
Topcoder nowadays mainly organize two types of crowdsourcing contests: design events 
94 
and development events (Topcoder, 2017a). Both types of events have very similar 
structure in which Topcoder or focal buying firms specify elements of event design at the 
beginning and solvers (i.e., agents) are supposed to convert the specified requirements 
into usable software (Boudreau et al., 2011; Boudreau, Lakhani, et al., 2016). One 
notable difference notified by Archak (2010) is that “winning design submissions go as 
inputs into the development events in which agents are required to submit actual code 
implementing the provided design” (Archak, 2010, p. 22). We did not find this notable 
difference in our data, but we found the descriptive statistics of some variables are 
different between these two types of crowdsourcing event. For instance, the average 
payment size for the design events is significantly larger than that of develop events, 
while the average event length of develop events is longer than that of design events. 
The general process for these two types of events is essentially similar. TopCoder 
works with its clients to identify software needs and converts identified needs into design, 
development, or data science related contests of its community of programmers (Lakhani 
et al., 2010). According to these needs, TopCoder specifies the detailed requirements for 
programing design/development, the length of event (i.e., start date, end date, and winner 
announcement), payment size, payment structure, and evaluation criteria. Before events 
go alive, Topcoder post them on the “coming events” section for programmers to review. 
After events go alive online, programmers view the details, evaluate the attractiveness of 
the contests, and decide whether they compete for an event. Depending on the situation, 
TopCoder or its clients provide feedback to programmers in their problem solving 
process. Programmers submit their solutions for a particular programming event before 
its deadline. 
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 All the software design and development events organized by Topcoder are run in 
a tournament format. The nature of the events creates a limitation in our data analysis – 
specific type of crowdsourcing event – but does not deter the generalizability of 
conclusion. This is because the tournament format of programming events is applicable 
to all the other competition-based crowdsourcing events. Topcoder uses an open call to 
attract programmers nested in its online community to compete in different programming 
events. The companies that sponsor the crowdsourcing events include not only Fortune 
500 companies such as Eli Lilly, IBM, and Best Buy but also many small and medium 
size companies like Mediafly. These companies represent industries such as 
pharmaceutical, information technology, retailing, electronics, insurance, and others 
(Boudreau et al., 2011).  
Scholars in the operations and supply chain management field, such as Boudreau 
and his coauthors, have justified the validity of Topcoder’s archival data and used the 
data between 2001 and 2007 to study the performance implication of tournament design 
(e.g., number of participants) (Boudreau et al., 2011; Boudreau, Lakhani, et al., 2016). 
Other scholars in the computer science literature have also used Topcoder’s data between 
2001 and 2013 to examine programmers’ participation and their performance 
implications. We thus believe that the secondary data from Topcoder is representative.  
Data Collection 
Topcoder makes its archival data publically available on its website. We used web 
crawling to automate the assembly of Topcoder’s historical programming contests. Web 
crawling is “the systematic, automated navigation of a series of internet-based 
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references” (Massimino, 2016, p. 35). Using web-crawling techniques to collect research 
data is relatively new to scholars in the operations and supply chain filed (Massimino, 
2016), but this technique is popular in the computer science and information systems 
literature (Dissanayake et al., 2015; Javadi Khasraghi & Aghaie, 2014). We hired a 
professional web crawler for the data collection in this dissertation. This data collection 
process follows the following steps to ensure validity in the data collection process. The 
following Figure 11 summarizes the data collection and cleaning process. 
Figure 11 
Data Collection and Cleaning Process 
 
First, we searched Topcoder’s website that listed past challenges and identified 
the specific number of both design and development events. Through this search, we 
understood the structure of a programming contest (e.g., challenge details, payment size 
and structure, participants, and results). This understanding was useful when we 
described our data collection requests to our web crawler in the following step. We 
started our data collection on Sep 2, 2016. At that time, we found that there were 2,452 
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historical events (438 design events and 2,014 development events) available on 
Topcoder website according to the one-year default filtering setting (i.e., Sep 1, 2015 – 
Sep 1, 2016).  
Second, based on our understanding of the structure of an event and our expected 
needs for data, we developed a data request proposal that described our specific, detailed 
needs for data collection. In this document, we also described how to access Topcoder’s 
historical data step by step. Since each programming contest was one observation, we 
specified that all crawled data related to one event should be saved separately in an Excel 
file for validation purpose. We asked one graduate student in the Accounting Department 
at W.P.Carey School of Business who had data crawling experience to check the clarity 
of our proposal.  
Third, we crowdsourced our data collection proposal to ten potential Chinese 
crawlers and identified a qualified crawler. We targeted only Chinese web crawlers due 
to cost and response considerations. For instance, the price for developing a data crawling 
program was between RMB800 and RMB1200 (i.e., between $115 and $175), which was 
cheaper than many crawlers in the US. The lead time for designing program was around 
one week, and the lead time for program and data collection was around one month. We 
first identified ten potential suppliers through a Chinese e-commons website 
(www.taobao.com) based on their online reputation scores and transaction records. We 
contacted them one by one by sending them our data collection proposal. Three out of ten 
showed interest in our data collection process. One of three accepted our offer 
(RMB1100 (i.e., around $160) and two weeks leading time) on Sep 4, 2016.   
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Fourth, we cross-validated the accuracy our collected data in multiple times. We 
got our first round of data on Sep 20, 2016. We collected 2,5825 observations (457 design 
events and 2,126 development events). We randomly selected 30 observations from our 
data and compared our collected observations with the original ones on Topcoder’s 
website. This comparison took us almost one month and helped us identify two potential 
issues. We found that we could customize the time framework filter by tracing backing to 
July 2014 and that Topcoder’s server actually hosted around 6,807 historical events 
available (1,196 design events and 5,611 development events). The one-year default 
setting made us miss many observations available on Topcoder’s server. Another big 
issue we found was that we forgot to specify event cycle time (i.e., start time, end time, 
feedback time, and winner announcement time) in our data collection proposal. Except 
the cycle time issue, we found that all the other information in our crawled data matched 
exactly with the observations on Topcoder’s website.  
We then reported these two issues to our crawler to update our requests on Oct 20, 
2016. Since we changed our data collection needs, our crawler charged us another 
RMB800 (i.e., around $115). We maintained communication during the second round of 
data crawling process to make sure these two issues were properly taken into 
consideration. Our crawler finished the second-round data collection on Nov 1, 2016. We 
got 6,833 observations (1,202 design events and 5,631 development events). In this 
round, we randomly selected 50 observations from our crawled data and manually 
compared them with the correspondent observations on Topcoder’s website. All the 
                                                          
5 The discrepancy between 2,582 and 2,452 (our previous identified number of observations) was due to the 
two-week difference between step one and step four. 
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information matched well except a minor issue. We found that the time format for some 
observations was not consistent. Specifically, all the time format shown on Topcoder’s 
website was in “EDT” format (i.e., Eastern Time). In our crawled data, some format was 
shown as “EDT”, but the time format for around 35 percent of our observation was 
shown at “00.000-05:00” which is equivalent to “EDT”. For instance, “2014-11-
30T09:00:00.000-05:00” is equivalent to “2014-11-30T09:00EDT”. This minor issue did 
not influence our data analysis (i.e., calculating the correct event length). We thus did not 
ask our crawler to update our second crawled data.  
Data Cleaning 
We cleaned the data in several ways. We first removed eight test events created 
by Topcoder to check its internal system. There were no participants for these test events 
which were titled with words such as “Test Event” or “Do not register”. We had 6,825 
useable observations in total (i.e., 6,833 - 8 = 6,825). We then reviewed our observations 
in detail and removed the observations that were kept “confidential”. The detailed 
descriptions related to these “confidential” events were not publically available on 
Topcoder’s website. Programmers had to register and sign confidentiality agreements 
before they could view the details of these events. We thus missed the text information to 
evaluate the complexity of these events.  
We totally identified 1,776 confidential observations (i.e., 26 percent of 6,825 
useable observations). Because 97.24 percent of the confidential observations came from 
the development event category, we suspected that the missing data on the confidential 
events was caused by the avoidance of information leakage in the new product 
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development process. This reason was completely out of the control of our methodology 
design and data collection. We thus assumed that this missing was completely random 
and took the 1,776 confidential observations out of our usable data (Cohen, Cohen, West, 
& Aiken, 1983; Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2013). We eventually got 5,049 effective 
observations (1,155 design events and 3,894 development events) which had 161,735 
total participation records from 21,741 community programmers. 
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Chapter 6: Data Analysis 
Data Analysis for the Influence of Event Design on Crowd Emergence 
Data Description  
We used the design events collected from Topcoder to analyze the relationship 
between elements of event design and crowd emergence. We chose to use only design 
events for two practical reasons. First, all design events were organized in competition-
based crowdsourcing format. For all these design events, solvers from Topcoder’s 
network competed with each other to provide the best solutions and were rewarded 
according to the relative rankings of their solutions for a particular event. We thus believe 
that design events are representative for crowdsourcing events. Second, design events 
have more complete information compared to the category of crowdsourcing events from 
Topcoder (i.e., development events). Design events are publicly open to all solvers, 
which means that we could get complete information about design events. However, we 
found that many development events were kept confidential, which means that some 
important information was not available for web-crawling.  
All events were saved in a separate csv file with unique event ID number. We 
used Python, a widely used computer programing language for data processing (Shaw, 
2013), to extract and pre-process the raw data that are saved in csv files. The unit level of 
our data extracting and pre-processing is at event level. First, we extracted all solvers’ 
participation time for a particular design event by using trace extraction code (Appendix 
A) to build a crowd growth trajectory over the cycle time of this event. Second, we fitted 
a Bass Diffusion Model to each crowd growth trajectory to identity the two growth 
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parameters (i.e., p and q). This process was executed over R software by using regression 
codes attached in Appendix B. It took us almost one month to process the total design 
events collected from Topcoder. Third, we extracted the description information (i.e., text 
information) from our raw files to analyze the difficulty of each design event by using 
text extraction code (Appendix C and D). Fourth, we extracted the basic statistics for 
each solver for each event (e.g., ID, membership registration data, country origin, and 
winning records) through extraction codes attached in Appendix E. Finally, we extracted 
the basic summary information for event level (e.g., event ID, event start date, event 
ending date, payment size, number of payments, and feedback) through codes attached in 
Appendix F.  
 We collected 1,202 design events from Topcoder. Among them, 1,154 were 
effective observations. During the process of fitting the linear Bass Model (Bass, 1969) to 
empirical crowd growth trajectory, we found that not all regression models converged. 
Specifically, 734 out of 1,154 events converged with significant fit, yielding a 63.60 
percent effective observations with meaningful and comparable crowd growth rate. We 
compared the mean differences of each variables between convergence group and non-
convergence group through ANOVA analysis. We did not find significant mean 
difference between these two groups on crowd size and main independent variables (e.g., 
Fog Readability Index, event length, payment size, and number of influential agents). We 
assumed that these 734 effective observations are representative for our data analysis and 
justified this assumption in the robust check sections.   
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Measurement 
Dependent Variables.  There are two dependent variables in this analysis: crowd 
growth rate and crowd size. Crowd growth rate is defined as the relative speed with 
which solvers from a social network form a solution-providing crowd for a particular 
crowdsourcing event by self-selecting to participate in an event (Rogers, 1962, 2010). We 
operationalized this crowd growth rate by using the Bass Diffusion Model developed by 
Frank Bass (1969) to quantitatively measure the growth rate of new product adoption 
within a social network (Bass, 1969). This model has three basic parameters: innovation 
coefficient 𝑝 (i.e., the coefficient for solvers to participate in a particular event due to the 
influence coming from event itself); imitation coefficient 𝑞 (i.e., coefficient for solvers to 
follow other agents’ decisions to participate a particular event); and potential market size 
𝑚 (i.e., potential crowd size for a particular crowdsourcing event). Crowd growth rate is 
operationalized by the sum of innovation coefficient and imitation coefficient, i.e., “𝑝 +
𝑞” (Bass, 1969; Mahajan, Muller, & Bass, 1991). Crowd size defined as the number of 
participants for a crowdsourcing event at the time when the event reaches its deadline 
(Liu, Yang, Adamic, & Chen, 2011).  
Independent Variables.  Task complexity is defined as the perceived difficulty of a 
crowdsourced task (Rogers, 2010). We measured this construct by two indicators: 
number of words and Fog Readability Index. Number of words means the length of task 
description for a crowdsourcing event (Haas et al., 2015). Fog Readability Index 
indicates the extent to which a verbal description to a crowdsourcing task is perceived to 
be difficult, also referred to simply as FOG index (Collins‐Thompson & Callan, 2005; 
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Li, 2008). The FOG index, developed by Robert Gunning, is a well-know and simple 
formula for measuring text complexity in computational linguistics literature (Gunning, 
1969). Assuming that the text is well formed and logical, the FOG index captures text 
complexity as a function of the number of words per sentence and the number of syllabus 
per word to crease a measure of readability (Li, 2008). It is calculated as follows: 
𝐹𝑜𝑔 = (𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑_𝑝𝑒𝑟_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑡_𝑜𝑓_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑥_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠) ∗0.4, 
Complex words are defined as words with three syllables or more. The FOG index 
indicates the number of years of formal education of a reader of average intelligence 
would need to read the text and understand that piece of writing with its word-sentence 
workload (Li, 2008). The relationship between the FOG index and reading ease is as 
follows: FOG ≥ 18 means that the text is unreadable; 14-18, difficult; 12-14, ideal; 10-
12, acceptable; 8-10, childish.  
Event length is defined as the amount of time specified for a crowdsourcing event 
(in hours). Payment size is the amount of money specified for a crowdsourcing event (in 
dollars).  Influential agents are agents whose decisions and/or behaviors influence those 
of the others within a same network (Rogers, 2010). Specifically, we defined influential 
agents as solvers with above average membership length (in months) and at least one 
winning record. We used membership length as one of main indictors for being 
influential because research shows that membership length is a significant predictor for 
being a winner in a tournament-based crowdsourcing event (Bockstedt et al., 2016). We 
operationalized the influence of influential agents through two indicators: the number of 
influential agents involved for an event and the early involvement of influential agents 
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defined as the time difference between the event start time and the participation time of 
the first influential agent. 
Control Variables.  The purpose of including control variables in empirical study is to 
increase the power to detect the significance of variables in interests (Becker, 2005; 
Spector & Brannick, 2011). In this study, we control for two potential influences from a 
crowdsourcing event: number of payments and checkpoint. Number of payments is 
operationalized as the number of payments specified for a crowdsourcing event (Chen et 
al., 2011). We observe that many events in our sample have exact the same total payment 
size but different numbers of payment. Under this situation, the pay gap between 
different ranks of a tournament (e.g., first prize, second prize, and/or third prize) will be 
smaller for event with multiple payments. Tournament theory suggests that when the pay 
gap is small, suppliers are not motived to compete and are less likely to participate in 
crowdsourcing (Knoeber & Thurman, 1994; Lazear & Rosen, 1981). Number of 
payments specified for an event could contaminate the effect of payment size in a 
tournament-based crowdsourcing. We thus control the potential influence of the number 
of payments in our data analysis. 
Checkpoint is defined as a binary variable to capture whether feedback is 
provided to solvers during crowd formation process. We observed in our data is that not 
all events were provided feedback on the progress of problem-solving during the crowd 
formation process. Latest results from filed experiments on innovation tournaments 
shows that in-process feedback is associated positively with agents’ participation 
(Wooten & Ulrich, 2017). Feedback to participants thus could contaminate the growth of 
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a crowd and final crowd size. We used checkpoint to control for the potential influence of 
feedback on crowd emergence: 1 means that feedback is provided; zero otherwise. 
Measurement Validity  
The data used in this research for empirical analysis comes from a reliable 
crowdsourcing platform company (i.e., Topcoder), whose primary business is organizing 
programming crowdsourcing events for its customers such IMB, Eli Lily, and Best Buy 
(Archak, 2010; Lakhani et al., 2010). All events are organized in competition-based 
crowdsourcing format. Information related to constructs such as crowd size, payment 
size, event length, number of payment, and checkpoint (i.e., feedback control) comes 
from objective crowdsourcing events. The content validity of these constructs are thus 
satisfactory. We operationalized crowd growth rate through regression and calculated 
task complexity (i.e., number of words and Fog Readability Index) through text analysis 
package in Perl. We also operationalized influential agents indirectly through calculating 
the membership length. We justified the validity of our measurement for these three 
constructs in the following sections.  
Inspired by Bass’ (1969) work, the Bass Diffusion Model has been adopted by 
scholars from different disciplines to model the growth rate of innovation diffusion, 
information diffusion, and technology adoption at the society level (Mahajan et al., 1991; 
Rand et al., 2015; Van den Bulte, 2000). In this research, we conceptualized the crowd 
formation process as a process through which a particular crowdsourcing event diffuses 
across solvers from a social network. This conceptualization allowed us to operationalize 
crowd growth rate by using the Bass Diffusion Model. In this research, we compared 
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three most common approaches to operationalize the Bass Model (Bass, 1969; Boswijk & 
Franses, 2005; Van den Bulte, 2002).  
As shown in Table 5, each approach has unique advantages and disadvantages. 
After this comparison, we chose linear regression for this research for two main reasons. 
First, this approach provides acceptable estimation of growth rate. The amount of 
regression effort due to large sample size in this research makes this simple approach 
attractive. Second, the discrete form of linear regression captures the data collection 
Table 5 
Comparison between Different Operationalization of Bass Model  
  Model Formation Advantages Disadvantages 
Linear Regression 𝑆(𝑇) = 𝑝𝑚 + (𝑞 − 𝑝)𝑌(𝑇)
− 𝑞/𝑚[𝑌(𝑇)]2 
Discrete Analogue: 
𝑆𝑇 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑌𝑇−1 + 𝑐𝑌𝑇−1
2 , T=2, 3, … 
where:𝑆𝑇 ,  number of agents at T, 
𝑌𝑇−1= cumulative participants at T-1. 
𝑚 =
−𝑏±√𝑏2−4𝑎𝑐
2𝑎
, 𝑝 =
𝑎
𝑚
, 𝑞 = 𝑏 +
𝑎
𝑚
 
Simple; 
provide 
good fit; 
discrete 
form 
𝑏2 − 4𝑎𝑐 ≥ 0, 
otherwise, no 
solution 
Non-Linear 
Regression 
𝑌(𝑇) = 𝑚𝐹(𝑇) = 𝑚(
1−𝑒−(𝑝+𝑞)𝑇
1+(
𝑞
𝑝
)𝑒−(𝑝+𝑞)𝑇
) 
𝑌(𝑇), cumulative participants at time T; 
 𝐹(𝑇), cumulative probability density at 
time T. 
Continuous 
form; offer 
better fit 
Problems with 
convergence 
Agent-based 
Simulation 
𝑝(𝑇)=
𝑓(𝑇)
1−𝐹(𝑇)
= 𝑝 + 𝑞/𝑚𝑌(𝑇) 
𝑝(𝑇), probability of participation at 
time T; 𝑓(𝑇), the likelihood of 
participation at time T 
Capture 
emergence 
well; new 
 Assume m = 
observed “m”. 
Source: Bass (1969), Jain and Rao (1990), Rand et al., 2015 
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process (i.e., number of participants per each hour). By using this linear regression, we 
correctly captured the growth rate for many crowdsourcing event with good fit indices. 
Event 30047222 was a good example. As shown in Figure 12, the fitted Bass curve (in 
red) captured the growth trend of real crowd trajectory (in blue) and the actual crowd size 
well (i.e., R-square: 0.27; F-value: 70.72, p<0.001; growth rate (i.e., “𝑝 + 𝑞”): 0.034; 
predicted crowd size: 52). However, we ran into a convergence issue that caused us to 
lose 467 observations. We addressed this shrinkage of sample size in the robust check 
section.   
Figure 12 
Linear Bass Model Fit for Event 30047222 
 
We adopted Lingua::EN:Fathom package coded in Perl language to analyze text 
complexity. This package is a well-established tool to analyze the complexity of text 
information in linguistics, communication, and accounting literature (Collins‐
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Thompson & Callan, 2005; Li, 2008; Muresan, Cole, Smith, Liu, & Belkin, 2006). Basic 
description of the Lingua::EN:Fathom package was attached in Appendix D. To our best 
knowledge, this study will be the first to introduce this Lingua::EN:Fathom package in 
supply chain management literature.  
In order to increase the validity of this package, we conducted a pilot test by 
comparing the differences on the evaluations of two texts from the Lingua::EN:Fathom 
package and from undergraduate students. The texts that we used for this pilot test are 
two cases from a textbook on supply chain management (Johnson & Flynn, 2015). 86 of 
99 students who major in global logistics or supply chain management from an 
undergraduate class participated in this pilot test. Students were asked to evaluate the 
difficulty of understanding the content and analyzing the two selected cases on a 5-Likert 
scale. The average student evaluations for these two cases were 2.89 and 3.42, 
respectively. That is, the second case was 18 percent more difficult than the first one. An 
ANOVA test confirms that the means of students’ evaluations are significantly different. 
The FOG indices (i.e., text difficulty) generated by the Lingua::EN:Fathom package for 
these two cases were 15.88 and 19.53. The FOG index of the second case was 23 percent 
more than that of the first case. The evaluation differences between these two approaches 
are comparable, demonstrating the validity of the Lingua::EN:Fathom package in 
evaluating text complexity.  
We used membership length instead of winning record to define influential agents 
in this research. This is because Topcoder automatically updates each solver’s 
participation and winning records. That is to say, a solver with many winning records 
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today might not be an influential agent one or two years ago. In a sense, the data related 
to the winning records is contaminated with noise. On the contrary, the membership 
length is objective since each solver has unique membership registration data. Research 
confirms that membership length is a significant predictor for being a winner in a 
tournament-based crowdsourcing event (Bockstedt et al., 2016). Our post hoc analysis 
shows that membership length is positively and significantly related to each solver’s 
number of wins (𝑟 = 0.35, 𝑝 < 0.01) and that the effect size of membership to predict 
the number of wins is 0.20 (𝑝 < 0.01). We thus believed that it was reasonable to use 
membership length to identity influential solvers.  
We calculated each solver’s membership length (in months) from his or her 
registration data to 12:55 pm on November 1, 2016. This was the last time that we 
finalized and validated our data collection. The distribution of solver’s membership 
length is right-skewed with a long tail (Figure 13). Specifically, solvers whose 
Figure 13 
Distribution of Solver’s Membership Length 
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membership length is above the average membership length take around 20 percent of the 
total number of solvers. Through a detailed analysis on the membership length, we found 
that there were quite a few inactive solvers whose membership length was above average. 
We then took the number of winning record into considerations. By applying these two 
criteria, 309 out of 4,315 solvers were classified as influential in this research (i.e., 7.16 
percent). Based on this classification, we counted the number of these influential agents 
for each crowdsourcing event. By calculating the time difference between event start data 
and the participation time of the first influential agent, we got the variable called early 
involvement of influential agents. The following Table 6 lists all the variables in this data 
analysis. 
Table 6 
Variable Operationalization in First Empirical Study 
Variable Measurement Reference  
Crowd growth 
rate 
“p + q” from the Bass Diffusion Model Bass (1969) 
Crowd size The total number of registrants for a particular 
crowdsourcing event 
Liu et al. 
(2014) 
Number_words Total number of words in describing an event Li (2008) 
Fog index Fog readability index Li (2008) 
Event length The amount of time specified for suppliers to solve a 
particular crowdsourcing event 
Connelly et al. 
(2014) 
Payment size The amount of money specified for the winners in a 
tournament-based crowdsourcing event 
Lazear & 
Rosen (1981) 
Number of 
influentials 
The number of agents with above average membership 
length and at least one winning record 
Bockstedt et al. 
(2016) 
Early 
involvement of 
influentials 
The difference between event starting time and the 
participation time of the first influential agent 
Bockstedt et al. 
(2016) 
Number of 
payments 
The number of payments specified for an event (1,2,…) Chen et al. 
(2011) 
Checkpoint Binary: 1 means feedback provided; 0, otherwise Wooten & 
Ulrich (2017) 
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Model Specification 
We used the ordinary least square (OLS) regression (Cohen et al., 2013; Kutner, 
Nachtsheim, & Neter, 2004) to analyze the two dependent variables in this research: 
crowd growth and crowd size. The use OLS regression analysis allowed us to specify the 
dependent variable as a linear function of the explanatory and control variables discussed 
in the construct measurement section in addition to an error term.  
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑁_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖
2 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑜𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑜𝑔𝑖
2 + 𝛽5𝐸_𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑖
+ 𝛽6𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐸_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑁_𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑁_𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖
+ 𝛽10𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
The error term 𝜀𝑖 is assumed to be random and normally distributed with a mean of zero 
and a constant standard deviation (Kutner et al., 2004). In this research, both our 
dependent variables only takes non-negative values and are right skewed (Figure 14), 
which generally leads to violation on the normality assumption of OLS regression (Cohen 
et al., 2013). Following the recommendations made by methodologists in dealing with 
non-normally distributed data (Kutner et al., 2004; Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, & 
Wasserman, 1996), we took a log transformation and found that this transformation made 
the distribution of both our dependent variables approximate to be normal (Figure 15), 
thus supporting our decision to use OLS in this study. Another advantage of using OLS 
regression is that this method has useful regression diagnostics and sophisticated 
remedies to deal with any kind of assumption violations (Kutner et al., 2004). 
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Figure 14 
Histogram of Dependent Variables 
 
Figure 15 
Histogram of Dependent Variables after Log Transformation 
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Data Analysis and Findings 
Process.  We used a hierarchical approach as recommended by scholars (e.g., Cohen 
et al., 2013) to analyze our data. Specifically, we first considered a basic model (i.e., 
Model 1) in which we separately regressed the dependent variables (i.e., growth rate and 
crowd size) only upon the control variables (i.e., number of payment and checkpoint). 
Then, we added the explanatory variables to the basic model and built Model 2, through 
which we tested our proposed hypotheses in our theoretical model (Figure 9). Finally, we 
conducted extensive regression diagnostics to check the validity of our OLS regression. 
This is because both histograms of our dependent variables (Figure 14) suggest the 
existence of outliers that might cause us to violate the normality assumption for the error 
term. Besides, the model that we propose to test might not be completely, correctly 
specified. This can also lead to any other kinds of OLS violations. To increase the 
validity of our empirical testing, we performed extensive regression diagnostics to check 
whether we violated assumptions for linear regression (e.g., multicollinearity testing, 
autocorrelation testing, normality testing, constancy of variance testing, and linearity 
testing) and took necessary remedies. We further run seemingly unrelated regression 
(Greene, 2003; Zellner & Huang, 1962) and robust regression (Koller & Stahel, 2011; 
Yohai, 1987) to justify the validity of our empirical findings.  
We ran all analyses in R version 3.3.2. The descriptive statistics (i.e., mean and 
standard deviation) and simple correlations are reported in Table 7. As indicated by the 
descriptive statistics, the magnitude of the dependent variables (crowd growth rate in 
particular) is much smaller than that of a few independent variables (e.g., number of 
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words, event length, and payment size). This difference might lead to trivial coefficient 
estimations for these independent variables.  
Many correlation coefficients among the constructs used in this study are 
relatively small. A few constructs such as payment size and number of influential agents 
are significant and are highly correlated (𝑝 = 0.73). We took several measures to account 
for the significant relationships among variables that might lead to multicollinearity. 
First, we used the mean-centered value of all explanatory variables including the 
quadratic terms to mitigate multicollinearity (Cohen et al., 2013; Neter et al., 1996). 
Second, we ensured that the variance inflation factor (VIF) scores for each explanatory 
variable were below the recommended cutoff value of 10.0 typically taken as an indicator 
of excessive multicollinearity (Neter et al., 1996). Each of the VIFs scores for our dataset 
met this requirement, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a major issue in our dataset.  
Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (1) 
    Mean Std 1 2 3 4 
1 Crowd size 33.4 32.66 1    
2 Growth rate 0.04 0.05 -0.1** 1   
3 Number_words 1144.30 578.20 0.08* -0.17*** 1  
4 Fog index 13.44 3.06 -0.02 -0.02 0.35** 1 
5 Event length 250.47 141.9 0.14*** -0.34*** 0.08* -0.06 
6 Payment size 1819.60 916.90 0.22*** -0.14*** 0.53** 0.20** 
7 E_involvement 2.25 3.04 -0.08* -0.03 -0.03 -0.08 
8 Number_agents 15.19 6.50 0.36*** -0.14*** 0.23** 0.10** 
9 Number_payment 2.56 1.11 0.25*** -0.03 0.33** 0.21** 
10 Checkpoint (0,1) 0.85 0.36 0.16*** -0.40** 0.31** 0.03 
       Notes: n = 734; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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(Table 7 continued) 
    5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Crowd size       
2 Growth rate       
3 Number_words       
4 Fog index       
5 Event length 1      
6 Payment size 0.11** 1     
7 E_involvement -0.03 -0.05 1    
8 Number_agents 0.15** 0.56** -0.21** 1   
9 Number_payment -0.02 0.73** -0.06 0.53** 1  
10 Checkpoint (0,1) 0.34** 0.30** 0.10** 0.31** 0.13*** 1 
 
Findings.  The results of the OLS regression for crowd growth rate and crowd size 
are reported in Table 8. The variables are introduced sequentially. For each model, we 
compared the fit statistics (e.g., R-square and F value) to ensure the validity of our 
testing. For crowd growth rate, Model 1 only includes the control variables. This base 
model explains 9.4 percent of variance in growth rate. Binary control variable (i.e., 
checkpoint) is significantly and negatively related to growth rate, suggesting that the 
crowd for events provided with feedback (i.e., checkpoint = 1) tends to grow slowly. 
Model 2 includes all the variables of interests and control variables. The R-square 
increases from 0.094 in model 1 to 0.283. An F test shows that adding our independent 
variables significantly increases the gain on the R-square since  
𝐹𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 =
𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙
2 −𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑡1
2
1−𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙
2 (
𝑛−𝑘−𝑚−1
𝑚
)=
0.283−0.094
1−0.283
(
734−2−10−1
10
)= 48.15 is greater than the 
associated critical F value with the same degree of freedom (𝐹(10,721)𝛼=0.05 = 1.84). 
A significant increase in the gain of R-square indicates the validity of adding our 
proposed independent variables. Several coefficients in Model 2 are significant. 
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Specifically, the coefficient for the second order term of the Fog index is negative (𝛽 =
−0.814, 𝑝 < 0.05), while that of the first order term of the FOG index is positive (𝛽 =
4.372, 𝑝 < 0.05). This finding suggests that Fog Readability Index (i.e., task complexity) 
related to crowd growth rate in an inverted U-shape. The competition view based on 
Table 8 
OLS Regression for Growth Rate and Crowd Size 
  Growth Rate Crowd size 
 Model 1  Model 2 Model 1  Model 2 
Intercept -3.080*** 
(0.010) 
-8.101* 
(3.342) 
2.393*** 
(0.051) 
3.493* 
(1.419) 
Control variables     
Number_payments 0.001 
(0.028) 
-0.059 
(0.038) 
0.191*** 
(0.014) 
0.066*** 
(0.016) 
Checkpoint (0,1) -0.739*** 
(0.086) 
-0.014 
(0.105) 
0.568*** 
(0.044) 
0.167*** 
(0.044) 
Main variables     
Number_words  0.819 
(0.694) 
 -0.303 
(0.294) 
Number_words^2  -0.066 
(0.053) 
 0.027 
(0.022) 
Fog   4.372* 
(1.972) 
 -0.671 
(0.837) 
Fog^2  -0.814* 
(0.381) 
 0.078 
(0.162) 
Payment size  0.009 
(0.052) 
 -0.006 
(0.022) 
Event_length  -0.738*** 
(0.057) 
 0.162*** 
(0.024) 
Number_agents  0.009 
(0.006) 
 0.047*** 
(0.002) 
E_involvement  0.028** 
(0.009) 
 -0.005 
(0.004) 
     
Sample size 734 734 734 734 
Fit statistics     
-- R-square 0.094 0.283 0.358 0.646 
-- F value 37.77*** 28.48*** 204.00*** 131.80*** 
      Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, **p<0.01,*p<0.05. 
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tournament theory that crowd growth rate relates to task complexity in an inverted U-
shape (i.e., H1c) is supported. We did not find evidence to support the alternative 
hypothesis based on diffusion theory (i.e., H1a). Event length significantly relates to 
crowd growth rate in a negative way (𝛽 = −0.738, 𝑝 < 0.001), which supports the 
competition view on the negative association between event length and crowd growth 
(H3c) and rejects the alternative hypothesis (H3a). We also found that the early 
involvement of influential agents (i.e., E_involvement) is positively related to crowd 
growth (𝛽 = 0.028, 𝑝 < 0.01). This finding supports the tournament perspective on the 
positive relationship between early involvement of influential agents and crowd growth 
rate (H5c) and rejects the alternative hypothesis based on diffusion theory (H5a). 
The results based on OLS regression for crowd size are also reported in the above 
Table 8. The base model (i.e., Model 1) for crowd size is significant (𝐹 = 204, 𝑝 <
0.001), which explains 35.8 percent of the variance of the crowd size. In the base model, 
we found that the number of payments specified for each crowdsourcing event and 
providing feedback (i.e., checkpoint=1) are both positively associated with crowd size. 
After adding the main independent variables, the overall R-square increases from 0.358 
to 0.646. This increase is strongly significant according to the F test proposed by scholars 
(Cohen et al., 2013), suggesting that the inclusion of the main independent variables is 
meaningful in predicting the size of a crowd for a particular crowdsourcing event. 
Particularly, the coefficient of event length is positive and significant (𝛽 = 0.162, 𝑝 <
0.001). This finding supports H3b which says that crowd size is positively associated 
with event length. The diffusion perspective is justified in terms of the implication of 
event length. We also found the evidence to support H4b since the coefficient for the 
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number of influential agents (i.e., Number_agents) is significantly positive (𝛽 =
0.047, 𝑝 < 0.001). Diffusion theory is more applicable in explaining the relationship 
between the number of influential agents and crowd size.  
Robust Checks 
Check for the Violation of OLS Assumptions.  An OLS model makes five basic 
assumptions about the way in which the observations are generated (1) dependent 
variables are a linear function of independent variables plus an error term ( i.e., linearity 
assumption); (2) expected value of the error term is zero (i.e., zero-mean disturbance); (3) 
disturbances have uniform variance and are uncorrelated (i.e., normality assumption and 
constant variance assumption); (4) observations on independent variables can be 
considered fixed in repeated samples (i.e., independent observation assumption); (5) no 
exact linear relationship exists between independent variables and more observations than 
independent variables (Kennedy, 2003; Kutner et al., 2004). These assumptions are not 
necessarily independent of each other, which means that one violation might lead to 
others. Any violation to these assumptions can lead to biased and/or unstable coefficient 
estimations (Kennedy, 2003; Kutner et al., 2004).  
Through Table 7, we assured that there exist no perfect linear relationships 
between independent variables although a few of them are highly correlated. By mean-
centering independent variables and running multicollinearity test, we confirmed that the 
significant relationships existing between our independent variables did not cause major 
concerns for using OLS regression. Since the number of observations (i.e., 734) is larger 
than that of our independent variables (i.e., 10), we concluded that our analyses for both 
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our dependent variables did not violate assumption five. To check whether we violated 
any other assumptions during our data analysis process, we conducted an extensive post 
hoc analyses and took remedial measures in case of violations (e.g., re-specifying 
regression models, running seemingly unrelated regression, and robust regression). 
Results from our post hoc analysis are reported in the following section.  
Post Hoc Analysis for Crowd Growth Rate.  Following the guidelines on 
regression diagnostics proposed by scholars (Kutner et al., 2004; Neter et al., 1996), we 
first generated the residuals of Model 2 for crowd size and then ran a series of 
recommended tests on them to check the validity of our data analysis (e.g., Shapiro-Wilk 
test, Breusch-Pagan test, and Durbin-Watson test). The residuals of Model 2 for crowd 
growth rate has a mean of zero and stand deviation of 0.73, suggesting that we did not 
violate the zero-mean assumption (i.e., assumption two). We conducted a Durbin-Watson 
test on the residuals of Model 2 which turned out be non-significant (i.e., D-W statistics = 
2.15, p-value = 0.554). The Durbin-Watson test is a test of randomness (i.e., independent 
observations) (Durbin & Watson, 1951). The null hypothesis of this test is that there 
exists no autocorrelation in observations. A non-significant Durbin-Watson test makes us 
fail to reject the null and allows us to conclude that we did not violate assumption four.  
We run a Shapiro-Wilk test to check the normality of our residuals. The Shapiro-
Wilk test was developed by Samuel Shapiro and Martin Wilk (Shapiro & Wilk, 1965). 
The null hypothesis of this test is that the population is normally distributed. Our analysis 
indicates that this test was significant (i.e., w = 0.98, p<0.001), leading us to reject the 
null of normal distribution. To check whether our analysis violates the constant variance 
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assumption (i.e., homoscedasticity), we performed a Breusch-Pagan test to the residuals 
of growth rate. In statistics, the Breusch-Pagan test developed by Trevor Breusch and 
Adrian Pagan in 1979 is used to test for heteroscedasticity in a linear regression model 
(Breusch & Pagan, 1979). The null of the Breusch-Pagan test is that the variance of the 
residuals is constant. The result of this test turned out to be significant (i.e., BP = 21.935, 
df = 10, p = 0.015). This finding suggests that we should reject the null and conclude the 
existence of heteroscedasticity. Our Model 2 thus violates the normality assumption and 
constant of variance assumption.  
Although our regression model violates the normality assumption, the distribution 
of our residuals shown in the following histogram (Figure 16) is approximate to normal. 
The QQ plot of the residuals suggests the existence of a few outliers, which might be the 
reason that leads to this violation of normality. We then performed a regression diagnosis 
to identify these potential outliers by following the guidelines on regression diagnostics 
proposed by methodologists (Cohen et al., 2013; Kutner et al., 2004). Through our 
detailed diagnostics, we did identify a few influential outliers. Specifically, we found five 
most influential outliers whose influence indices obviously exceed the recommended 
cutoff score ((e.g., √𝑝′ 𝑛⁄
2
 for DFFIT and 2 √𝑛⁄  for EFBETA) (Cohen et al., 2013; 
Kutner et al., 2004). A close examination on the raw data shows that these five outliers 
take either the maximum or the minimum value of some independent variables (e.g., 
FOG Readability Index, number of words) or the maximum of the dependent variable. 
This examination further supports our decision to delete these five outliers in the 
subsequent regression analysis.  
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Figure 16 
Histogram of Residuals of Crowd Growth Rate in Model 2 
  
 We performed the Tukey’s test for nonadditivity to check the linearity assumption 
(i.e., assumption one) (Castle & Hendry, 2010; Fox & Weisberg, 2012; Tukey, 1949). 
This test is obtained by adding the squared terms of the fitted independent variables to 
Model 2 and refitting this model. The significant level for the Tukey’s test is obtained by 
comparing the statistics with the standard normal distribution, and the null hypothesis of 
this test is that the coefficient for the quadratic terms of the fitted variables is zero (Fox & 
Weisberg, 2012). Through this test, we found that only the coefficient for event length is 
significant (test statistics = 3.710, p<0.001), suggesting that relationship between event 
length and crowd growth rate is not linear but quadratic. The residual plot against the 
independent variable also confirms that the relationship between event length and crowd 
growth is quadratic (Figure 17). It was problematic for us to specify only linear terms for 
event length in our proposed model.  
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Figure 17  
Residual Plots for Crowd Growth Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We thus re-specified our Model 2 by adding a quadratic term for event length. 
Findings from the re-specified regression analysis are reported in Table 9. We did find a 
significant quadratic relationship between event length and crowd growth rate 
(𝛽𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ2 = 0.151, 𝑝 < 0.001), suggesting a U-shape between these two variables. 
All the other significant coefficients identified previously still hold in our re-specified 
model (i.e., Model 2' (OLS) in Table 9). The residuals from this re-specified model 
passed the Breusch-Pagan test (i.e., BP=19.05, df = 11, p-value = 0.06), which suggests 
the existence of constant variance after we re-specified our regression model. However, 
we still failed to pass the Shapiro-Wilk test (i.e., normality test) with the re-specified 
model. Even if we took out the five most influential outliers and reran the re-specified 
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model in Table 3, the Shapiro-Wilk normality test is still significant (i.e., w=0.98, 
p<0.001), suggesting the violation of normality assumption.  
Table 9  
Post Hoc Regression Analysis for Crowd Growth Rate  
   Model 2'(OLS)  Model 3(SUR)  Model 4 (Robust) 
Intercept -4.083 
(3.485) 
-4.168 
(3.854) 
-4.979 
(3.611) 
Control variables    
Number_payments -0.062 
(0.038) 
-0.069† 
(0.038) 
-0.068* 
(0.032) 
Checkpoint (0,1) -0.107 
(0.109) 
0.144 
(0.108) 
0.166 
(0.108) 
Main variables    
Number_words 0.816 
(0.688) 
0.868 
(0.717) 
0.761 
(0.786) 
Number_words^2 -0.065 
(0.052) 
-0.071 
(0.054) 
-0.063 
(0.059) 
Fog  4.172* 
(1.955) 
4.721* 
(2.204) 
5.448** 
(1.866) 
Fog^2 -0.769* 
(0.378) 
-0.877* 
(0.428) 
-1.013** 
(0.361) 
Payment size 0.009 
(0.052) 
0.007 
(<0.001) 
-0.005 
(<0.001) 
Event_length -2.281*** 
(0.420) 
-2.567*** 
(0.422) 
-2.433*** 
(0.513) 
(Event length)^2 0.151*** 
(0.041) 
0.176*** 
(0.041) 
0.162** 
(0.051) 
Number_agents 0.007 
(0.005) 
0.009† 
(0.005) 
0.010* 
(0.005) 
E_involvement 0.029** 
(0.009) 
0.031*** 
(0.009) 
0.027*** 
(0.007) 
    
Sample size 734 724 734 
Fit statistics    
-- R-square 0.296 0.315 0.336 
-- F value 27.60*** n/a n/a 
       Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, **p<0.01,*p<0.05, †<0.1. 
For the normality check, we also compared the actual frequencies of the residuals 
against expected frequencies under normality. A percent of 69.89 of residuals falls 
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between ±√𝛿𝑖 and 91.28 percent of the residuals falls between ±1.645√𝛿𝑖 (𝛿𝑖 is the stand 
deviation of residuals). These two numbers are above the recommended thresholds 
recommended by scholars to quantitatively determine the normality of the distribution of 
residuals, that is, 68 percent of the residuals fall between ±√𝛿𝑖 and 90 percent fall 
between ±1.645√𝛿𝑖 (Kutner et al., 2004). Thus, the actual frequencies here are 
reasonably consistent with those expected under normality. Based on the comparison of 
frequencies and the histogram of residuals (Figure 16), we concluded that the residuals of 
our Model 2 fall an approximate normal distribution with a small departure, which does 
not create any serious problems for our regression (Kutner et al., 2004; Neter et al., 
1996).  
Post Hoc Analysis for Crowd Size.   The residuals of Model 2 for crowd size has 
a mean of zero and standard deviation of 0.31. We did not violate the zero-mean 
assumption (i.e., assumption two). We followed the diagnostic procedures that we took 
previously to check the validity of our analyses for crowd size. By analyzing the residuals 
of Model 2 for crowd size, we found that they approximately follow a normal distribution 
(Figure 18) with 91.7 percentage of residuals falling within the expected range of normal 
distribution (Kutner et al., 2004), although the existence of a few outliers of crowd size 
shown on the QQ plot in Figure 14 made our regression model fail to pass the Shapiro-
Wilk normality test (i.e., w=0.94, p<0.01).  
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Figure 18 
Distribution of Residuals for Crowd Size 
 
The residuals of crowd size in Model 2 passed the Breusch-Pagan test (i.e., 
BP=12.408, df = 10, p=0.2587), suggesting that the variance of residuals is constant. Our 
proposed model for predicting crowd size does not violate the constant of variance 
assumption. However, the Durbin-Watson test on the residuals of Model 2 for crowd size 
is significant (D-W = 1.316, p<0.001), suggesting that the residuals of crowd size auto-
correlate to each other. Omitting the autocorrelation of residuals might seriously 
underestimate the true standard deviation of the estimated regression coefficient and lead 
to ineffective coefficient estimations (Kutner et al., 2004; Neter et al., 1996). In the 
subsequent analysis, we took the recommended remedy (i.e., the Cochrane-Orcutt 
procedure) to correct our predictions for crowd size (Beach & MacKinnon, 1978; 
Betancourt & Kelejian, 1981; Kutner et al., 2004). This procedure was implemented by 
the “Orcutt” package in R software. Through the Tukey’s test for nonadditivity, we also 
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found that there exists a significant quadratic term for the number of influential agents 
(i.e., Number_agents) (Figure 19).  
Figure 19 
Residuals Plots for Crowd Size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We thus reran the regression analysis by specifying a quadratic term of the 
number of influential agents and taking the Cochrane-Orcutt remedy to account for 
autocorrelation. Findings for this analysis are reported in Table 10 (i.e., Model 2' (OLS)). 
We did find a significant and negative quadratic terms for the number of influential 
agents (𝛽𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟_𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠2 = −0.001, 𝑝 < 0.001). In this re-specified model (i.e., Model 2' 
(OLS)), the positive relationship between event length and crowd size still holds. We alas 
found that the relationship between payment size and crowd size is marginally significant 
after taking the Cochrane-Orcutt remedy (𝛽𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 0.033, 𝑝 = 0.081). Model 2' 
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(OLS) passed all the assumption checks except the Shapiro-Wilk normality test (w=0.94, 
p<0.001). Although Model 2' (OLS) failed to pass the formal normality test, the residuals 
of this model fall an approximate normal distribution with minor departure due to the 
existence of a few extreme observations.  
Table 10 
Post Hoc Regression Analyses for Crowd Size 
   Model 2' 
(OLS) 
Model 2'' 
(OLS) 
 Model 3 
(SUR) 
 Model 4 
(Robust) 
Intercept 1.434 
(1.234) 
1.012 
(1.140) 
3.488* 
(1.444) 
2.797† 
(1.587) 
Controls     
N_payments 0.048*** 
(0.014) 
0.031** 
(0.012) 
0.053*** 
(0.015) 
0.054*** 
(0.014) 
Checkpoints 0.023 
(0.039) 
0.031 
(0.033) 
0.055 
(0.043) 
0.084† 
(0.051) 
Main effects     
Number_words -0.031 
(0.256) 
0.114 
(0.221) 
-0.214 
(0.279) 
-0.233 
(0.374) 
Number_words^2 0.001 
(0.019) 
-0.010 
(0.017) 
0.020 
(0.021) 
0.021 
(0.027) 
Fog  0.137 
(0.699) 
0.134 
(0.661) 
-1.008 
(0.858) 
-0.349 
(0.725) 
Fog^2 -0.064 
(0.135) 
-0.060 
(0.128) 
0.147 
(0.167) 
0.018 
(0.143) 
Payment size 0.033† 
(0.019) 
0.045** 
(0.016) 
0.020 
(0.019) 
0.017 
(0.021) 
Event_length 0.173*** 
(0.019) 
0.153*** 
(0.017) 
0.137*** 
(0.022) 
0.132*** 
(0.025) 
Number_agents 0.096*** 
(0.006) 
0.096*** 
(0.005) 
0.093*** 
(0.007) 
0.084*** 
(0.009) 
(Number_agents)^2 -0.001*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(<0.001) 
E_involvement -0.003 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
Sample size 734 728 724 734 
Fit statistics     
-- R-square 0.707 0.769 0.696 0.673 
-- F value  158.40*** 215.90*** n/a n/a 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, **p<0.01,*p<0.05, †<0.1. 
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By running similar regression diagnostics as we did previously, we identified six 
influential outliers whose influence indices (e.g., DFFITS and DFBETAS) are beyond the 
recommended cutoff values. One out of these six outliers (ID=175) was also classified as 
an influential outlier for crowd growth rate. This observation takes the maximum value of 
Fog Readability Index and number of words. We reran our regression by taking out the 
six influential outliers identified by our regression diagnostics. Results are reported in 
Table 10 under Model 2'' (OLS). After taking out the six influential outliers and the 
Cochrane-Orcutt remedy, the coefficient for payment size became significant 
(𝛽𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 = 0.045, 𝑝 < 0.01), suggesting a positive relationship between payment 
size and crowd growth. We also found that, if we took out influential outliers, the 
residuals from our re-specified model passed the Shapiro-Wilk normality test (w = 0.997, 
p = 0.112) but failed to pass the Breusch-Pagan test (BP = 66.36, df = 11, p < 0.001). 
This finding suggests that the existence of outliers in our data causes our regression 
model for crowd size to violate either the normality test or the constant variance test. We 
need to rely on more robust regression techniques to alleviate the influence of outliers, 
which will be addressed in the following section.  
Robust Check on the Regression Coefficients.  All our analyses so far for the 
dependent variables (i.e., crowd growth rate and crowd size) were conducted separately. 
We assumed that these two models are independent. This assumption might not be true. 
This is because some unconsidered factors that influence the error term in one equation 
probably influence the error term in the other equation (Greene, 2003; Henningsen & 
Hamann, 2007). Particularly, our post hoc analysis confirms that the residuals of our two 
prediction models are slightly correlated to each other (𝑟 = −0.096, 𝑝 < 0.001). 
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Ignoring this contemporaneous correlation and estimating these two equations separately 
might lead to biased estimates of the coefficients (Henningsen & Hamann, 2007).  
Thus, we have to estimate both our dependent variables (i.e., crowd growth rate 
and crowd size) simultaneously through seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), which 
takes the covariance structure of the residuals into account (Moon & Perron, 2006). SUR 
was developed by econometricians to deal with statistical analyses that are based on 
models containing structurally related equations (Greene, 2003; Henningsen & Hamann, 
2007). We took out the identified ten most influential outliers when we ran the SUR 
analysis. This is because SUR is not robust to the influence of outliers although it 
accounts for the potential correlations of error terms (Greene, 2003; Moon & Perron, 
2006). Therefore, the sample size for SUR analysis is 724 (i.e., 734-10=724).  
Based on the above checks on the regression assumptions, we also took a robust 
regression (Koller & Stahel, 2011; Kutner et al., 2004; Yohai, 1987) to account for the 
impact of many other potential outliers other than the ten most influential outliers 
identified previously. This regression was carried out by the “lmrob” function in the 
“robust” package in R (Wilcox, 2011). The “lmrob” function computes an MM-type 
regression estimator as described in Yohai (1987) and Koller and Stahel (2011). By 
default, this function uses a bi-square redescending score function and returns a highly 
robust and highly efficient estimator (with 50 percent breakdown point and 95 percent 
asymptotic efficiency for normal errors) (Wilcox, 2011). Findings from SUR analysis and 
robust regression for both crowd growth rate and crowd size are reported in Table 9 and 
Table 10 (i.e., Model 3 (SUR) and Model 4 (Robust)). These findings are consistent with 
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those based on revised OLS regression, demonstrating the robustness of our data 
analyses.  
Endogeneity Check.   Endogeneity arises when an independent variable is 
correlated with the error term, thereby violating the exogeneity condition in OLS 
specifying that the error terms or the residuals have an expected value of zero given any 
independent variable (i.e., 𝐸(𝑢|𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑘) = 0) (Bascle, 2008; Wooldridge, 2015). As 
shown in the following Figure 20 and Figure 21, the residuals for our two re-specified 
OLS models for predicting crowd growth rate and crowd size do not correlate with any of 
our independent variables. Thus, the sufficient condition for endogeneity does not occur.  
Figure 20  
Final Residual Plots for Crowd Growth Rate 
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Figure 21 
Final Residual Plots for Crowd Size 
 
 
According to econometricians, three main instances that lead to endogeneity 
include measurement error, simultaneous causality, and omitted variables (Wooldridge, 
2015). In this research, we used objective secondary data from a very reliable 
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crowdsourcing platform to operationalize our variables. Moreover, the dependent and 
independent variables involved in this research come from different sources. The 
independent variables such as task complexity (i.e., number of words and Fog readability 
index), payment size, and event length are fully exogenous to the two dependent 
variables in this research. This is because these variables are clearly specified by focal 
buying firms or crowdsourcing platforms at the initiation stage of a crowd development 
process. We collected the solvers’ participation decisions during the crowd formation and 
realization stages and used this information to operationalize the two dependent variables 
(i.e., crowd growth rate and crowd size) in this research. The separation of causes (i.e., 
elements of event design) and effects (i.e., crowd growth rate and crowd size) makes 
endogeneity not a concern for our data analysis (Wooldridge, 2015).  
In this research, we controlled for potential influence of the omitted variable in 
our analysis by adding number of payments and feedback and adding them into our 
analysis as control variables. A common source of omitted variable bias is the self-
selection of samples that might cause some information related to dependent variables to 
be unobservable to researchers (Wooldridge, 2002, 2015). In this research, the 
operationalization of crowd growth rate through the Bass Model made 39.38 percent of 
our observations “unobservable” due to a convergence issue in regression. We compared 
the mean differences of each variables between the convergence group and non-
convergence group through ANOVA analysis. Results from this analysis are reported in 
Table 11. We did not find significant mean difference between these two groups on 
crowd size and four independent variables (e.g., Fog Readability Index, event length, 
payment size, and number of influential agents). However, we did find some levels of 
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significant differences on number of words and early involvement of influential agents 
between the convergence group and non-convergence group. We need to be cautious in 
interpreting the effect of early involvement of influential agents on the crowd growth 
rate. Based on all these considerations, we conclude that the endogeneity is not a major 
concern for this research.  
Table 11 
Mean Differences on Independent Variables between Convergence Group and Non-
convergence Group 
  Convergence  Non-convergence  Mean difference  
Crowd Size 32.7 32.29 n.s 
Number_words 1125.58 1033.19 ** 
Fog 13.45 13.41 n.s. 
Event length 245.52 229.33 n.s. 
Payment size 1779.76 1759.18 n.s. 
Number_agents 14.89 15.45 n.s. 
E_involvement 2.25 1.28 *** 
Notes: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, n.s.: not significant 
Summary  
The first purpose of this data analysis was to test the theoretical model on crowd 
emergence (Figure 9) proposed in chapter 4, that is, to identify the influence of event 
design on crowd emergence (i.e., crowd growth rate and crowd size). Through our 
regression analyses and extensive post hoc analyses, we identified a few significant 
relationships: (1) Fog Readability Index, an indicator of task complexity, relates to crowd 
growth rate in an inverted U-Shape (H1c); (2) the early involvement of influential agents 
positively relates to crowd growth rate (H5c); (3) the relationship between event length 
crowd growth rate is not linear but quadratic, i.e., U-shape; (4) the number of influential 
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agents involved in a crowdsourcing event seems to have a positive influence on crowd 
growth rate (H4a). As for the relationships between elements of event design and crowd 
size, we found that the event length is positively relate to crowd size (H3b), while the 
number of influential agents actually relates to crowd size in a U-shape rather than a 
linear approach. Detailed discussions on these findings will be addressed later. 
The second purpose of this data analysis was to test whether diffusion theory is 
more applicable than tournament theory in explaining crowd emergence in 
crowdsourcing. Our findings suggest that neither diffusion theory nor tournament theory 
can fully explain the relationships between elements event design and crowd emergence. 
Instead, we need combine these two theoretical lenses to get a full picture on the 
mechanisms underlying crowd emergence. We propose a new perspective to look at 
crowd emergence, which will be discussed in the discussion section.  
The most unexpected finding is that payment size does not seem to play a 
significant role in influencing crowd emergence. This finding is contradictory to the 
claim that financial incentive is a major consideration for suppliers to participate in 
crowdsourcing events (Brabham, 2010, 2012; Liu et al., 2014). Instead, we found that the 
number of payments is positively related to both crowd growth rate and crowd size and 
seems to be more important than the payment size in influencing crowd emergence. The 
unexpected finding related to payment size suggests that there is more story to tell on 
how suppliers in crowdsourcing interpret financial information. This will be further 
discussed in the discussion and conclusion sections.   
 
136 
Data Analysis for the Performance Implications of Crowd Attributes 
Data Description  
We used 5,049 effective observations from Topcoder through web crawling for this data 
analysis. Among these observations, 1,155 observations were design events, and 3,894 
were development events. There were five observations whose productivity data (i.e., the 
number of solutions) were more than three standard deviations above the average 
productivity. We classified these five observations were outliers and then took these five 
observations out when we analyzed crowd productivity. Thus, the total sample size was 
5,044 when we analyzed crowd productivity (i.e., 5,049 – 5 = 5,044). Among the 5,049 
effective observations, the efficiency data for 377 observations was missing because 
these observations had no submission (i.e., crowd productivity was zero). When we 
analyzed the crowd efficiency, we only used 4,702 observations (i.e., 5,049 – 347 = 
4,702). 
Variables 
Dependent Variables.  We considered two main dependent variables in this 
research: crowd productivity and crowd efficiency. We measured crowd productivity by 
the amount of work done by the solvers for a crowdsourcing event, i.e., the total number 
of solutions generated by a crowd for a crowdsourcing event (Cohen & Bailey, 1997; 
Horwitz & Horwitz, 2007; Ren et al., 2015). Crowd efficiency is defined as the relative 
speed with which a crowd solve a particular crowdsourced task (Cohen & Bailey, 1997; 
Horwitz & Horwitz, 2007). We operationalize crowd efficiency in two ways by 
calculating the shortest time to solve crowdsourced tasks (i.e., efficiency_1) and the 
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average time to solve a crowdsourced task (i.e., efficiency_2). The following Table 12 
summarizes the measurement of the dependent variables, independent variables, and 
control variables.  
Table 12 
Variable Operationalization in the Second Empirical Study 
Variable Measurement  Reference  
Crowd 
productivity 
The total number of submissions produced by a crowd 
in crowdsourcing 
Horwitz & 
Horwitz (2007) 
Efficiency_1 The shortest time that a crowd takes to complete a 
crowdsourcing task 
Cohen & 
Bailey (1997) 
Efficiency_2 The average time that a crowd takes to complete a 
crowdsourcing task 
Horwitz & 
Horwitz (2007) 
Crowd size The total number registrants for a particular 
crowdsourcing event 
Liu et al. 
(2014) 
Tenure disparity The coefficient of variation of crowd members’ 
membership length 
Harrison & 
Klein (2007) 
Country variety The variation in the origin of crowd members, i.e., the 
Blau’s index 
Blau (1977) 
 
Task complexity 1) Total number of words in describing an event 
2) Fog readability index 
Li (2008) 
Event length The amount of time specified for an event Connelly et al. 
(2014) 
Payment size The amount of money specified for a crowdsourcing 
event 
Lazear & 
Rosen (1981) 
Number of 
payments 
The number of payments specified for an event (1,2,…) Lazear & 
Rosen (1981) 
Checkpoint(0,1) Binary: 1 mean feedback provided; 0, otherwise Wooten & 
Ulrich (2017) 
Group (0,1) Binary: 1 means design event; 0, otherwise  
Independent Variables.  Crowd size refers to the number of participants for a 
crowdsourcing event (Liu et al., 2014). Crowd diversity is defined as the extent of 
difference among members of a crowd (i.e., solvers) with respect to a common attribute, 
such as tenure, ethnicity, and knowledge (Harrison & Klein, 2007). Following the 
common practices on diversity measurement in management literature (Harrison & Klein, 
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2007) and open source literature (Daniel et al., 2013), we measure crowd diversity from 
two approaches: tenure disparity and country variety. Disparity diversity reflects the 
difference in the concentration of valued social assets or resources such as knowledge, 
status, and reputation among units members (Harrison & Klein, 2007). We measured 
tenure disparity using the coefficient of variation of the membership length of all crowd 
members. Coefficient of variation is a widely used measure of tenure disparity in 
diversity research (Harrison & Klein, 2007; Ren et al., 2015). If we denote each 
member’s membership length as 𝐿𝑖 and the average membership length of 𝐿𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛, the 
coefficient of variation can be calculated using the following formula (Harrison & Klein, 
2007): 
[∑(𝐿𝑖 − 𝐿𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛)
2 𝑛⁄ ]1/2 𝐿𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛⁄  
 Varity diversity reflects “the number and spread of ‘batches’ of information 
content, experience, or unique network ties available across unit members”(Harrison & 
Klein, 2007, p.1204). Accordingly, country variety is defined as the variation in the 
origin of crowd members. Country origin is a categorical variable. We use the Blau’s 
index to calculate the country variety for a crowd (Blau, 1977; Harrison & Klein, 2007). 
For a particular crowd, we calculate origin variety by counting the number of crowd 
members from each country. If we denote the percentage of crowd members in a country 
as 𝑃𝑖, Blau’s index can be calculated as follows (Harrison & Klein, 2007): 
1 − ∑ 𝑃𝑖
2 
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The highest level of origin variety occurs when a crowd has members with origin 
evenly distributed in all country categories. The lowest level of origin variety occurs 
when all crowd members come from the same country. In this situation, the origin variety 
is zero. A moderate level of origin variety arises when a crowd has its members with 
country origin in some of the categories – some uniqueness and some overlapping 
(Daniel et al., 2013; Ren et al., 2015).  
Control Variables.  In order to increase the validity of our empirical analysis, we 
control for the potential influence on the variations of the dependent variables that might 
be caused by the following factors. Studies in the diffusion literature and communication 
literature show that the complexity of an idea or a product influences how consumers 
interpret and perceive the attractiveness of the idea or the product, which might influence 
consumers’ subsequent decision-making (e.g., adoption) (e.g.,  (Boyd & Mason, 1999; 
Rogers, 2010). Similarly, we believe that the complexity of a crowdsourcing event can 
influence agents’ perceptions on the attractiveness of an event, which may determine 
agents’ investment and the final outcome. The first control variable in this research is 
task complexity defined as the perceived difficulty of a crowdsourcing task. Following 
the practices adopted in our previous empirical study, we measure task complexity in 
crowdsourcing by using the number of words used in each description (Haas et al., 2015) 
and task readability index, i.e., Fog Readability Index (Collins‐Thompson & Callan, 
2005; Li, 2008).  
We control the potential influence of the length of a crowdsourcing event. This is 
because studies in psychology literature demonstrate that time is an important factor for 
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individuals’ creativity and team productivity (Baer & Oldham, 2006; Pepinsky, Pepinsky, 
& Pavlik, 1960). In this research, event length is operationalized as the amount of time (in 
days) that is specified by a focal buying firm or a crowdsourcing platform for a particular 
crowdsourcing event. Field experiments conducted by Liu and her colleagues (2014) 
show that a higher reward induces more submissions in crowdsourcing events that are 
related to translation and programming (Liu et al., 2014). This study indicates that the 
size of reward might be related to crowd productivity in crowdsourcing. We then control 
payment size defined as the amount of money specified for a crowdsourcing event. We 
also control for the number of payments since many crowdsourcing events in our sample 
are set up as rank-order tournaments (Chen et al., 2011; Lazear & Rosen, 1981). In such 
situation, multiple payments are specified when buying companies create the 
crowdsourcing events at the beginning. For instance, the maximum number of payments 
in our sample is eight. One empirical study shows that feedback offered to a crowd in 
crowdsourcing influences crowd members’ participation behaviors and potential 
outcomes (Wooten & Ulrich, 2017). We then use a binary variable, i.e., Checkpoint, to 
capture whether a focal buying firm offers feedback for agents who participate in a 
crowdsourcing event.  
There are two types of crowdsourcing events in our sample that are organized by 
Topcoder: design programming events and development programing events. Both two 
types of events have very similar structure in which Topcoder or focal buying firms 
specify elements of event design at the beginning and solvers (i.e., agents) are supposed 
to convert the specified requirements into usable software (Boudreau et al., 2011; 
Boudreau, Lakhani, et al., 2016). One notable difference notified by Archak (2010) is that 
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“winning design submissions go as inputs into the development events in which agents 
are required to submit actual code implementing the provided design” (Archak, 
2010)(p.22). We did not find this notable difference in our data, but we found the 
descriptive statistics of some variables are different between these two types of 
crowdsourcing event. For instance, the average payment size for the design events is 
significantly larger than that of development events, while the average event length of 
development events is longer than that of design events. We thus create another binary 
variable named group to control for the potential influence of these differences on our 
dependent variables (i.e., group = 1 means design event; otherwise, development events.  
Model Specification 
In this research, we have two dependent variables: crowd productivity and crowd 
deficiency. By definition, crowd productivity is a count variable which takes only non-
negative integer values (i.e., 0, 1, 2 …). The distribution of crowd productivity is right-
skewed with a mean of 4.32 and a variance of 122.32 (Figure 22), which indicates the 
existence of overdispersion (Cameron & Trivedi, 1986, 2013). A linear regression model 
is inappropriate for analyzing right-skewed, overly dispersed data since this distribution 
violates the basic assumptions of homoscedastic, normally distributed residuals in linear 
regression (Kutner et al., 2004). Following the recommendations made by many 
statisticians and econometricians on analyzing count data, we adopt the negative binomial 
regression to analyze crowd productivity in this research, i.e., crowd productivity 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 1986, 2013; Greene, 2003; Zeileis, Kleiber, & Jackman, 2008). The 
negative binomial model not only accounts for overdispersion but also helps avoid high 
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levels of significance due to coefficients whose standard errors might be underestimated 
(Bellamy, Ghosh, & Hora, 2014; Cameron & Trivedi, 1986, 2013).  
Figure 22 
Histogram of Crowd Productivity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We operationalize the other dependent variable (i.e., crowd efficiency) by using 
(1) the shortest solution time (i.e., Efficiency_1) and (2) the average solution time within 
a crowd (i.e., Efficiency_2). Thus, a short task completion time means a high efficiency. 
We use a Generalized Linear Model (GLM) with a gamma distribution to analyze the two 
time-related variables (i.e., Efficiency_1 and Efficiency_2). This approach is suitable for 
analyzing these two variables for two reasons. First, both our time-related variables are 
continuous and take only positive values. Second, the distributions of these two variables 
are right-skewed (Figure 23). By probing the relations between dependent variables and 
the covariates, we found that the variance of these two variables increases with the mean. 
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These two reasons are consistent with the basic assumptions of a GLM with a gamma 
distribution (Ballinger, 2004; Crawley, 2012; Dobson & Barnett, 2008).  
Figure 23 
Histogram of Crowd Efficiency
Data Analysis and Findings 
Process.  We ran all analyses in R version 3.3.2. The descriptive and simple 
correlations are reported in Table 13. The standard deviation of crowd productivity is 
more than twice its mean, which further supports the judgement that this variable is over-
dispersed (Cameron & Trivedi, 1986, 2013). The magnitude of two control variables (i.e., 
Number_words and Pay_size) is obviously greater than that of our dependent variables. 
We thus scale down these two variables by 10 and 100, respectively, to avoid the 
occurrence of very small coefficient estimations in the following data analysis.  
Quite a few constructs such as crowd size and productivity are significantly 
highly correlated with each other. We took several measures to account for the significant 
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relationships among variables that might lead to multicollinearity. First, we used the 
mean-centered value of all explanatory variables including interactions terms to mitigate 
multicollinearity (Cohen et al., 2013; Neter et al., 1996). Second, we ensured that the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) scores for each explanatory variable were below the 
recommended cutoff value of 10.0 typically taken an indicator of excessive 
multicollinearity (Neter et al., 1996). Each of the VIFs scores for our dataset met this 
requirement, indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue in the give dataset.  
Our theoretical models involve curvilinear term (i.e., crowd size2), linear 
interaction (e.g., crowd size × tenure disparity), and quadratic interaction terms (e.g., 
crowd size2 × tenure disparity). As recommended by some methodologists (Cohen et al., 
2013), we took a hierarchical approach to test the significance of main explanatory 
variables including quadratic term of crowd size, linear interaction terms, and quadratic 
interactions terms separately. Variables were introduced sequentially to ensure model 
stability and to make sure that any significant relationship is robust to the inclusion of 
other variables. Specifically, we first considered a basic model in which we regressed the 
dependent variables (i.e., crowd productivity and crowd efficiency) only upon the control 
variables (Model 1). We then added the main explanatory variables (e.g., crowd size, 
crowd size2, tenure disparity, and country variety) to develop Model 2, through which we 
tested the first two hypotheses in our theoretical model. After step two, we tested the 
linear interaction terms in Model 3 and the quadratic interaction terms in Model 4. For 
each model, we conducted the Chi-square likelihood test based on the null hypothesis that 
all the estimated coefficients that were not present in the previous model are zero. The 
Chi-square statistics and significance levels are presented in the following Table 14. For 
145 
each step, we also compared the fit statistics to control for the validity of our data 
analysis (e.g., AIC and Deviance).  
Table 13 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (2)  
    Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Productivity 4.32 11.06 1.00     
2 Efficiency_1 3.65 3.23 -0.06** 1.00    
3 Efficiency_2 4.95 4.03 0.21** 0.81** 1.00   
4 Crowd size 24.83 25.25 0.71** 0.18** 0.42** 1.00  
5 Tenure disparity 0.95 0.26 0.19** 0.05** 0.21** 0.30** 1.00 
6 Country variety 0.75 0.14 -0.01 0.23** 0.18** 0.22** -0.06** 
7 Number_words 660.26 486.36 0.16** 0.15** 0.32** 0.20** 0.09** 
8 Fog_index 13.97 5.46 0.02 0.10** 0.07** 0.06** -0.05** 
9 Event length 12.85 11.01 -0.02 -0.03* 0.01 -0.07** 0.16** 
10 Pay_size 1252.30 1060.04 0.23** 0.30** 0.38** 0.36** -0.07** 
11 Number_pay 1.84 0.91 0.19** 0.13** 0.25** 0.26** -0.02 
12 Checkpoint (0,1) 0.19 0.39 0.26** 0.08** 0.41** 0.20** 0.22** 
13 Group (0, 1) 0.23 0.42 0.27** 0.01 0.33** 0.17** 0.29** 
  
  6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Productivity         
Efficiency_1         
Efficiency_2         
Crowd size         
Tenure disparity         
Country variety 1.00        
Number_words 0.01 1.00       
Fog_index 0.09** 0.02 1.00      
Event length -0.18** -0.22** -0.10** 1.00     
Pay_size 0.20** 0.49** 0.11** -0.45** 1.00    
Number_pay 0.10* 0.47* 0.10** -0.46** 0.69** 1.00   
Checkpoint (0,1) -0.11** 0.55** -0.04* -0.08** 0.33** 0.44** 1.00  
Group (0, 1) -0.15** 0.52** -0.05** -0.14** 0.28** 0.45** 0.86** 1.00 
   Notes: n = 5049; **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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Table 14 
Native Binomial Regression Model - Crowd Productivity  
Variables Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Mode 4 
Controls     
Number of words 0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
Fog readability index -0.006* 
(0.002) 
-0.005* 
(0.002) 
-0.005* 
(0.002) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
Event length -0.013*** 
(0.001) 
-0.017*** 
(0.001) 
-0.017*** 
(0.001) 
-0.016*** 
(0.001) 
Payment size -0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.020*** 
(0.002) 
-0.020*** 
(0.002) 
-0.021*** 
(0.002) 
Number of payment 0.21*** 
(0.018) 
0.178*** 
(0.013) 
0.175*** 
(0.013) 
0.180*** 
(0.013) 
Checkpoint (0,1) 0.631*** 
(0.052) 
0.455*** 
(0.042) 
0.443*** 
(0.042) 
0.428*** 
(0.042) 
Group (0, 1) 0.638*** 
(0.050) 
0.635*** 
(0.043) 
0.619*** 
(0.044) 
0.600*** 
(0.044) 
Main effects     
Crowd size  0.280*** 
(0.007) 
0.282*** 
(0.008) 
0.306*** 
(0.009) 
Crowd size2 H1c -0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.019*** 
(0.002) 
Tenure disparity H2a 0.131*** 
(0.043) 
0.099* 
(0.045) 
0.037 
(0.046) 
Country variety H2c -0.413** 
(0.085) 
-0.503*** 
(0.094) 
-0.934*** 
(0.113) 
Linear interactions      
Crowd size × Tenure disparity H3a  0.039* 
(0.019) 
0.055* 
(0.023) 
Crowd size × Country variety   -0.177*** 
(0.004) 
-0.291*** 
(0.052) 
Curvilinear interactions     
Crowd size2 × Tenure disparity  H3a   0.004* 
(0.002) 
Crowd size2 × Country variety     0.079*** 
(0.011) 
     
AIC 22368 20577 20433 20390 
Deviance 4989.5 4754.7 4745.4 4771.1 
Chi-square likelihood ratio test 2976.82***a 1926.17*** 150.22*** 47.07*** 
Over-dispersion (Theta) 3.026 7.364 7.424 7.813 
N 5044  5044 5044 5044 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, **p<0.01,*p<0.05. a: The AIC and 
Deviance for the null model in which no variables are included are 25971 and 5263.5. 
147 
Findings.  The results of the negative binomial regression for crowd productivity are 
presented in Table 14. Model 1 includes only control variables. Some of the control 
variables are significant. Specifically, number of payments, checkpoint (i.e., feedback = 
yes), and group (i.e., event type = design) are positively related to crowd productivity. 
Conversely, Fog Readability Index (i.e., task complexity), event length, and payment size 
are negatively associated with crowd productivity. All the significant relationships 
between control variables and crowd productivity remain consistent across four testing 
models, suggesting the robustness of these relationships.  
Model 2 includes only the main explanatory variables. Compared with Model 1, 
Model 2 demonstrates a good fit with substantial deductions on both AIC and Deviance. 
The Chi-square likelihood ratio test demonstrates that these deductions are significant. In 
this model, crowd size significantly relates to crowd productivity in a negative, 
curvilinear way (𝛽𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 = 0.280 , 𝑝 < 0.001;  𝛽𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒2 = −0.007, 𝑝 < 0.001), 
supporting the competition view that crowd size is related to crowd productivity in an 
inverted U-shape (H1c).  Tenure disparity displays a significant, positive relationship 
with crowd productivity (𝛽𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 0.131, 𝑝 < 0.01). This finding supports the 
search view that crowd diversity is positively related to crowd diversity (H2a). On the 
contrary, country variety shows a significant, negative relationship to crowd productivity 
(𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦 = −0.413, 𝑝 < 0.001), thus supporting the competition view that crowd 
diversity is negatively related to crowd productivity (H2c). 
Both Model 3 and Model 4 in Table 14 test the significance of linear and 
curvilinear interaction effects between crowd size and crowd diversity (i.e., tenure 
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disparity and country variety). Model 4 fits the data better than Model 3 in terms of the 
AIC index but slightly increases the residual deviance. We got first punishment by fitting 
a complicated model to our data. However, the Chi-square likelihood ratio test in Model 
4 is significant, suggesting the existence of significant curvilinear interactions terms. 
Both the linear and curvilinear interaction terms between crowd size and tenure disparity 
are significantly positive (𝛽𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒×𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 0.039, 𝑝 <
0.05; 𝛽𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒2×𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 0.004, 𝑝 < 0.05). This finding supports a search view 
on the positive interaction between crowd size and crowd diversity (H3a). The positive 
linear and curvilinear interactions between crowd size and tenure disparity suggest that 
the negative quadratic relationship between crowd size and productivity is less concave 
under situations of high tenure disparity. This finding also suggests that the axis of 
symmetry for the quadratic function between crowd size and crowd productivity is 
moved rightward under situations of high tenure disparity. In a sense, a high level of 
tenure disparity cancels out some negative influence of crowd size on crowd productivity.  
As shown in Table 14, we found mixed interaction effects between crowd size 
and country variety. Specifically, the linear interaction is significant and negative 
(𝛽𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒×𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦 = −0.177, 𝑝 < 0.001). The significant linear interaction 
supports a competition view on the negative interaction between crowd size and crowd 
diversity (H3c). However, the curvilinear interaction is positive 
(𝛽𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒2×𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦 = 0.079, 𝑝 < 0.001), which indicates that the negative 
quadratic relationship between crowd size and productivity is less concave under 
situation of high country variety. The significant curvilinear interaction supports an 
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innovation search view on the positive interaction between crowd size and crowd 
diversity (i.e., H3a).  
The results of the GLM for crowd efficiency are presented in Table 15 (i.e., 
shortest task completion time) and Table 16 (average task completion time). We took the 
same hierarchical approach as we did previously for crowd size. Unlike the negative 
binomial regression, the generalized linear regression offers F statistics on the overall fit 
of our regression models. As shown in Table 15 and Table 16, both the basic models (i.e., 
model 1_1 and Model 1_2) only includes control variables. The fit indices show that 
these two models fits the data better than their null models. Statistics from both models 
show that Fog Readability Index (i.e., task complexity), event length, payment size, and 
checkpoint (yes=1) significantly and positively relate to task completion time, suggesting 
that these control variables are negatively related to crowd efficiency. The number of 
payments and design events (i.e., group =1) are negatively associated with task 
completion time, suggesting that they have a positive implication on crowd efficiency.  
The inclusion of the variables of interests (i.e., crowd size, tenure disparity, and 
country variety) in Model 2_1 and 2_2 significantly improves the fit indices. As indicated 
by the significant, negative coefficients for the quadratic term in Table 15 and Table 16 
(i.e.,𝛽𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒2 = −0.001, 𝑝 < 0.001; 𝛽
′
𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒2 = −0.001, 𝑝 < 0.001), crowd size 
relates to task completion time in an inverted U-shape, which suggests that crowd size is 
associated with crowd efficiency in a U-shape. This finding means that as crowd size 
increases, crowd efficiency first declines and then increases. This finding does not 
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support a positive association between crowd size and crowd efficiency (H1b) nor an 
inverted U-shape between crowd size and crowd efficiency (H1d).  
The coefficients for tenure disparity and country variety from both Model 2_1 in 
Table 15 and Model 2_2 in Table 16 are all significantly positive. These findings suggest 
that tenure disparity and country variety are positively related to task completion time, 
indicating the existence of a negative relationship between crowd diversity and crowd 
efficiency. This finding supports a competition view that there exists a negative 
association between crowd diversity and crowd efficiency (H2d).  
The fit indices of Model 3_1 in Table 15 and those of Model 3_2 in Table 16 
indicate that the inclusion of the linear interaction terms marginally improves the model 
fit (i.e., 𝐹 = 3.16, 𝑝 < 0.05; 𝐹′ = 5.52, 𝑝 < 0.01). However, Model 4_1 and Model 4_2 are 
not significant. None of the coefficients for the curvilinear interaction terms are 
significant. We conclude that there exists only linear interactions between crowd size and 
crowd efficiency. Specifically, the coefficients for the linear interaction between crowd 
size and country variety across Model 3_1 and Model 3_2 are consistent and significantly 
negative (𝛽𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒×𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦 = −0.144, 𝑝 < 0.01; 𝛽
′
𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒×𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦
=
−0.174, 𝑝 < 0.01). This finding suggests that crowd size and country variety negatively 
interact to influence task completion time, thus supporting a search view on positive 
interaction for crowd efficiency (H3b). As for the influence of interaction between crowd 
size and tenure disparity on crowd efficiency, we found significant evidence from only 
Model 3_2 (𝛽′
𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒×𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦
= −0.014, 𝑝 < 0.001), which supports H3b in a 
similar approach. 
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Table 15  
Generalized Linear Regression Model – Efficiency_1 (Shortest Task Completion Time) 
Variables Model 1_1 Model 2_1  Model 3_1 Model 4_1 
Controls     
Number of words 0.005 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
Fog readability index 0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
Event length 0.012*** 
(0.001) 
0.009*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
Payment size 0.046*** 
(0.002) 
0.040*** 
(0.002) 
0.040*** 
(0.002) 
0.040*** 
(0.002) 
Number of payment -0.123*** 
(0.023) 
-0.117*** 
(0.022) 
-0.122*** 
(0.023) 
-0.123*** 
(0.023) 
Checkpoint (0,1) 0.256*** 
(0.069) 
0.343*** 
(0.068) 
0.325*** 
(0.069) 
0.328*** 
(0.069) 
Group (0, 1) -0.332*** 
(0.064) 
-0.385*** 
(0.066) 
-0.390*** 
(0.067) 
-0.389*** 
(0.067) 
Main effects     
Crowd size  0.044** 
(0.009) 
0.057*** 
(0.011) 
0.058*** 
(0.013) 
Crowd size2  -0.001*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(<0.001) 
Tenure disparity H2d 0.445*** 
(0.056) 
0.388*** 
(0.059) 
0.390*** 
(0.066) 
Country variety H2d 1.399*** 
(0.106) 
1.118*** 
(0.149) 
1.210*** 
(0.168) 
Linear interaction      
Crowd size × Tenure disparity   -0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.029) 
Crowd size × Country variety H3b  -0.144** 
(0.068) 
-0.134† 
(0.074) 
Quadratic interactions     
Crowd size2 × Tenure disparity 
 
   -0.0001 
(0.0005) 
Crowd size2 × Country variety 
 
   -0.003 
(0.008) 
     
AIC 20988 20628 20625 20629 
Deviance 4404.9 4112.9 4107.5 4107.5 
F value 93.07*** 96.60*** 3.26* 0.04 
Dispersion parameter  0.869 0.843 0.845 0.845 
N 4702 4702 4702 4702 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, **p<0.01,*p<0.05, †<0.1.  
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Table 16  
Generalized Linear Regression Model – Efficiency_2 (Average Task Completion Time) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, **p<0.01,*p<0.05 
 
Variables Model 1_2 Model 2_2  Model 3_2 Model 4_2 
Controls     
Number of words 0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
Fog readability index 0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.006** 
(0.002) 
0.006** 
(0.002) 
0.006** 
(0.002) 
Event length 0.012*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Payment size 0.038*** 
(0.002) 
0.030*** 
(0.002) 
0.030*** 
(0.002) 
0.030*** 
(0.002) 
Number of payment -0.120*** 
(0.019) 
-0.109*** 
(0.019) 
-0.112*** 
(0.019) 
-0.109*** 
(0.020) 
Checkpoint (0,1) 0.598*** 
(0.060) 
0.671*** 
(0.059) 
0.658*** 
(0.059) 
0.654*** 
(0.059) 
Group (0, 1) -0.063 
(0.055) 
-0.116* 
(0.056) 
-0.138* 
(0.057) 
-0.139* 
(0.057) 
Main effects     
Crowd size  0.100*** 
(0.008) 
0.115*** 
(0.010) 
0.107*** 
(0.011) 
Crowd size2  -0.001*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(<0.001) 
Tenure disparity H2d 0.460*** 
(0.048) 
0.427*** 
(0.051) 
0.462*** 
(0.056) 
Country variety H2d 1.396*** 
(0.091) 
1.114*** 
(0.128) 
1.135*** 
(0.144) 
Linear interaction      
Crowd size × Tenure disparity H3b  -0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.035 
(0.025) 
Crowd size × Country variety H3b  -0.174** 
(0.059) 
-0.205** 
(0.064) 
Quadratic interactions     
Crowd size2 × Tenure disparity  
 
   -0.001 
(0.001) 
Crowd size2 × Country variety  
 
   0.0001 
(0.006) 
AIC 23212 22439 22431 22431 
Deviance 3425.7 2948.8 2942 2939.7 
F value 179.66*** 192.61*** 5.52** 1.79 
Dispersion parameter  0.641 0.619 0.624 0.624 
N 4702 4702 4702 4702 
153 
Robust Checks 
Robust Checks for Negative Binomial Regression.  We used a negative binomial 
regression to analyze crowd productivity. Developed by statisticians to analyze non-
negative count data with over-dispersion, a negative binomial regression model includes 
three basic components: overly-dispersed error structure, a link function, and linear 
predictor(s) (Ballinger, 2004; Hardin, Hilbe, & Hilbe, 2007). In this research, crowd 
productivity is a count variable. As shown in Table 14, the over-dispersion parameters 
range from 3.026 to 7.424, justifying the validity of choosing negative binomial 
regression (Hofer, Cantor, & Dai, 2012) and supporting the assumption of this method on 
the distribution of error (Crawley, 2012; Hardin et al., 2007).  
As suggested by scholars, a miss-specified link could lead to biased coefficient 
estimations (Crawley, 2007). In our data analysis, we used the default log link for our 
proposed negative binomial regression. To test the validity of this selection, we compared 
our findings with those from the other two available link functions (i.e., identity link and 
square root link) (Crawley, 2007; Hardin et al., 2007; Nelder & Baker, 1972). Our 
comparison demonstrated that the log link is more robust and effective than the other two 
link functions for our data for two reasons. First, we ran into convergence issues 
frequently when using the identity link or square root link to analyze our data, but the 
convergence was not an issue for a log link. Second, for those models did converge by 
using either identity link or square root link, the log link provided much better model fit 
in terms of residual deviance.  
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 The linearity in generalized linear models means that the conditional mean of a 
response variable (i.e., dependent variable) is equal to a linear combination of the 
predictors (Fox & Weisberg, 2012). To test the linearity of predictors in our negative 
binomial models, we performed the Tukey’s test for nonadditivity (Castle & Hendry, 
2010; Tukey, 1949) by adding the squared terms of the fitted main variables (e.g., tenure 
disparity and country variety) to our proposed models. The significance level for the 
Turkey’s test is obtained by comparing the statistics with the standard-normal distribution 
(Fox & Weisberg, 2012). All our test results are not significant, suggesting the non-
existence of quadratic terms for these two variables.  
 To further validate our findings, we performed a regression diagnosis according to 
the procedures and guidelines proposed by methodologists (Cohen et al., 2013; Kutner et 
al., 2004; Neter et al., 1996). Our regression diagnoses support our decision to delete the 
five most influential outliers that are distributed more than three standard deviations 
beyond the mean of crowd productivity. All these post hoc analyses that we performed 
demonstrate the robust of our data analysis.  
Robust Checks for Generalized Linear Regression.  We used a generalized linear 
model with a Gamma distribution to analyze crowd efficiency which is a positive and 
right skewed variable (Figure 2). By design, the generalized linear model with a Gamma 
distribution was developed by scholars to analyze continuous variance with skewed 
distribution (Ballinger, 2004; Dobson & Barnett, 2008). Similar to a negative binomial 
regression model, a generalized linear model also has three components: error structure, 
link function, and linear predictor(s) (Crawley, 2012). The variance of a Gamma 
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distribution is defined by 𝑣(µ𝑖 = µ𝑖
2/𝑣) (Dobson & Barnett, 2008; Hardin et al., 2007), 
i.e., the variance is proportional to the squared mean. The dispersion parameters shown in 
Table 15 and Table 16 range from 0.619 to 0.869, indicating that the variance is 
proportional to the mean. These parameters are very close to the results that we 
calculated using the descriptive statistics in Table 13 (i.e., 0.66 and 0.78), which justifies 
our selection on the generalized linear model with a Gamma distribution.  
 The default link function in R for Gamma distribution is an inverse function, and 
there are other two alternatives: identity function and log function (Fox & Weisberg, 
2012). In our data analysis, we compared the performance of all three link functions. All 
three links offered convergent results for the base model only with control variable. The 
fit indices based on Model 4_1 are reported in the following Table 17. For the basic 
model, the identity link offers the best fit, but as we add more variables of interests to the 
basic model, we ran into convergence issues for both the identity link function and the 
inverse link function. The log link consistently converges for all models, suggesting the 
robust of the Gamma distribution with a log link.  
Table 17  
Fit Indices Comparison for Model 4_1 
  Identity link Log link Inverse link 
AIC 20824 20988 21356 
Deviance 4272.4 4404.9 4714.7 
F value 106.07*** 93.07*** 41.18*** 
Dispersion parameter 0.94 0.869 0.888 
  
To check the linearity issue, we performed the Tukey’s test for nonadditivity 
(Castle & Hendry, 2010; Tukey, 1949) by adding the squares of the fitted main variables 
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(e.g., tenure disparity and country variety) to our proposed models. Test results were not 
significant. We failed to reject the null that the coefficients for the second order terms of 
tenure disparity and country variety were zero. This result suggests the non-existence of 
quadratic terms for these two variables that are in question. Our proposed models meet 
the linearity requirement for a generalized linear model. To further validate our findings, 
we performed a regression diagnostics according to the procedures and guidelines 
proposed by methodologists (Cohen et al., 2013; Kutner et al., 2004; Neter et al., 1996). 
Our analysis identified a few influential outliers that are beyond the recommended cutoff 
values. By taking out these influential outliers, our findings still hold and become more 
significant, further justifying the robust of our data analysis.   
Endogeneity Test. In our second data analysis, crowd-level attributes are endogenous 
variables because they are contingent on the setting of a crowdsourcing event (e.g., 
payment size, number of payments, and event length). As indicated by tournament theory 
(e.g., Boudreau et al., 2011, Garcia & Tor, 2009), there exists a possibility that suppliers 
observing a relatively large number of submissions may choose to submit their solutions 
or to withdraw their participation. This possibility suggests the existence of simultaneity 
between crowd attributes and crowd performance, which might lead to threats to the 
internal validity of our data analysis (Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010).  
Our post hoc analyses discovered that only crowd size correlated with the error terms 
when we used crowd attributes (i.e., crowd size, tenure disparity, and country variety) to 
predict crowd productivity. This finding further supports the existence of endogeneity 
problem associated with crowd size in our data analysis.    
157 
To address the endogeneity of crowd size, we ran a two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) regression. Before the 2SLS was executed, we had to identify instrument 
variables that met validity requirements according to the criteria proposed by scholars 
(e.g., Antonakis et al., 2010; Wooldridge, 2002): (1) an instrument variable should be 
significantly and strongly related to the endogenous variable(s); (2) an instrument 
variable should be uncorrelated with the error terms of the main regression model; (3) an 
instrument variable must be related to the dependent variable(s) but less strongly than is 
the endogenous variable(s). Among all the exogenous variables controlled in our data 
analysis, we found that only Fog Readability Index met all these three requirements when 
predicting crowd productivity. However, we did not find any exogenous variable that 
could meet these criteria when analyzing crowd efficiency. We thus performed an 
endogeneity test for crowd productivity.  
In the first stage, crowd size was regressed on all exogenous variables in order to 
obtain predicted values and error terms (𝜀𝑖) for this endogenous variable. In the second 
stage, the predicted values from the first stage were included as independent variables to 
replace the actual values of crowd size. The error terms (𝜀𝑖) from the first stage were also 
included as a predictor for crowd productivity in the second stage. The significance of the 
coefficient for error terms indicates the existence of endogeneity of crowd size 
(Wooldridge, 2015). Other exogenous variables (e.g., payment size, number of payments, 
and event length) and two dummy control variables (i.e., checkpoint and group) were also 
included. Because crowd size and crowd productivity are count variables, we adopted the 
negative binomial regression instead of the ordinary least square (OLS) regression in the 
both stages of 2SLS regression analysis (Antonakis et al., 2010; Wooldridge, 2015). 
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Table 18 
Endogeneity Test for Crowd Productivity 
Variables (1) 
Crowd size 
(NBR) a 
(2) 
Crowd 
productivity 
(2SLS) b 
Controls   
Checkpoint (0,1) 0.232*** 
(0.046) 
0.537*** 
(0.042) 
Group (0, 1) -0.038 
(0.043) 
0.534*** 
(0.043) 
Number of words  0.006* 
(0.002) 
-0.004† 
(0.002)  
Fog readability index c 0.004** 
(0.002) 
 
Event length  0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.018*** 
(0.001) 
Payment size  0.025*** 
(0.001) 
-0.035*** 
(0.003) 
Number of payments  0.022 
(0.015) 
0.168*** 
(0.014) 
   
Main effects   
Crowd size  0.039*** 
(0.003) 
Crowd size2  -1.357e-05*** 
(<0.001) 
Tenure disparity  0.027 
(0.044) 
Country variety  -0.729*** 
(0.089) 
𝜀𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒  0.458*** 
(0.010) 
Constant 3.106*** 
(0.011) 
-0.018 
(0.067) 
   
AIC 39960 20344 
Deviance 5362.0 4698.3 
N 5044  5044 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, **p<0.01,*p<0.05, †<0.1. Models (1) depicts 
the results of the first-stage regression considering the endogenous crowd size. Model (2) is the 
second stage regression incorporating the predicted values and residuals from the first stage, other 
exogenous variables, and dummy control variables. a) and b): negative binomial regression. c): 
instrument variable. 
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 Table 18 shows the results of the first stage and second stage of regression 
analyses. In the first stage regression, Fog Readability Index (i.e., the instrument 
variable) is a significant predictor for crowd size (𝛽 = 0.004, 𝑝 < 0.01). However, a Chi-
square test shows that Fog Readability Index is a weak instrument because a 7.504 Chi-
square value (𝑝 = 0.006) is below the recommended threshold of 9 for strong instrument 
(Staiger & Stock, 1997; Wooldridge, 2015). A weak instrument might create a limitation 
in our endogeneity test (Murray, 2006), which suggests that we should interpret our 
findings on endogeneity test with caution. Besides Fog Readability Index, we found that 
number of words, payment size, and checkpoint were also significant predictors for 
endogenous crowd size.  
In the second stage, we found that the coefficient for the residual terms of the first 
stage was statistically different from zero (𝛽𝜀 = 0.458, 𝑝 < 0.001). We rejected the null 
that crowd size was exogenous and concluded that it was indeed endogenous. This 
finding suggests that we should use the predicted crowd size from the first stage of 2SLS 
analysis instead of the actual crowd size in our data analysis. Accordingly, we updated 
our data analysis and found that the significant findings identified before still held, which 
demonstrated that the endogeneity of crowd size did not jeopardize the validity of 
findings after we used the instrumental regression approach. The existence of the 
endogeneity between crowd size and crowd productivity suggests the simultaneity 
between these two variables. The managerial implication of this simultaneity will be 
further addressed in the discussion section.  
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Summary 
The main objective of the second data analysis was to reveal the associations 
between crowd attributes (e.g., crowd size and crowd diversity) and crowd performance 
(e.g., crowd productivity and crowd efficiency) and to discover the performance 
implications of crowd attributes in crowdsourcing. By analyzing secondary data from a 
crowdsourcing platform, we identified significant relationships proposed in our 
theoretical model in chapter 4 (Figure 10).  
Specifically, we found that (1) crowd size relates to crowd productivity in an 
inverted U-shape that supports a competition view on the performance implication of 
crowd size; (2) tenure disparity is positively associated with crowd productivity, which 
means that a crowd with diversified members in terms of membership length can 
generate more solutions for buying firms, thus supporting a search view on the 
performance implication of crowd diversity; (3) the relationship between country variety 
and crowd productivity is significantly negative, which supports a competition view on 
the performance implication of crowd diversity; (4) there exists a significant and positive 
interaction between tenure disparity and crowd size, which justifies a search view on the 
complementary effect of these two crowd attributes. As for the interactions between 
country variety and crowd size, we found that a negative linear interaction term and a 
positive quadratic interaction term. Detailed explanations and implications of these 
findings will be further discussed in chapter 7.  
As for the implications of crowd attributes on crowd efficiency, we found that (1) 
both tenure disparity and country variety are negatively related to crowd efficiency, 
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supporting a competition view on the performance implication of diversity in 
crowdsourcing; and (2) both tenure disparity and country variety positively interact with 
crowd size to make a crowd function more efficiently (i.e., reducing task completion 
time). This positive linear interaction between crowd size and crowd diversity supports 
an innovation search view on the complementary effects for crowd attributes on crowd 
efficiency. We will discuss the implications of these findings in detail in the following 
chapter.  
Another purpose of this data analysis was to test whether innovation search view 
is more applicable than competition view in explaining the associations between crowd 
attributes and crowd performance. Based on the above findings, we found that neither an 
innovation search view nor a competition view can fully explain the performance 
implications of crowd attributes. We need to combine these two views together to get a 
full understanding on the mechanisms that underlie the associations between crowd 
attributes and crowd performance. We thus propose a competition-search view in this 
dissertation and address the application of this new perspective in the discussion section.  
This research also discovers an unexpected finding that calls for further 
exploration. For instance, we found that crowd size relates to crowd efficiency in a U-
shape, which is different from the proposed positive relationship based on innovation 
search view (e.g., Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Laursen & Salter, 2006) and the inverted U-
shape relationship based on competition view (e.g., Boudreau et al., 2011; Che & Gale, 
2003). This U-shape relationship between crowd size and crowd efficiency suggests the 
existence of other mechanism(s), other than innovation search and competition that 
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influence the operations of a crowd in crowdsourcing. We will talk about this issue more 
in the following two chapters. 
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Chapter 7: Discussion 
 This chapter discusses the theoretical contributions of this dissertation and 
managerial implications of our findings. With a purpose to explain the phenomenon of 
performance variation puzzle in crowdsourcing, we systematically examine the issue of 
crowd development and its performance implications. Specifically, we first propose a 
double-funnel crowd development framework to elaborate the process of a crowd 
development. We then uncover the mechanisms that underline the relationship between 
crowd development and crowd performance through two empirical studies based on 
secondary data analysis. Accordingly, we discuss the theoretical contributions and 
managerial implications separately in the following sections. 
Theoretical Contributions 
Contributions of the Crowd Development Framework.   The proposed double-funnel 
crowd development framework is the first theoretical model that describes an emerging 
process – crowd development – in current crowdsourcing literature and supply chain 
management literature. As crowdsourcing becomes more popular for executives and 
supply chain managers to solve their innovation-related problems, crowd management 
becomes an important salient issue for managers and scholars in the supply chain field 
(Felin et al., 2015; Wooten & Ulrich, 2017). Increasing the understanding of a crowd in 
crowdsourcing and crowd development process then becomes the first and foremost for 
scholars in the supply chain field. We believe that the double-funnel crowd development 
framework proposed in this dissertation makes a few significant theoretical contributions.  
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First, this framework establishes a developmental perspective to look at the 
concept of a crowd and crowd attributes. The double-funnel crowd development 
framework demonstrates that a crowd in crowdsourcing is contingent on a particular 
crowdsourcing task. This demonstration challenges the dominant view in existing 
crowdsourcing literature that a crowd is a population outside of the focal firms’ 
organizational boundaries and exists before the start of a crowdsourcing event (Afuah & 
Tucci, 2012; Malhotra & Majchrzak, 2014). Due to the emergence nature of a crowd in 
crowdsourcing, crowd-level attributes (e.g., pervasiveness of problem-solving know-how 
in a crowd) are not what scholars assumed to be recognized inputs for a crowdsourcing 
decision making (e.g., Afuah & Tucci, 2012). Instead, these attributes remain unknown to 
managers before the start of an event and are actually outcomes of a crowd development 
process. These new understanding on a crowd based on the proposed crowd development 
framework suggests an emergence perspective to understand and examine the human 
crowd in crowdsourcing.   
Second, the proposed double-funnel crowd development framework enriches 
current supply chain literature by identifying crowd development as a new process from a 
supply chain management perspective. As many companies apply crowdsourcing to solve 
their innovation-related problems, the human crowd has emerged as an alternative 
supplier in supply network. Crowd management thus becomes an emergent issue 
(Kaganer et al., 2013). However, little research in current crowdsourcing literature has 
systematically described crowd management, and no framework on crowd engagement 
has been provided in current crowdsourcing literature (Wooten & Ulrich, 2017). Our 
proposed double-funnel crowd development framework fills this void by providing a 
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holistic view on the whole crowd development process and partitions this process into 
four stages. The proposed double-funnel crowd development framework demonstrates the 
emergence and transient nature of a crowd development process. This is very different 
from the controlled, systematic, and deliberate nature of a supplier development in 
traditional sourcing literature (Hahn et al., 1990; Krause & Ellram, 1997). These 
differences suggest that the criterion-based, performance-oriented supplier development 
does not work for crowd development in crowdsourcing. Scholars and professionals need 
to take an emergence perspective to look at crowd development. Our framework thus 
introduces a new research topic – crowd development – to the supply chain management 
literature. 
Finally, the proposed crowd development framework offers a structural view on 
how event design in crowdsourcing might influence the development process of a crowd 
that, in turn, determines the performance outcomes of a crowd. This framework thus 
creates many new research opportunities for scholars to examine crowdsourcing from 
supply chain perspective. The direct theoretical contributions of framework are to help us 
partition crowd development into two testable phases (e.g., crowd formation and crowd 
evaluation). Based on this partition, we develop two empirical studies in this dissertation 
that examine the influence of event design on the emergence of a crowd and the 
performance implication of crowd attributes. As such, this framework offers support to 
reveal the underlying mechanisms that influence crowd performance and increase 
academic understanding on suppliers’ participation behavior in crowdsourcing and crowd 
performance variation.  
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Beyond direct theoretical implications in this dissertation, this framework also 
maps out a new landscape for academic research on crowdsourcing in supply chain 
literature. For instance, this framework suggests that crowd attributes mediate the 
relationships between crowdsourcing event design and crowd performance. Testing and 
revealing mediation mechanisms can be useful for scholars and professionals to better 
understand the emergence of a crowd in crowdsourcing. Scholars can further examine 
individual participant’s interactions within the crowd development process from a system 
dynamics perspective (Größler et al., 2008). It is also worthy of applying more interactive 
methodology (e.g., agent-based simulation or behavioral experiments) to further 
understand the implications of event setting (e.g., payment adjustment) on solvers’ 
interaction behaviors (Delre, Jager, Bijmolt, & Janssen, 2010; Delre, Jager, & Janssen, 
2007).  
Contributions of Contatition Perspective on Crowd Emergence.  Our 
dissertation uncovers the contatition (i.e., contagious competition) mechanism underlying 
a crowd development in this first empirical study that examines the relationships between 
elements of event design and crowd emergence. The contagious competition mechanism 
means that imitation and competition are the two coexisting forces that influence solvers’ 
participation behaviors that, in turn, form a crowd for a particular crowdsourcing event. 
These two forces are not exclusive to each other as indicated by tournament theory and 
diffusion theory. Instead, they jointly influence the crowd-development process and 
create variations on crowd growth rate and realized crowd size for different 
crowdsourcing events. The discovery of the contagious competition mechanism 
contributes to the understanding on crowd development in several nontrivial ways.  
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First, the contatition perspective on crowd emergence offers a complete view on 
the considerations for suppliers’ participation behavior in crowdsourcing. The proposed 
new perspective suggests that suppliers’ interactive participation in crowdsourcing is 
driven not only by economic considerations from tournament theory (e.g., winning 
chance and expected returns) but also by social and technical reasons from diffusion 
theory (e.g., imitation of others and ease of completion). The blended nature of 
participation behavior determines that both tournament theory and diffusion theory 
cannot fully explain the spreading of participation behavior within a crowd and crowd 
emergence in crowdsourcing. This is the main reason we need to combine elements from 
both theoretical lenses to provide a full story on crowd emergence.  
Second, the proposed contatition perspective implies that subgroups within a 
crowd serve different roles in crowd emergence. Our empirical findings suggest that 
some senior members with winning record(s) can facilitate the spreading of participation 
behavior within a crowd that, in turn, can be beneficial for crowd emergence. These 
crowd members whose behaviors and decision-making are influential to others are 
referred to as influential agents. Our findings also indicate that if many influential agents 
participate in a crowdsourcing event, they might exert a negative influence on crowd 
emergence by overinflating the competition within a crowd. The existence of influential 
agents in a crowd development process indicates that we need to take a less homogenous 
view toward participants in a crowd in crowdsourcing. As the strategic supplier 
management in sourcing literature indicates (e.g., Dyer, Cho, & Chu, 1998; Yan, Choi, 
Kim, & Yang, 2015), the contatition perspective suggests that we need to take a strategic 
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view to segment crowd members so as to better understand the human crowd in 
innovation processes.  
Third, the discovery of the contatition mechanism answers a research call on 
crowd management. As the human crowd plays an increasingly important role in 
innovation processes, scholars call for research that can help organizations better engage, 
utilize, and organize both internal and external crowds when innovating (Felin et al., 
2015). Our literature review indicates that crowd development is an under-explored topic 
in current crowdsourcing literature. Through examining the underlying mechanisms for 
crowd development, this study fills a void in current crowdsourcing and supply chain 
literature. This contatition mechanism offers direct implications for future academic 
research and creates new conversations on crowd development for scholars in these two 
research streams. For instance, scholars need to relax the rational behavioral assumption 
and incorporate social motivations when using tournament theory to understand 
crowdsourcing.  
Last but not least, many empirical findings from this research are helpful for 
scholars to better understand the influence of crowdsourcing event design. Specifically, 
we identified a quadratic relationship between task complexity and crowd growth rate. 
This finding suggests the existence of optimal complexity for a crowdsourcing task, 
which means that increasing the complexity of a crowdsourcing task by extending the 
problem scope and making the description slightly difficult to understand may not be a 
bad thing. We found that early involvement of influential agents can stimulate the growth 
rate of a crowd, which means that influential agents can increase the attractiveness of a 
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crowdsourcing event and send out positive signals to other potential solvers. We also 
found that the longer an event lasts, the more solvers participate. This finding implies that 
time is a constraint for problem solving and is one important factor when solvers evaluate 
the attractiveness of an event and decide whether to participate. Extending the length of 
an event might increase the attractiveness of a crowdsourcing event.   
Our post hoc analysis identified some thought-provoking conclusions. For 
instance, we found that the number of payments for each event seems to be more 
influential than payment size in influencing crowd emergence and more useful in 
interpreting solvers’ participation behavior in crowdsourcing. This finding suggests that a 
sense of winning and the likelihood of winning might be more important to a solver than 
how much he or she actually wins. The fact that many suppliers come from low income 
countries such as Malaysia and India might also dilute the influence of payment size on 
crowd emergence. We discovered a positive quadratic relationship between event length 
and crowd growth rate (i.e. U-shape), which suggests the existence of “non-optimality” 
of event length. This finding means that giving more time for suppliers to solve a 
particular crowdsourcing event may not necessarily increase the attractiveness of this 
event. Moreover, we revealed a negative quadratic relationship between the number of 
influential agents and crowd size (i.e., inverted U-shape), which indicates the existence of 
optimal number of influential agents for a particular crowdsourcing event. Influential 
agents can increase the attractiveness of an event and attracts other solvers to participate. 
However, they can trigger and even intensify the competition mechanism, which reduces 
the chance of winning for all participants and slow down the crowd growth.   
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Contributions of Competition-Search View on Crowd Performance.  Our second 
empirical study examined the performance implications of crowd attributes. In this study, 
we drew from a competition perspective based on tournament theory and a search 
perspective based on innovation search literature. Through this study, we discovered a 
competition-search mechanism beneath the variations of crowd performance. The 
discovery of the competition-search view contributes to the understanding of crowd 
performance variation in crowdsourcing in several significant ways.  
First, the competition-search mechanism indicates that the logic linkage between 
crowd attributes and crowd performance includes not only a competition process driven 
by solvers’ utility maximization but also a search process over a solution landscape. 
These two forces are not necessarily exclusive in explaining crowd performance. Instead, 
they are complementary to each other. This view is different from the predominant 
thinking in either crowdsourcing literature that mainly conceptualizes crowdsourcing as a 
solution to distant search (Afuah & Tucci, 2012) or tournament literature that mainly 
claims crowdsourcing as tournament (Boudreau et al., 2011; Fullerton & McAfee, 1999; 
Lazear & Rosen, 1981). It explains the puzzle in current crowdsourcing literature that 
although many scholars argue against increasing the number of participants in a 
tournament (e.g., Che & Gale, 2003; Garcia & Tor, 2009), the application of a crowd in 
solving innovation-related problems becomes even more popular nowadays (Roth et al., 
2015). This is because these scholars overlook the performance implications of the search 
mechanism. As crowd size for a particular crowdsourcing event increases, firms can 
obtain the benefits of distant search over a rugged solution landscape although they might 
experience some losses due to increased competition within a crowd. The competition-
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search mechanism thus better explains the application of crowdsourcing than either the 
tournament theory or innovation search literature does.    
Second, the proposed competition-search mechanism explains performance 
variation puzzle in crowdsourcing and thus answers the grand research question proposed 
in this dissertation. This mechanism suggests that the crowd level attributes such as size 
and diversity have direct implications for the crowd performance variations. Although 
many of the event design elements such as payment size and payment structure are 
similar, the crowd performance can vary if the emergent crowd level attributes are 
different. For instance, we mentioned two similar data search programming contests in 
the introduction sections (Topcoder, 2014a & 2014b). The main reason that one 
programming contest was more productive than the other is that the crowd for the crowd 
for the first contest was more diversified in terms of membership tenure. As suggested by 
the proposed competition-search mechanism, a diversified crowd in terms of knowledge, 
skills, and experience allows firms to search over a rugged solution landscape and locate 
participants who are at a marginal position with available problem-solving skills.  The 
crowd for the first crowdsourcing event thus generate more solutions although other 
conditions remains very similar those of the second event.  
Third, the competition-search mechanism demonstrates that we need to take a less 
homogenous view toward the diversity issue in a crowd. In this research, we mainly 
examined two sources of differences that exist in a crowd: experience difference 
measured by crowd members’ tenure disparity and participants’ origin difference 
measured by crowd members’ country variety. Our empirical findings show that these 
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two sources of differences have very opposite implications for crowd productivity. 
Specifically, tenure disparity exhibits a positive association with productivity, while 
country variety shows a negative association. The competition-search mechanism also 
indicates the different logic behind these associations between crowd diversity and crowd 
performance. In particularly, tenure disparity follows a distant search perspective to 
influence crowd performance, while country variety relies on competitive social 
comparisons among crowd members to impact crowd performance. Due to these different 
implications and different underlying mechanisms, scholars need to treat the crowd 
diversity issue differently.  
Fourth, this research reveals the complexity of performance implication of crowd 
attributes and contributes to a better understanding of crowd performance in 
crowdsourcing. For instance, the inverted U-shape relationship between crowd size and 
crowd performance (i.e., productivity and efficiency) suggests the existence of optimality 
of crowd size. A moderate level of competition within a crowd in crowdsourcing can 
motivate all participant to increase their effort and thus improve the overall performance. 
However, very strong competition due to a large increase in crowd size can be 
detrimental. This inverted U-shape relationship between crowd size and crowd 
performance also suggests that the wisdom of a crowd is not unlimited in tournament-
based crowdsourcing situation as what scholars claim (Howe, 2006; Surowiecki, 2005), 
but actually depends on the number of participants. Moreover, the positive interaction 
effect between crowd size and tenure disparity on productivity indicates that the effects 
of crowd size and tenure disparity are complementary. This finding suggests that up-ward 
comparison (i.e., more tenure -disparity) matters to solvers when they compete with 
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many agents. Furthermore, there exists a negative interaction effect between crowd size 
and country variety on crowd performance (i.e., productivity and efficiency). This finding 
implies that the effects of crowd size and country variety are incompatible. When these 
two factors meet each other, they tend to increase the spatial distance and  “psychological 
distance” among crowd members and might lead to “over-search”, which can be 
detrimental for performance (Laursen & Salter, 2006).  
Last but not least, this study creates new research topic related to the influence of 
crowd size on crowd efficiency. Our data analysis shows that crowd size relates to crowd 
efficiency in a U-shape, which is different from either the proposed positive relationship 
based on innovation search view (e.g., Laursen & Salter, 2006) or the inverted U-shape 
relationship based on competition view (e.g., Boudreau et al., 2011; Che & Gale, 2003). 
This unexpected finding suggests that the mechanism underlying the relationship between 
crowd size and crowd efficiency remains unclear. It is possible that an increase in the 
crowd size might create a shared sense of responsibility toward solving a particular 
crowdsourcing task within a crowd which might lead to reduced crowd efficiency 
(Forsyth, 2009; Zimbardo, 2007). The negative effect of shared responsibility could be 
intensified by the anonymity of crowd members in crowdsourcing and the loosely 
coupled relationship between crowd members and focal buying firm. It could also be 
possible that the crowd size has to be large enough for the competition mechanism to be 
effective to improve the crowd efficiency. Anyway, the implication of crowd size on 
crowd efficiency requires further exploration. 
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Managerial Implications   
Insights of the Double-Funnel Crowd Development Framework.  The purpose 
of this dissertation was to explain the performance variation puzzle in crowdsourcing and 
to answer managers’ concern and doubts on the application of a crowd in innovation 
processes. Based on four qualitative cases and structural thinking, we proposed a double-
funnel crowd development framework in this dissertation. We believe that our proposed 
framework offers many strategic and operational implications for managers.  
First, this framework indicates that managers cannot use criterion-based supplier 
development to manage crowd development and need to develop new skills to engage a 
crowd in crowdsourcing. This is because crowd development is an emergent process in 
the supply chain field. Unlike a supplier development, a crowd development involves an 
open call through which suppliers make their own decision to form a loosely coupled 
relationship with focal buying companies. The limited information visibility within a 
crowd and suppliers’ self-selection make a crowd development full of uncertainty. All 
these significant differences suggests that managers need to switch from a control 
mentality in outsourcing to an emergence mentality toward crowd development. As 
indicated by our double-funnel crowd development, managers need to focus their 
attention on creating crowdsourcing event design so as to provide a beneficial structure 
for a crowd to emerge by itself, that is, for suppliers to self-select themselves to join the 
crowd formation process.  
Second, our framework offers an indirect approach for managers to exert their 
influence on crowd performance. Although our framework suggests that managers need 
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to switch from a controlled mentality in outsourcing context to an emergence in 
crowdsourcing, this does not mean that managers have no influence on crowd 
performance. Our proposed framework provides a structural view on how the event 
setting impacts the crowd formation process and realized crowd attributes that, in turn, 
impact the crowd performance. In a sense, managers can indirectly exercise their 
influence by managing the crowdsourcing event design and by supervising the crowd 
formation process. An understanding of the associations between event design and crowd 
development and the mechanisms underlying crowd performance thus becomes very 
critical for managers to organize and engage a crowd in crowdsourcing.  
 Third, our proposed framework demonstrates the challenges associated with 
crowd engagement and crowd performance management. A crowd in crowdsourcing is a 
collective of suppliers that are nested in a virtue network. Our framework suggests that 
the boundary of a crowd in crowdsourcing is vaguely and loosely determined. Suppliers 
can self-select to join a crowd and withdraw their participation at any time without any 
contract liability. Managing a collective of suppliers with fuzzy boundary and no specific 
organization structure is thus very challenging. The proposed framework also show the 
uncertainty associated with the crowd development. The crowd for a particular 
crowdsourcing event realizes at the end of a crowd development process. Who gets 
involved in this process and how a crowd emerges remain unclear to managers at the 
beginning of a crowdsourcing event. This is the main reason that we develop this 
dissertation to uncover the mechanisms underlying crowd development and crowd 
performance. 
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Insights of the Contatition Perspective.  The contagious competition mechanism 
proposed in the first empirical study in this dissertation suggests that that imitation and 
competition are the two coexisting forces that influence solvers’ participation behaviors 
that, in turn, form a crowd for a particular crowdsourcing event. These two forces are not 
exclusive to each other but jointly influence crowd development process and create 
variations on crowd growth rate and realized crowd size for different crowdsourcing 
events. In reality managers concern about crowd growth rate and crowd size for a 
particular crowdsourcing event when managing the crowd development process. This is 
because both variables are quantitative indicators for understanding a process that is out 
of managers’ direct control due to agents’ self-selection and endogenous participation 
entry. As indicated by our double-funnel crowd development framework, these two 
variables could have strong performance implications. The proposed contatition 
perspective can allow professionals to manage crowd emergence better in several 
significant ways.  
 The contatition perspective on crowd emergence offers many options for 
managers to increase the growth rate of a crowd. Specifically, managers can increase the 
problems scope of a task and make the task a little bit more challenging to motivate 
suppliers to participate in solving a crowdsourced problem. Managers can also attract 
influential agents (i.e., agents with winning records and above average membership 
length) to participate in a particular event as early as possible to leveraging their positive 
influence of attracting other suppliers to join the crowd formation. At the same time, 
manager can increase the number of influential agents by sending customized invitations 
to these influentials. As indicated by our empirical findings, there exists a U-shape 
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relationship between event length and crowd growth rate. This finding means that events 
with relative short or long duration are more attractive to suppliers. Managers can create 
a crowdsourcing event with relative short event length in which suppliers are motivated 
to participate due to time pressure. They can also think of give suppliers enough time and 
extend the event length.      
 If the goal is to increase the crowd size (i.e., the number of participants for a 
crowdsourcing event), managers can increase the number of payments for each event 
instead of the payment size since our study suggests that the number of payments seems 
to be more attractive to suppliers than the total payment size. They can also extend the 
event length to allow suppliers have more time work on designing their solutions, thus 
increasing the attractiveness of an event to potential suppliers. Furthermore, managers 
can attract influential agents to participate in an event with caution. Because the 
relationship between number of influential agents and crowd size is inverted U-shape, 
managers should avoid attracting to many influential suppliers for an event and over-
inflating the competition within a crowd.  
 However, our proposed contatition perspective also indicates the challenges 
associated with crowd management. Our findings suggest that there exists opposing 
implications of some elements of event settings on growth rate and crowd size. For 
instance, event length positively relates to crowd size but relates to crowd growth rate in 
a positive U-shape. This finding suggests that a large increase in the event length might 
increase the crowd size, but it might have a negative influence on the crowd growth rate. 
Another element of event design that might have opposing implications for crowd growth 
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rate and crowd size is the number of influential agents. Our data analysis discovered that 
a large increase in the number of influential agents involved in a crowdsourcing event 
might stimulate more people to join the crowd formation but it might slow down the 
growth by over-inflating the competition within a crowd. This finding suggests that 
managers need to take a less homogenous view towards the crowd members and keep a 
close eye on the influential suppliers in the crowd formation process.  
Insights of the Competition-Search View.   Productivity and efficiency are two 
of the main managerial focuses in crowdsourcing. High productivity means that managers 
can get multiple solutions for one particular task. Comparing the traditional internal 
development (e.g., hiring engineers) or contract with suppliers (i.e., outsourcing), 
crowdsourcing allows managers to harness the wisdom of a crowd and leverage 
competition mechanism to determine the best outcomes. High efficiency means that 
managers can reduce the cycle time for their innovation processes and achieve 
competitive advantages on market competition. An understanding of the competition-
search perspective can allow managers to administer crowdsourcing event more 
efficiently and effectively and achieve better outcomes.  
 Managers can achieve the objective to acquire multiple solutions or designs for a 
particular crowdsourced problem by directly adjusting the elements of event setting. As 
indicated by our data analysis in the second empirical study, the number of payment and 
checkpoint (i.e., feedback = yes) are positively related to crowd productivity, while Fog 
Readability Index (i.e., task complexity), event length, and payment size are negatively 
associated with crowd productivity. Managers thus can take utilize these significant 
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findings to create a beneficial context in which suppliers are motivated to compete with 
each other to provide best solutions. For instance, managers can increase the number of 
payments to increase each suppliers’ sense of winning. They can provide active feedback 
for participants and build an information loop between buying firms and the crowd which 
can increase participants’ engagement and sense of belonging. Managers can also 
increase the attractiveness of an event by narrowing the scope of problems and using 
simple words to describe events.    
Managers can also achieve the goal of increasing submissions by leveraging the 
influence of crowd attributes. Unlike adjusting elements of event settings, managing 
crowd attributes to increase crowd productivity is more challenging for two reasons. 
First, crowd attributes in crowdsourcing has dynamic nature since the crowd for an event 
is evolving in the crowd development process. The crowd realizes in the last minute and 
dissolves after the deadline of an event. By that time, solutions have been submitted. 
Second, all the main relationships between crowd attributes and crowd productivity are 
not linear but quadratic. For instance, crowd size relates to crowd productivity in an 
inverted U-shape, suggesting that managers can increase the productivity by increasing 
the number of participants or attracting participants with a wide range of skills. There 
also exists a positive interaction. This finding suggests that if managers can take these 
two actions simultaneously, they have more chances to achieve a productive crowd. In 
terms of country variety, this variable relates to crowd productivity in a U-shape and 
negatively interacts with crowd size, indicating that managers need to address where the 
solvers come from. If they can narrow the geographical distance or spatial distance, it’s 
likely that they can get a productive crowd.  
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Our endogeneity test on crowd size revealed the existence of simultaneity 
between crowd size and crowd productivity. This simultaneity suggests that crowd size 
(i.e., the number of participants) have an influence on the performance of a crowd. It also 
suggests that crowd productivity (i.e., the number of submitted solutions) influences 
suppliers’ participation and submission behaviors, which demonstrates the dynamic 
nature of crowd performance in crowdsourcing. The simultaneity between crowd size and 
crowd productivity indicates that managers can attract more participants for a particular 
crowdsourcing event by making the number submissions public available to all potential 
suppliers. Since crowd size relates to crowd productivity in an inverted U-shape, 
managers should be cautious about the “N-effect” caused by over competition.  
If the objective for a crowd is to solve a crowdsourced project more efficiently 
(i.e., using less time to complete a task), manages can consider reducing task complexity 
and event length, choosing a relative small payment size while increasing the number of 
payments, and providing no feedback during the crowd formation process. In terms of 
managing crowd attributes to increase crowd efficiency, managers can think of either 
reducing the diversity or increasing the crowd size. This is because both tenure disparity 
and country variety are positively related to shortest task completion time and average 
task completion time. That is, attracting participants with similar skills and geographical 
background can be associated with shorter task competition time (i.e., high crowd 
efficiency). Crowd size relates to task completion time in an inverted U-Shape and 
negatively interacts with crowd diversity (i.e., tenure disparity and country variety), 
suggesting that increasing the crowd size might lead to short completing time, i.e., high 
crowd efficiency.   
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
Overview  
The grand research question that we addressed in this dissertation is how a crowd 
development impacts crowd performance in crowdsourcing. We attempted to understand 
the mechanisms that cause the performance of a crowd to vary across different situations 
and to generate knowledge through which managers can use to increase crowd 
performance. To achieve this objective, we first took a structural thinking view and 
proposed a double-funnel model on crowd development based on four anecdotal crowd 
development examples. We argued that the elements of event setting (e.g., payment size, 
payment structure, and event length) created a virtue structure within which agents (e.g., 
solvers) interact through mechanisms such as competition and contagious imitation to 
influence the outcomes of a crowdsourcing events.  
Through this proposed double-funnel process framework, we not only acquired 
the basic knowledge about crowd development but also partitioned crowd development 
into two main stages: crowd emergence and crowd evaluation. This partition allowed us 
to develop two empirical tests to answer our grand research question. In this first test, we 
studied whether a competition mechanism or a contagious imitation mechanism can 
better explain the relationships between elements of event setting and crowd emergence. 
In the second test, we examined which a distant search mechanism or a competition 
mechanism can better describe the relationships between crowd attributes (e.g., crowd 
size and crowd diversity) and crowd performance. Through these two empirical analyses 
based on secondary data from a crowdsourcing platform, we found that none of the 
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proposed mechanisms could explain our proposed relationships. Instead, we had to 
combine pieces from two seemingly opposing mechanisms to fully understand the 
performance implications of crowd development. We thus concluded that this dissertation 
revealed two actual mechanisms, i.e., contagious competition (i.e., contatition) 
mechanism and competition-search mechanism through which crowd development 
influences crowd performance in crowdsourcing.  
Limitations  
 Just like any other studies, this dissertation has limitations. The first limitation 
comes from the singular secondary data source. In this dissertation, all our data came 
from one crowdsourcing platform (i.e., Topcoder). Our observations are limited to 
programing crowdsourcing events. This single data source might create limitations on the 
interpretation of our findings. However, we believe that the singular data source does not 
deter the generalizability of our findings. This is mainly because all the programming 
events are set up in a tournament-based format. Our findings are thus generalizable to all 
tournament-based crowdsourcing events. In this dissertation, we takes a meaningful first 
attempt by using the web crawling techniques to assemble secondary data from 
Topcoder. There are other crowdsourcing platforms available (e.g., InnoCentive, Kaggle, 
and Eyeka). There are also other forms of crowdsourcing formats (e.g., cooperation-
based crowdsourcing and coopetition-based crowdsourcing). Future research on crowd 
development can apply multiple data sources to examine crowd development under 
different situations. 
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 The second limitation of this dissertation is that we do not have qualitative 
performance outcomes when we operationalize crowd performance. We only included 
productivity and efficiency due to lack of availability of qualitative data. This is not 
necessary an inefficiency or drawback of our research design because research shows that 
managers have obvious selection biases when they evaluate the quality of solutions in 
crowdsourcing (Bockstedt et al., 2015; Boudreau, Guinan, et al., 2016; Piezunka & 
Dahlander, 2015). However, if we could incorporate quality into our analysis and 
compare the findings across productivity, efficiency, and quality, that would increase the 
granularity of our data analyses.  
 Third, our data analysis might suffer from potential threats from endogeneity. In 
our first empirical analysis, we used the Bass Model to operationalize the crowd growth 
rate. We run into a convergence issue when we applied regression techniques to identify 
the parameters of the Bass Model. This convergence issue caused a shrinkage on the 
sample size. Although an ANOVA analysis confirmed that this shrinkage did not cause 
obvious threats to our data analysis, we could not completely eliminate the sample 
selection biases associated with the measurement of crowd growth rate.  
In our second empirical study, we could not find any effective instrument variable 
in our data to address the potential threats of endogeneity for crowd efficiency. Besides, 
there was a small percentage of observations missing efficiency data due to unobservable 
submission (i.e., no submission before the deadline). We conducted extensive post hoc 
analysis to justify our findings and to make sure these potential threats did not bias our 
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findings. We were confident about our findings; however, we could not completely 
eliminate this potential influence of endogeneity in our data analysis.  
Future Research Ideas  
In order to reduce the limitation of data source on the interpretation of our 
empirical findings, we believe that it’s worthwhile to further validate our findings using 
archival data from other sources such as InnoCentive and Local Motors in the future. 
Besides the secondary data, we believe that we can consider other methods to further 
understand interactive crowd behavior and to avoid the potential sample selection biases 
and endogeneity issue. For instance, we can consider using behavioral experiment or 
agent-based simulation to understand how suppliers respond to the different events 
setting and interact with each other in the crowd development process. We can also use 
these interactive methodologies to understand the performance implication of event 
design, especially the influence on the qualitative crow-level performance. As suggested 
by our discussions on limitations, we need design or collect more exogenous variables 
that might be used as instrument variables to address the potential endogeneity of crowd-
level attributes when we study the performance implications of crowd attributes in the 
future. 
Our empirical findings in this dissertation suggest a few further research ideas. 
For instance, our data analysis discovered an unexpected U-shape relationship between 
crowd size and crowd efficiency. This finding suggests that the mechanism underlying 
this U-shape relationship remains unclear. We suggest to use qualitative case study or 
behavior experiment to further explore the underlying mechanisms. Our proposed 
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double-funnel crowd development suggests a mediation model in which crowd level 
attributes and crowd level state variables mediate the relationships between elements of 
event design and crowd performance. Revealing the significant mediation mechanism can 
generate many meaningful implications for managers.  
Through our informal qualitative conversations with executives and managers in 
our data collection process, we found that they were struggling with the growth of crowd 
member community. We believe that scholars can also extend this crowd development 
research stream by considering other potential research topics such as membership 
retention and “make vs. buy” crowd development. These topics are similar to the supply 
base management and product or service “make vs buy” in traditional sourcing literature. 
Because of the context difference, it is interesting to see whether the knowledge gained 
from sourcing literature holds in crowdsourcing situation.  
Publication Plan  
 We plan to publish three peer-reviewed papers out of this dissertation: one 
conceptual paper and two empirical papers. We will work on publishing the two 
empirical papers first and then the conceptual piece. The potential timeline for each paper 
is as follows: (1) submit the first empirical to JOM (Journal of Operations Management) 
by October 2017; (2) submit the second empirical to POM (Production and Operations 
Management) by December 2017; (3) submit the conceptual paper to JSCM (Journal of 
Supply Chain Management) by May 2018. 
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APPENDIX A 
SOLVERS’ TRACE EXTRACTION CODE 
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The following is the solvers’ trace extraction syntax coded in Python. This syntax 
is used to transfer solvers’ unique participation records (i.e., registration time) for a 
crowdsourcing event to a crowd emergence trajectory over the event cycle time.  
i = list(range(1,1831)) 
f = pd.DataFrame(index=i) 
print 'starting now' 
t=time.time() 
for fn in glob.glob('*.xlsx'): 
    if fn != '~$30047472.xlsx': 
        print fn 
             d = pd.read_excel(root_dir+fn) 
             d2 = d.ix[:,0:3] 
        reg = pd.DataFrame(d2.ix[:,2].dropna()) 
        reg = reg[1:] 
        #start = d2['Unnamed: 1'][0] 
        dates = list(reg['Unnamed: 2']) 
        dates.append(d2['Unnamed: 1'][0]) 
        # Create a df, rename column, and sort by date. Convert to datetime format 
        a = pd.DataFrame(dates) 
        a.columns = ['timestamp'] 
        a = a.sort_values('timestamp') 
        a['datetime'] = pd.to_datetime(a['timestamp']) 
        # Calculate the time between each row and the row before it. Convert to 
        # hours and get rid of the start date, keeping only registration dates. 
        a['time_bw'] = a['datetime'] - a['datetime'].shift(1) 
        a['time_bw2'] = (a['time_bw']/np.timedelta64(1,'D'))*24 
        a = a[1:] 
        # Calculate the cumulative sum of the time difference. Round up. 
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        a['cumul_time'] = a['time_bw2'].cumsum() 
        a['cumul_time2'] = np.ceil(a['cumul_time']) 
        # Create a count by rounded up cumulative sum 
        a2 = pd.DataFrame(a.groupby(['cumul_time2']).size()) 
        # Naming the column the event number 
        a2.columns = [fn.split('.')[0]] 
        # Add to the dataframe 
        f = f.join(a2) 
f2 = f.fillna(0) 
f2.to_csv(root_dir+'design_events0301.csv',sep=',') 
print 'finished importing files' 
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APPENDIX B 
BASS DIFFUSION MODEL IN R 
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The following is the linear regression of Bass Diffusion syntax coded in R. This 
syntax is used to generate the three coefficients of the Bass Diffusion Model (i.e., 
𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑚). The input for this regression analysis is the output of the APPENDIX A.  
#plot cumulative number of participants 
Y=cumsum(data) 
plot(Y,type="l", lty=2,col="red", ylab="", xlab="") 
points(Y,pch=20,col="blue") 
title("Cumulative participants over time") 
#title("Cumulative participants over time(ID30051064)") 
 
#fit bass regression and compute m, p,q 
Y_lag=c(0,Y[1:(length(Y)-1)])  # we want Y_t-1 not Y_t. Y_0=0 
Ysq=Y_lag**2 
out=lm(data~Y_lag+Ysq) 
summary(out) 
a=out$coef[1] 
b=out$coef[2] 
c=out$coef[3] 
mminus=(-b-sqrt(b**2-4*a*c))/(2*c) 
m=mminus 
mplus=(-b+sqrt(b**2-4*a*c))/(2*c) 
p=a/m 
q=b+p 
 
#create a bass diffusion by using m,p,and q. 
bassModel=function(p,q,m,T=300) 
{ 
  S=double(T) 
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  Y=double(T+1) 
  Y[1]=0 
  for(t in 1:T) 
  { 
    S[t]=p*m+(q-p)*Y[t]-(q/m)*Y[t]**2 
    Y[t+1]=Y[t]+S[t] 
  } 
  return(list(data=S,cumdata=cumsum(S))) 
} 
#compute 
Spred=bassModel(p,q,m,T=300)$data 
ts.plot(data,Spred,col=c("blue","red")) 
legend("topleft",legend=c("actual","Bass Model"),fill=c("blue","red")) 
 
#now do this for cumulateive participants 
Spred=bassModel(p,q,m)$data 
CumSpred=ts(cumsum(Spred)) 
CumData=ts(cumsum(data)) 
ts.plot(CumData,CumSpred,col=c("blue","red")) 
legend("topleft",legend=c("actual","Bass Model"),fill=c("blue","red")) 
title("Predicted Cumulative participants") 
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APPENDIX C 
TEXT EXTRACTION PYTHON CODE 
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The following syntax is designed to extract the textual information on the 
description of each programming contest from the saved excel files. It is coded in Python. 
The extracted textual information is saved in separate txt files for subsequent text 
analysis in APPENDIX D in the following page.  
for xlsx in xlsxlist: 
 workbook = xlrd.open_workbook(xlsx) 
 sheet = workbook.sheet_by_index(0) 
 pos = 5 
 if sheet.cell_value(pos,0) == 'Detail': 
  # print sheet.cell_value(pos+1,0) 
  with open(xlsx.split('.')[0]+'.txt','w') as f: 
   f.write(sheet.cell_value(pos+1,0)) 
  content += '\n\n' 
  content += xlsx  
  content += '\n' 
  content += sheet.cell_value(pos+1,0) 
 else: 
  pos += 1 
  # print sheet.cell_value(pos+1,0) 
  with open(xlsx.split('.')[0]+'.txt','w') as f: 
   f.write(sheet.cell_value(pos+1,0)) 
  content += '\n\n' 
  content += xlsx 
  content += '\n' 
  content += sheet.cell_value(pos+1,0) 
with open('final.txt','w') as f: 
 f.write(content)  
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LINGUA::EN::FATHOM TEXT ANALYSIS CODE IN PERL 
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The following is the Lingua::EN::Fathom Text Analysis syntax6, which is 
designed to analyze text complexity by calculating the length of a document and 
generating the FOG readability index. This syntax is coded and run in Perl which is a 
general-purpose programming language originally developed for text analysis and now 
used for a wide range of tasks including web development (Schwartz & Phoenix, 2001). 
use Lingua::EN::Fathom; 
my $text = Lingua::EN::Fathom->new(); 
$text->analyse_file("300496369.txt"); 
$accumulate = 1; 
$text->analyse_block($text_string,$accumulate); 
 
$num_chars             = $text->num_chars; 
$num_words             = $text->num_words; 
$percent_complex_words = $text->percent_complex_words; 
$num_sentences         = $text->num_sentences; 
$num_text_lines        = $text->num_text_lines; 
$num_blank_lines       = $text->num_blank_lines; 
$num_paragraphs        = $text->num_paragraphs; 
$syllables_per_word    = $text->syllables_per_word; 
$words_per_sentence    = $text->words_per_sentence; 
%words = $text->unique_words; 
foreach $word ( sort keys %words ) 
    { 
      print("$words{$word} :$word\n"); 
    } 
$fog     = $text->fog; 
                                                          
6 http://search.cpan.org/dist/Lingua-EN-Fathom/lib/Lingua/EN/Fathom.pm 
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$flesch  = $text->flesch; 
$kincaid = $text->kincaid; 
print($text->report); 
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The following syntax is designed to extract solvers’ background statistics (e.g., 
country origin, membership registration time, winning records, and participation records). 
This syntax is coded in Python. This program loops through all the excel files that save 
solvers’ information and prints out a grand excel file that includes all solvers’ 
background statistics in one excel file for further data analysis.  
for xlsx in xlsxlist: 
    try: 
            missiontime = {} 
            regtime = {} 
            workbook = xlrd.open_workbook(xlsx) 
            sheet0 = workbook.sheet_by_index(0) 
            sheet1 = workbook.sheet_by_index(1) 
            if sheet0.cell_value(1,0).strip() == "Start Date": 
             startdate = sheet0.cell_value(1,1) 
            for i in range(5): 
                if sheet0.cell_value(6+i,1) == "Username": 
              i = i+1 
              break 
            for line in range(6+i,sheet0.nrows): 
            missiontime[sheet0.cell_value(line,1)] = sheet0.cell_value(line,2) 
            for pos in range(1,sheet1.nrows): 
              if not sheet1.cell_value(pos, 0): 
                     pos += 1 
                     continue 
              else: 
                     eid = xlsx.split('.')[0] 
                     pid = sheet1.cell_value(pos, 0) 
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                     country = sheet1.cell_value(pos, 1) 
                     since = sheet1.cell_value(pos, 2) 
                     win = sheet1.cell_value(pos, 3)                 
                 skills = sheet1.cell_value(pos, 4)                
     contentstr = [comma(i) for i in 
[eid,pid,startdate,missiontime.get(pid),country,since,win, skills]] 
                     cf.write(','.join(contentstr)+'\n') 
     except: 
          print xlsx 
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APPENDIX F 
EVENT SUMMARY EXTRACTION CODES 
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The following syntax is designed to extract information at event level (e.g., event 
ID, total number of participants, total number of submission, and payment size). This 
syntax is coded in Python. This program loops through all the excel files that save event 
level  information and prints out a grand excel file that includes all event-related statistics 
in one excel file for further data analysis.  
import xlrd 
import os 
xlsxlist = [i for i in os.listdir('./') if i.split('.')[1] == 'xlsx'] 
cf = open('summary.csv','w') 
cf.write('"Event ID","Start Date","Checkpoint","End Date","Total number of 
Registor","Total number of submission","Payment size","number of 
payments","Checkpoints(yes,no)"\n') 
for xlsx in xlsxlist: 
    workbook = xlrd.open_workbook(xlsx) 
    sheet0 = workbook.sheet_by_index(0) 
    eid = xlsx.split('.')[0] 
    if sheet0.cell_value(1,0).strip() == "Start Date": 
        startdate = sheet0.cell_value(1,1) 
    else: 
        startdate = "" 
    if sheet0.cell_value(2,0).strip() == "End Date": 
        enddate = sheet0.cell_value(2,1) 
        checkpoint = 0 
    else: 
        if sheet0.cell_value(2,0).strip() == "Checkpoint": 
            checkpoint = sheet0.cell_value(2,1) 
        enddate = sheet0.cell_value(3,1) 
    for detailpos in range(8): 
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        if sheet0.cell_value(detailpos,0).strip() == 'Detail': 
            break  
    if sheet0.cell_value(detailpos+1,1).strip() == "Username": 
        TotalReg = 0 
        while 1: 
            try: 
                if sheet0.cell_value(detailpos+1+TotalReg,2): 
                    TotalReg += 1 
                else: 
                    break 
            except: 
                break 
    if sheet0.cell_value(detailpos+1,5).strip() == "submissionId": 
        TotalSub = 0 
        while 1: 
            try: 
                if sheet0.cell_value(detailpos+1+TotalSub,5): 
                    TotalSub += 1 
                else: 
                    break 
            except: 
                break 
    if sheet0.cell_value(detailpos+1,10).strip() == 'prize': 
        TotalPay = 0 
        npay = 1 
        while 1: 
            try: 
                if sheet0.cell_value(detailpos+1+npay,10): 
                    TotalPay += int(sheet0.cell_value(detailpos+1+npay,10)) 
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                    npay += 1 
                else: 
                    break 
            except: 
                break 
        npay -= 1 
    else: 
        print(sheet0.cell_value(detailpos+1,10).strip()) 
    if checkpoint: 
        checkstr = 'yes' 
    else: 
        checkstr = 'no' 
    csvline = [comma(i) for i in 
[eid,startdate,checkpoint,enddate,TotalReg,TotalSub,TotalPay,npay,checkstr]] 
    csvline = ','.join(csvline)+'\n' 
    cf.write(csvline) 
 
 
